

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
 GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
 DATE: **09-FEB-2008** TIME: **1515** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Union Oil Company of California**
 REPRESENTATIVE: **Matthews, Justin**
 TELEPHONE: **(337) 989-3435**

CONTRACTOR:
 REPRESENTATIVE:
 TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
 ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **00827**
 AREA: **SS** LATITUDE:
 BLOCK: **209** LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: **A-CMP**
 RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
 (DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

- HISTORIC INJURY
- REQUIRED EVACUATION
- LTA (1-3 days)
- LTA (>3 days)
- RW/JT (1-3 days)
- RW/JT (>3 days)
- Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. WATER DEPTH: **95** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **34** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: **N**
 SPEED: **5** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: **S**
 SPEED: **2** M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: **2** FT.

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

A fire occurred when a resistive thermal detector vibrated loose from the 3/4 inch thread-o-let and released gas into the compressor enclosure. The detector was installed on the two inch discharge piping from the compressor to the fuel gas scrubber. An undetermined ignition source caused a fire to erupt. Pressure on the piping at the time was approximately 1100 psi. The gas detection system shut down Compressors 802 and 803 and operators initiated the platform ESD. The fire was extinguished with the fire water monitors and fire hoses.

The detectors were new installations and had not yet been terminated electrically. Chevron's investigation noted that the thermo weld had only 1/4 inch of threads screwed into the thread-o-let. All of the other detectors were inspected and a second device was found to be improperly installed as well.

MMS conducted an onsite investigation on March 28, 2008 and issued an Incident of Noncompliance.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The resistive thermal detector thermo-weld was not installed properly. Visual observation of the detector indicated that approximately 1/4 inch of threads were screwed into the thread-o-let.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The two-inch third stage high pressure discharge piping was not adequately supported causing additional vibration. Chevron's investigation team was able to shake the piping easily by hand.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/a

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Compressor, compressor cooler, and compressor enclosure, electrical and instrumentation components and control panels.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

The compressor enclosure, electrical and instrumentation components, and control panels were burned.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$900,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

Due to the specific nature of this incident, the Houma District has no recommendations to report to the Regional Office.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

A G-110 Incident of Noncompliance (INC) was issued for this accident. The INC states the following: A compressor fire occurred on Feb. 9, 2008 at the above mentioned facility and all the necessary precautions were not taken to prevent it from happening. The Resistive Thermal Detector thermo-weld was not installed properly. Natural gas escaped from the open thread-o-let in the 2 inch discharge piping of the compressor to the platform fuel scrubber and ignited causing substantial damages.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28-MAR-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Bryan Domangue / Freddie L. Mosely
/ Amy Wilson /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan A. Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: 17-APR-2008

FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: **Unknown**

2. TYPE OF FUEL: GAS
 OIL
 DIESEL
 CONDENSATE
 HYDRAULIC
 OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: **Rosemont transmitter on 2" discharge piping of compressor**

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE
KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? **NO**

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED: HANDHELD
 WHEELED UNIT
 FIXED CHEMICAL
 FIXED WATER
 NONE
 OTHER