ASSESSMENT OF FIXED OFFSHORE PLATFORM PERFORMANCE IN HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

FINAL REPORT
May 2007

Prepared for:
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Engineering and Research Branch
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MMS Project No.: 578
Energo Engineering Project No.: E06117

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29 May 2007

Lori Medley
U.S. Department of the Interior
Mineral Management Service
Engineering and Research Branch
381 Elden Street, MS 4021
Herndon, VA 20170

Subject: ***MMS Project #578 – Final Report***

Dear Lori:

Please find enclosed the final report of the Assessment of Fixed Offshore Platform Performance in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The final report addresses your comments on drafts 1 and 2 as well as updates made by Energo during our review.

In closing we appreciate your help and input throughout the project and look forward to working with you in the future. Please don't hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,
Energo Engineering, Inc.

Frank Puskar, P.E.
President

Sean Verret
Principal Engineer

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ABBREVIATIONS

API	American Petroleum Institute
Bul	API abbreviation for Bulletin
CBD	Consequence Based Design
FORM	First Order Reliability Method
HEAT	API Hurricane Assessment and Evaluation Team
MMS	Minerals Management Service
NTL	Notice To Lessees
OOC	Offshore Operators Committee
OSTS	Office of Structural and Technical Support
RP	API abbreviation for Recommended Practice
RP2A	API Recommended Practice 2A for Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms, 21st Edition
Section 17	Section within RP 2A 21st Edition that covers the assessment of existing platforms
WID	Wave In Deck

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Saffir-Simpson Intensity Scale (SSI) – 1-5 category rating based on a hurricane's sustained wind intensity and it's potential for damage to shore side infrastructure.

Forristall Distribution – A probabilistic distribution used to describe the maximum wave height during a storm

Bayesian Updating – A method used to update probabilistic distributions based on actual findings of samples

Bias Factor – A factor used to describe the ratio of actual capacity to calculated capacity

CONVERSIONS

1 foot (ft) = 0.305 meters (m)
1 mile (mi) = 1.609 kilometers (km)
1 knot (kn) = 0.514 meters/second (m/s)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita passed through over approximately 3,000 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) during the fall of 2005. While most of these platforms performed adequately, numerous platforms were destroyed or had major damage. There was no life loss and no significant pollution, which is a tribute to the Minerals Management Service (MMS) oversight of offshore operations and American Petroleum Institute (API) design codes, specifically API RP2A (RP2A) for the structural design of fixed offshore platforms.

This study presents a comprehensive study of the performance of fixed steel jacket platforms in Katrina and Rita. Much of the work is based upon data collected from the MMS, API HEAT (Hurricane Evaluation and Assessment Team) and specific operators on how their platforms performed (survived, damaged or destroyed), the specific destruction and damage observed, and how this compared to analytical results based upon structural analysis where available.

The study also used results from metocean studies to compare the estimated wave height and wave crest conditions at some of the platform locations to what was observed at the platform. For example, if the metocean work estimated that the waves were large enough to impact the platform deck, was this indeed observed in terms of damage to the deck structure or topsides equipment? Waves impacting platform decks has been and is a major concern for GOM platforms and extra effort was applied to better understand this issue.

Particular focus was also applied to how and why such a large number of platforms were destroyed and were damaged. Explanation as to what went right and what went wrong with some of the platforms is explored. The study also ties-in findings of the API HEAT work and to RP2A design practices.

Once again, the overall findings indicate that there was *no life-loss or major environmental problems* as a direct result of the hurricanes. This is attributable to the prior evacuation of the platforms and to the use of sub-surface safely valves and shut-in of wells prior to the hurricane arrival. This evacuation and shut-in approach worked well in these hurricanes as it did in prior hurricanes such as Ivan, Lili, and Andrew.

Other findings were similar to those from other studies of fixed platform performance in hurricanes. For example, that fact that most of the destroyed platforms were older vintage structures of 1960s or 1970s design when there was little or no industry guidance on how to properly design a platform. Other findings were new to Katrina and Rita such as the destruction of newer generation platforms installed in the year 2000 or later. Further study determined that these failed platforms were medium and low consequence (of failure) platforms designed to lower environmental criteria.

In addition to the above, other key results and recommendations are summarized below.

1. Performance of A-2 manned-evacuated platforms.
Result - All of the A-2 manned-evacuated platforms that were destroyed experienced metocean conditions equal to but mainly larger than the Section 17 A-2 Ultimate Strength Criteria. This confirms that these structures should be able to withstand the API defined Sudden Hurricane conditions in the event that a Sudden Hurricane occurs in the GOM, ensuring life safety since these platforms may be manned at that time.
Recommendation – API is still investigating the Sudden Hurricane conditions and if they have changed then the findings of this report need to be reconfirmed. Initial indications are that the Sudden Hurricane conditions are the same as before Katrina and Rita.

2. Performance of L-1 platforms
Result - There were no L-1 platforms that were destroyed or damaged in Katrina or Rita. L-1 represents the High Consequence API exposure category for fixed platforms and also the latest API approach for metocean loading including design to 100 yr conditions. Katrina and Rita essentially "proof loaded" several of these platform to loads at or above the L-1 criteria and the platforms survived with no major damage. This validates the L-1 design approach.
Recommendation – No specific recommendation.

3. Performance of L-2 and L-3 Platforms
Result – There were nine (9) medium consequence L-2 and low consequence L-3 platforms destroyed that were installed since the year 2000. Several of these were installed in 2004. These failures are not a surprise since these platforms use lower design criteria than an L-1 platform. L-2 platforms are designed to 50 yr conditions and L-3 platforms are designed to 15 yr conditions. The lower design criteria allows these platforms to be installed at a lower cost than L-1 platforms as dictated by economics for marginal production.
Recommendation: Owners need to be better educated that platforms designed to L-2 and L-3 are lower cost, but are designed to lower criteria and are susceptible to damage and destruction in large storms. One possible method to assist with this is better descriptions and limitations of categorizing L-2 and L-3 platforms, for example limits on production rates, water depth, etc.

4. Performance of A-2 platforms.
Result: There were more A-2 platforms damaged and destroyed than any other assessment category. Many owners assess their platform to A-2 and assume that it will be safe from hurricane damage, but this is not the case. In particular, the minimum A-2 deck elevation curve is used to determine if the platform is adequate. As noted in Item 5 below, the A-1 criteria should alternatively be considered for platforms that are determined to be of economic value to an owner.
Recommendation: Similar to L-2 and L-3 platforms, platform owners need to be better educated that a platform that passes A-2 assessment may still be damaged or destroyed in a large storm. The A-1 criteria is a better assessment target for platforms critical to the owners operation (even if the platform can be categorized as A-2).

5. Performance of A-1 platforms.
Result: There were 6 destroyed A-1 platforms of the 116 destroyed fixed platforms in Katrina and Rita. This is a relatively low percentage and confirms that the A-1 criterion is a reasonable assessment threshold.
Recommendation: Platforms that can pass the Section 17 A-1 check have a higher likelihood of survival in large storms. Platform owners should be educated that this is a preferred criteria for platforms critical to their operations.

6. Wave in Deck (WID) platform damage.
Result: There was significant destruction and damage to platforms and topsides equipment in these hurricanes due to WID. This resulted in significant costs and downtime to make repairs or find alternate means of production.
Recommendation: Platform owners should be educated on the destruction or damage and associated potential downtime that can occur for platforms that have low decks or when critical production or other equipment and systems are located on lower decks that can be impacted by waves. Consideration should be given to relocate such equipment to higher decks.

7. API Bias Factor.
Result: The API Bias factor that describes the accuracy of API RP2A in terms of being able to predict platform performance was determined to be 1.06 for Katrina and Rita and 1.09 for a combination of all recent hurricanes. In simple terms, this implies that the API platform design approach has a conservatism of about 6 to 9 percent, above and beyond all known conservatisms related to factors of safety, etc. This is about the same value as determined for other hurricanes and has not changed with the addition of Katrina and Rita results.
Recommendation: The detailed probabilistic assessment that has been used since hurricane Andrew continues to show that RP2A does a good job and is adequate for design of fixed platforms. This quantitative approach to assess the accuracy of RP2A should be continued for future large hurricanes.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita directly impacted over 3,000 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) during the fall of 2005. While most structures performed adequately, many were destroyed or had major above and / or below water damage. There was no life loss and no significant pollution, which is a tribute to the Minerals Management Service (MMS) oversight of offshore operations and American Petroleum Institute (API) design codes, specifically API RP2A (RP2A) for the structural design of fixed offshore platforms. RP2A has evolved considerably over the past 38 years since its first edition in October 1969. Some of this success is attributable to changes in engineering practice and the results of experimental studies. Some is attributable to the experiences and lessons learned in large storms and hurricanes such as these and changes incorporated into the codes and standards.

1.2 Objectives and Approach

Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest number of destroyed and damaged platforms in the history of GOM operations. This study presents a comprehensive study of the performance of fixed platforms in Katrina and Rita. Much of the work is based upon data collected from the MMS and specific operators on how their platforms performed (survived, damaged or destroyed), the specific destruction and damage observed, and how this compared to analytical results based upon structural analysis where available.

The study also used results from state-of-the-art metocean studies to compare the estimated wave height and wave crest conditions at some of the platform locations to what was observed at the platform. For example, if the metocean work estimated that the waves were large enough to impact the platform deck, was this indeed observed in terms of damage to the deck structure or topsides equipment? Waves impacting platform decks has been and is a major concern for GOM platforms and extra effort was applied to better understand this issue.

Particular focus was also applied to how and why such a large number of platforms were either damaged or destroyed. Explanation as to what went right and what went wrong with some of the platforms is explored. The study also ties-in findings of the API Hurricane Evaluation and Assessment Team (HEAT) work and to API RP2A design practices.

Recommendations are made related to specific items that the MMS and the offshore industry may consider in terms of advanced preparation and response to future hurricanes.

1.3 Project Team

The project was performed and managed by Energo Engineering of Houston, Texas. Mr. Frank Puskar was the Principal Investigator. Mr. Puskar was also the Principal Investigator for the similar Andrew, Lili and Ivan studies. Mr. Sean Verret of Energo led the Qualitative Assessment. Dr. Albert Ku of Energo led the Quantitative Assessment. Other Energo staff assisted on the project as necessary.

The University of Texas (UT) at Austin also worked on the project via Dr. Robert Gilbert, assisted by Mr. Young Jae Choi. Dr. Gilbert is well known in the offshore community for his work in reliability, specifically foundations. Dr. Gilbert and Mr. Choi provide analysis and input of the performance of pile foundations, as contained in Appendix C. In particular, the fact that there were few if any foundation failures, yet computer models predict that they should have occurred.

Participating from the MMS were Ms. Lori Medley (COTR), Ms. Fung Chan Hassenboehler and Mr. Jason Mathews.

The project was conducted from May 2006 to May 2007.

2.0 HURRICANE CHARACTERISTICS

The objective of this qualitative assessment is to archive fixed platform damage caused by Katrina and Rita in order to form a permanent record for MMS and industry archives. The information is used to investigate trends and gain better understanding of the performance of the fleet of platforms in the path of the hurricanes.

2.1 Path of Hurricanes

Figure 2.1 shows the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of the offshore platform infrastructure. Each platform is represented by a dot. The paths of the eye of Katina, Rita and Ivan are included for comparison purposes. This figure is referred to throughout this section. Details of the performance of offshore fixed platforms in Ivan are contained in a separate report [Energo, 2006].

The figure also shows the four GOM metocean regions that are the basis of the new metocean conditions in the Gulf according to API Bulletin 2INT-MET [API, 2007]. These new metocean conditions are a result of updated study of extreme GOM conditions. Generally, the design conditions have increased in the Central Region and have remained about the same in the other regions. See API Bulletin 2INT-MET for details.

2.2 Hurricane Katrina Storm Characteristics

Hurricane Katrina started as a tropical depression over the southeastern Bahamas on August 23, 2005. It was upgraded to tropical storm status on the morning of August 24th. Just two hours before it reached Florida, Katrina attained Hurricane status and crossed southern Florida as a moderate Category 1 hurricane. As it crossed over Florida, Katrina weakened to tropical storm status. However, upon entering the GOM early on August 26th, it regained hurricane status. By the morning of the 27th it had reached Category 3 intensity. It was now the third major hurricane of the 2005 season.

Katrina strengthened rapidly moving from Category 3 to Category 5 status in a mere 12 hours. It attained Category 5 status by 12:00 p.m. on August 28th with wind speeds of 165 mph. It reached its peak intensity of 172 mph winds and a minimum central pressure of 902 mbar on the 28th at 6:00 p.m. that evening. The pressure measurement made Katrina the 4th most intense Atlantic hurricane at that time, only to be surpassed by hurricanes Rita and Wilma later in 2005.

Katrina was a large hurricane with tropical storm force winds extending 230 miles and hurricane winds extending up to 100 miles from the eye center. Katrina's eye was approximately 35 miles wide. Later, perhaps in the evening on the 28th Katrina started weakening. By the time it made landfall by noon on the 29th, Katrina was at the upper end of a Category 3 intensity hurricane.



Figure 2.1 Path of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the Gulf of Mexico Offshore Infrastructure.
The dots indicate specific platforms. The West, West Central, Central and East Regions are per API Bulletin 2INT-MET. All platforms located east of the NTL had to be inspected following the hurricanes per MMS NTL 2005-G20 and NTL 2005-G20 Addendum 1. Also shown for reference is the path of hurricane Ivan.

It was during the morning of the 29th that Katrina passed through a large number of oil and gas facilities in the GOM. Oil and gas facilities on either side of the hurricane eye path were damaged or destroyed. Katrina's track followed a North-Northwestern direction in the deepwater regions of the Gulf of Mexico when it passed through the Lund and Atwater Valley regions and into the Mississippi Canyon area. Halfway through the Mississippi Canyon area Katrina shifted course and headed directly North into the West Delta region. The worst damage to offshore infrastructure due to Katrina occurred in the South Pass, Grand Isle and West Delta regions. Katrina finally made landfall at 11:10 a.m. on the morning of the 29th as a Category 3 hurricane at Buras, Louisiana.

2.3 Hurricane Rita Storm Characteristics

Hurricane Rita formed as a tropical depression in the early hours on 18th September 2005 approximately 80 miles east of Grand Turk in the Turks and Caicos Islands. It attained tropical storm status by 6:00 p.m. the same day near the southeastern Bahamas. By the evening of September 19th Rita had recorded wind speeds of about 70 mph and was centered in the region near the island of Great Exuma, just south of Nassau. Rita continued to take a North-Western path towards the Florida straits, and on the morning of September 20th it was still a tropical storm.

Once in the straits, Rita began to strengthen and attained hurricane status with wind speeds of 80 mph by noon on September 20th approximately 120 miles south-southeast of Key west, Florida. In just a few hours Rita moved up to a Category 2 intensity with wind speeds of about 95 mph. Over the next 24 hours, Rita intensified from a Category 2 to a Category 5 status by the evening of September 21st. It then remained at Category 5 status for 18 hours, reaching a peak estimated intensity of around 178 mph early on September 22nd. Over the next few hours Rita entered the deepwater regions of the Gulf of Mexico.

By 6:00 p.m. on September 22nd Rita had weakened to a Category 4 hurricane with wind speeds of 145 mph. Rita followed a Northwestern course passing through the Walker Ridge, Green Canyon and Garden Banks areas. Over the next 24 hours Rita weakened to a Category 3 hurricane with wind speeds of 125 mph. By this time Rita was in the shallower shelf waters. Once in the shelf Rita maintained its course passing through the Vermillion, East Cameron and finally the West Cameron areas. Rita destroyed and damaged numerous oil and gas facilities along its path, in both the deep water regions as well as on the shelf. Rita caused the most damage and destruction to facilities located in the Vermillion, East Cameron and West Cameron areas. It then maintained Category 3 status until it made landfall on the morning of September 24th near the Texas-Louisiana border.

3.0 DATA SOURCES

There were three key sources of data used for the project. The first was the MMS, which supplied a majority of the data used for this study. The MMS also supplied metocean data for Katrina and Rita based upon a hindcast performed by Oceanweather. The second was API HEAT which supplied data via contacts made with specific operators for information about their platform fleets. API HEAT also provided metocean data adjusted by Forristall [Forristall, 2007] for several specific platform locations of interest. The third was through direct contact by Energo of some of the platform owners for specific information. All of this data was held confidential by Energo and the results put into a generic format as reported throughout this document.

3.1 MMS Data

Shortly following Hurricane Rita, the MMS issued a "NTL" or Notice to Lessees [MMS, 2005] that required API RP2A Level I above water and Level II underwater inspections respectively [API, 2005] of all platforms to the east of approximately the Texas – Louisiana border. The NTL line is shown in Figure 2.1. This area encompassed approximately 3,000 of the Gulf's 4,000 offshore platforms, including all platforms in offshore Louisiana (not including platforms in state waters). API Level I inspection consists of a topsides visual inspection for major structural damage possibly indicating wave in deck loading (i.e. bent deck beams). The API Level II inspection consists primarily of a visual swim-by of the platform by diver or ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) looking for underwater damage. If any underwater damage was located, or if there were indications of wave loading on the topsides, then additional API Level III "Close Visual Inspections" were required. Platform owners then reported the progress or results of the inspections to the MMS on a monthly basis.

In order to manage the results of this data, the MMS established an internal database that summarized the results of the post-hurricane inspection data. In order to further organize the data, and with the objective of further understanding of how and why the damage (or lack of damage) occurred, the post-hurricane inspection data was combined with the known platform configuration data also available in the MMS files, such as water depth, year installed, number of legs, cellar deck elevation, etc. This data had previously been collected from most Gulf of Mexico platform owners via an NTL in 2003 [MMS, 2003] associated with assessment of platforms according to RP2A Section 17 (Section 17).

The combination of the post-hurricane inspection data and the platform configuration data provided a powerful set of information to understand how platforms performed in the hurricanes. In addition to the general trends, an in-depth evaluation was made of the submitted inspection reports and in some cases associated detailed structural engineering reports. These included the typical types of damage found and possible causes. The data was further organized and several general trends were developed as discussed later. This data by far was the most extensive of all data collected, and was obtained primarily from the MMS Office of Structural & Technical Support (OSTS) located in New Orleans.

3.2 API HEAT Data

API HEAT developed and transmitted via the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC) to most GOM operators a letter dated September 15, 2006 [API HEAT, 2006] requesting that operators provide data in the form of specific formatted tables, or provide data in general. This data was used for other studies performed by API HEAT and reported elsewhere. The data was also used for this study where applicable. In exchange for this information, Energo provided to HEAT a sanitized form of the MMS data described in Section 3.1. The data provided to HEAT was desensitized by removing the specific platform owner, platform name and other identifying criteria, since this information was not necessary for the engineering related studies performed by HEAT.

3.3 Energo Gathered Data

Some of the data was supplied via operators directly to Energo via summary tables, inspection reports, engineering reports, and interviews with Energo staff. In several cases, this was to obtain clarification of data obtained via the MMS or HEAT. This data was also appropriately sanitized.

4.0 DESTROYED PLATFORMS

This section describes the destroyed fixed platforms including their characteristics and general trends. The platforms with major damage that were not destroyed are discussed separately in Section 5.

4.1 Number of Platforms Destroyed

Appendix A contains a list of all of the destroyed platforms including specific details such as year installed, water depth, deck elevation, etc. The platform name, owner name and location are also shown in Appendix A since this information had already been made public by the MMS [MMS, 2006]. There are a total of 116 destroyed fixed platforms from Katrina and Rita and one floating platform. Since this study is for fixed platform performance, the one floating platform that was destroyed will not be discussed but is included in Table A.1 in Appendix A. This brings the total number of destroyed fixed platforms to 116.

Most of these 116 platforms were immediately evident as destroyed platforms following the hurricanes. They were either completely toppled to the seafloor with no structure visible above the waterline, or were so severely damaged that it was obvious the structure was destroyed by the hurricanes and could no longer carry out its purpose and had to be removed. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show a side-scan sonar image and underwater photo, respectively, of two different toppled platforms that are lying on the seafloor. In most of these cases for toppled platforms there is no visible structure remaining above the waterline. In other cases there may be some small area of debris protruding from the sea surface. In all cases, whether completely toppled or debris protruding through the water surface, these platforms can be a hazard to navigation and need to be immediately identified to authorities as navigation hazards. Following the storms, the MMS issued a list of locations of the destroyed platforms for use by mariners where there may be debris and a hazard to navigation [MMS, 2005]. Even with this information, there were several collision incidents [Collision Incidents, 2006]. Such debris should be marked as soon as possible by the owner in accordance with US Coast Guard Regulations.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show examples of heavily damaged platforms that were still standing above the waterline, but were considered destroyed. In both examples the entire structure above the waterline has been destroyed. This type of damage is often associated with wave loading on the deck as discussed in later sections. In several cases, the platform survived Katrina but was destroyed by Rita. In other cases, the platform was damaged by Katrina and then fully destroyed by Rita. Since the storms occurred so close together, some of the platforms had been inspected post-Katrina, and damage located, but there was no time to repair the platform prior to Rita. The specific number of platforms damaged in one hurricane and then destroyed in the other is not available since there was insufficient time to obtain such information. However, the number is believed to be in the range of 15 to 30 platforms.



Figure 4.1 Sonar Image of a Toppled Platform in the West Delta Area



Figure 4.2 Underwater Photo of a Toppled Platform in the Eugene Island Area

Figure 4.3 Destroyed Platform in the East Cameron Area

Figure 4.4 Destroyed Platform in the South Timbalier Region

It is difficult to arrive at a specific number of destroyed platforms as a result of these hurricanes. This is because in some cases, a platform may have been damaged and the owner requires additional time to determine if it is economic to replace the platform. In other cases, the damage may not have been found in the initial inspection, and when located, the owner may elect to remove the platform at a later date. In other words, the platform may never restart production or its other operations after the hurricanes. In a certain sense, these platforms can also be termed destroyed by the hurricanes. Therefore, it was decided to freeze the number of destroyed platforms based upon the official list of destroyed platforms published by the MMS in May 2006. This list contained a total of 112 destroyed fixed platforms and one floating platform not included in this study. Energo then worked with the MMS and an additional 4 fixed platforms were identified as destroyed at that time. This brings the total to 116 destroyed fixed platforms.

At this time, approximately 18 months after the hurricanes, there are an additional 150 to 200 platforms that owners have indicated they will remove or have removed as a result of Katrina and Rita. However, again, it is difficult and not accurate to put all of these into the destroyed category. Some were indeed damaged such that repair is uneconomical and these could be included in the destroyed list. Others are being removed not because they were in any way damaged, but because the pipeline or platform that was part of their operational scheme is no longer in service as a result of the hurricanes, so they are also being taken out of service. While still others were not damaged by the hurricanes, but were near the very end of their operational life, and the owner has elected to remove the platform instead of spending funds to restart the platform.

4.2 Destroyed Platforms by Location

Figure 4.5 shows the location of the destroyed platforms compared to the paths of the hurricanes. Also shown is the relative size of the hurricanes at selected locations based upon the Saffir-Simpson Intensity (SSI) Scale of Hurricane Category.

For Rita, a majority of the destroyed platforms were located to the east of the eye path, as expected since this has the highest winds and waves. The area to the east of the Rita path is also is the area of highest concentration of platforms exposed to extreme hurricane conditions.

For Katrina, a majority of the platforms are interestingly to the west of the eye path, although there is a patch of five destroyed platforms in the Main Pass region to the east of the eye path, near one of the Mississippi river deltas (Main Pass). This may be because in prior years, hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Andrew (1992) went through this region either destroying or severely damaged numerous platforms. These storms claimed the weaker structures leaving the stronger platforms for Katrina.

In general, there seems to be no clear correlation of the eye path and distance to the destroyed platform or location, although API HEAT is studying this condition further and may produce results at a later date. If all platforms were of equal strength, then this indeed may be the case since metocean conditions are greatest near the eye path. However, the destruction is primarily based upon the platform strength, which varies by location.



Figure 4.5 Location of Destroyed Platforms Compared to Path of Hurricanes.
The dots indicate destroyed platforms. The SSI Category of the hurricanes at selected locations is also shown.

4.3 Destroyed Platforms by Vintage

Figure 4.6 shows the number of platforms destroyed according to vintage sorted by decade the platform was installed. Platforms were first installed in the GOM in the mid 1940s so this graphic covers the entire generation of GOM platforms. The largest concentration of destroyed and damaged platforms were installed in the 1960's and 1970's. This matches well with previous findings of destroyed and damaged platforms from previous Gulf of Mexico hurricanes [Puskar, et.al 1994; Puskar, et.al, 2004; Puskar, et.al. 2006]. The 1960's and earlier platforms were designed and installed prior to any industry design standard. These platforms generally had low deck elevations, lacked strengthened connections (joint cans) and in some cases were designed to only a 25 year return period wave. Hurricanes Carla in 1964 and Camille in 1969 in which platforms were destroyed provided lessons learned for input into the initial RP2A for better platform designs.



Figure 4.6 Destroyed Platforms by Vintage and API Category

As the industry gained design experience, the first edition of RP2A was developed and published in 1969, as shown by the box in the upper left hand side of the figure. This provided an improvement in both platform design as well as platform fabrication standards. However several key ingredients were still missing, including guidance on minimum deck elevation, a consistent design recipe to determine wave loads, the lack of specific 100 yr design wave heights and limited guidance on design of joints, member slenderness and other platform structural details. It is therefore no surprise that numerous 1970 vintage platforms, designed to these early RP2A standards, were also destroyed and damaged in Katrina and Rita. However, there is dramatic reduction (approximately one half) in the number of platforms destroyed that were installed in the 1970s vs 1960s. This improvement is due to the use of RP2A, even in its early stages.

Figure 4.6 shows that there were 33 platforms destroyed that were installed post 1980. Table 4.1 shows the details of these platforms including key platform and hurricane characteristics. These platforms represent a vintage of platforms designed to the post-9th edition of RP2A, published in 1977 as shown by the box in the upper middle of the figure, considered to be the time at which the RP2A platform design recipe had developed into a consistent and accurate approach. A key addition of the 9th edition was the inclusion of a specific wave load recipe including 100 year wave height criteria as a function of water depth. This allowed for a consistent design of all platforms to the same hurricane design loads. However, the reduction in the number of damaged and destroyed platforms installed post-1980 is not as large as seen in prior hurricanes Andrew, Lili and Ivan. This is perhaps because of the magnitude and path of these recent hurricanes. Katrina was an exceptionally large storm with very large waves, and numerous platforms experienced loading larger than they were designed for, including wave-in-deck loading which is known to be detrimental to platforms. Rita, while not as large as Katrina, went through the more western part of the Gulf of Mexico that had not experienced a hurricane of significant size in decades. It may have been the first time that some of these platforms experienced significant metocean loading. Section 6 discusses the sizes of waves at these locations.

The number of platforms decreases dramatically, again by about one-half, from the 1970s to the 1980s. This is explained by the use of the much improved 9th edition of RP2A as noted above. However, when going from the 1980s to the 1990s there is a slight increase in the number of destroyed platforms from 11 to 15, although this increase is not statistically significant and is more likely due to the specific path of the hurricanes through offshore areas with platforms installed in this timeframe. Another reason is the fact that RP2A did not change much in the timeframe between 1980 through the end of 1990's. In fact it wasn't until the 21st Edition of RP 2A was adopted that there were significant changes. In comparison, RP2A changed almost on a yearly basis in the 1970's, with changes sometimes being significant.

Table F.1 in Appendix F provides statistics of API Category by API Bulletin 2INT-MET Region for both destroyed and damaged platforms. Also provided in Appendix F is Table F.2 which offers statistics on API Category by decade installed for both the destroyed and damaged platforms.

The number of platforms destroyed that were installed from the year 2000 and later is nine. This surprises observers in that relatively "new" platforms such as these were destroyed. The installation date of the newest platform that was destroyed is 2004. The failure of these recent vintage platforms is partly due to a change in the RP2A design approach that occurred in the late 1990s, that allowed some types of platforms to be designed with return periods less than 100 yr. This was known as Consequence Based Design (CBD) and is discussed in the next section.

Table 4.1 – Destroyed Platforms – Post 1980 Installation

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
Rita	EI 294 A	1980	204	Yes	4-P	A-2	Unknown	68.2	43.5
Rita	WC 110 10	1980	40	No	CAS	A-3	Unknown	31.5	30.4
Katrina	WD 117 QRT	1982	214	Yes	4-P	A-2	50	68.5	47.6
Rita	EC 160 A-Aux	1983	85	No	B-CAS	A-3	13.5	55.8	41.2
Rita	EC 160 C	1984	84	No	B-CAS	A-3	24.7	55.8	41.2
Rita	SS 177 C	1984	92	No	4-P	A-3	40.5	56.4	39.6
Rita	EI 314 J	1985	230	Yes	4-P	A-1	40.3	70.5	44.7
Rita	WC 313 1	1985	59	No	CAS	A-2	68	42.6	34.1
Katrina	PL 20 39	1987	30	No	Unknown	A-3	Unknown	24.7	22.4
Rita	EC 286 B	1990	188	No	TRI	A-2	55	64.8	41.8
Rita	EI 313 C	1991	230	No	TRI	A-2	39.8	70.6	44.8
Katrina	MP 138 A	1991	158	Yes	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	76.2	56.8
Rita	SS 148 H	1995	44	No	CAS	A-3	54	33.3	30.2
Rita	VR 273 A	1995	185	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	67.2	43.0
Rita	VR 340 JA	1995	227	No	TRI	A-2	49	72.2	45.4
Rita	SM 90 A	1996	163	No	B-CAS	A-2	52.5	65.0	41.8
Rita	HI A 467 D	1997	195	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	44.1	28.2
Katrina	MP 312 JA	1997	248	No	TRI	A-2	37.1	80.9	56.4
Rita	SS 193 B	1997	86	No	CAS	A-3	52.7	57.1	41.4
Rita	SS 69 16	1997	28	No	CAS	A-3	19	20.8	19.0
Rita	WC 56 CAIS.#15	1997	34	No	CAS	A-3	19.8	27.0	25.7
Rita	ST 146 A	1998	96	No	B-CAS	A-2	57.5	56.1	41.4
Rita	WC 168 CAIS.#2	1999	44	No	CAS	A-3	Unknown	34.5	32.6
Rita	WC 172 E	1999	47	No	Unknown	A-3	Unknown	36.9	34.8
Rita	EC 151 C	2000	80	No	B-CAS	L-3	52	55.4	42.0
Rita	EC 161 A	2000	85	No	CAS	L-3	30.8	55.5	40.9
Rita	SM 66 E	2000	134	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	61.2	40.1
Katrina	WD 137 A	2000	310	No	TRI	L-2	50	72.8	48.8
Rita	WC 225 6	2001	58	No	CAS	L-3	Unknown	45.8	37.8
Rita	EC 222 D	2004	123	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	60.5	41.0
Rita	EC 71 8	2004	53	No	Unknown	L-3	Unknown	41.3	34.3
Rita	SS 181 K	2004	67	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	51.3	38.6
Rita	SS 218 D	2004	112	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	59.7	40.9

Notes: *Actual Deck Height* is the bottom of steel of the cellar deck as reported by the platform owner to the MMS. Some are Unknown as indicated

Hmax is the maximum wave height at the location for the indicated hurricane determined by Forristall (2007).

Local Crest is the estimated maximum crest elevation at the platform site. See Section 6 determined by Forristall (2007).

Manned/Evacuated refers to API's category for life safety. The "yes" implies the platform is usually manned; however, it will be evacuated during a design event such as a hurricane. The "no" implies the platform is not normally manned.

4.4 Destroyed Platforms by API Category

API RP2A Section 17 used for assessment of existing platforms categorizes platforms according to consequence of failure, designated as an "Assessment Category" defined as A-1 for high consequence, A-2 for medium consequence and A-3 as low consequence. The formal definitions are contained in RP2A. Over the past few years, the MMS requested platform owners to classify their platforms according to Assessment Category and submit the resulting designation and this was included in the data used by this study. Figure 4.6 shows the number of destroyed platforms by API category as stacked bars per decade the platform was installed. The category data was not available for some of the platforms, in which case the platform category was designated as unknown. Review of the categorized destroyed platforms indicates that a majority were A-2, predominately of 1960s vintage.

There were only six A-1 platforms destroyed. This is in part due to the higher Section 17 strength and deck elevation requirements for a platform to be designated as A-1. A wave crest hitting a platform deck creates a very large load that will likely result in significant platform damage and in many cases collapse. Hence a key ingredient in surviving hurricanes is to have a deck elevation above the largest hurricane waves. Wave load on decks is discussed in more detail in Section 6.

As shown in Appendix F, approximately 189 A-1's were exposed to hurricane winds and waves. Katrina and Rita accounted for destroying 3.2% of the A-1's. If comparing by the Regions defined in API Bulletin 2INT-MET [API 2007] the Central Region had 44 exposed with 2 being destroyed or 4.5% of the Central Region A-1's. The West Central Region contained approximately 145 which were exposed and 4 destroyed or 2.8%. The greater percentage destroyed in the Central Region shows some correlation when considering API Bulletin 2INT-MET states the environmental conditions in the Central Region are greater than the other regions. While the percentages are different it is not a significant difference and needs further investigation.

From 2000 onward, the platforms are classified per RP2A Section 2 categories of L-1 high, L-2 medium or L-3 low consequence. Technically, platforms designed to RPA 21st edition, issued in 2000, are not available for Section 17 Assessment and hence the Section 2 classification is used. A key observation is that there were no RP2A 20th edition L-1 platforms destroyed in the hurricanes. At the time of Katrina and Rita there were approximately 26 L-1's in the GOM with an estimated 24 of the 26 exposed to hurricane loads. The 20th edition was issued in 1993 and included a major change to the RP2A wave load recipe, resulting in a significant increase in the design metocean loading for L-1 conditions. The industry began to implement this approach on new L-1 platforms in mid to late 1990's with most L-1 platforms designed to the 20th edition by about 2000. The fact that none of these L-1 platforms were destroyed in the hurricanes is an indicator of the improved performance of these latest generation RP2A L-1 platforms. As shown in Section 5, there were also no L-1 platforms with major damage.

There were several post 2000 platforms that were destroyed, as shown by the nine L-2 and L-3 failures in Figure 4.6. The 21st edition of RP 2A was issued in the year 2000 and provided an option for "Consequence Based Design" (CBD) [Ward, et.al, 2000] whereby platforms are categorized according to their consequence of failure, and platforms with lower risk can use lower criteria than the 100 year design conditions. The platforms are classified per RP2A as L-1 high consequence, L-2 medium consequence or L-3 low consequence. In the GOM, the L-1 and L-2 platforms can be manned-evacuated (or unmanned), while the L-3 platforms are always unmanned. The L-1 platforms have a high consequence of failure in terms of environmental conditions, while the L-2 platforms have a medium consequence of failure and the L-3 platforms have a low consequence of failure. L-3 platforms are essentially caisson structures. See RP2A Section 2 for the complete definition of these platforms. The associated design return periods are 100 yr for L-1, 50 yr for L-2 and 15 yr for L-3, based upon Ward, et.al., 2000. Figure 4.6 shows that all of the platforms destroyed that were installed post-2000 were L-2 or L-3 platforms designed to 50 yr or 15 yr criteria respectively. Hence these platforms were not designed to the 100 yr conditions of some of the older platforms, and so failure is not unexpected. As the name "consequence based design" implies, the L-2 and L-3 platforms are more susceptible to the consequences of damage and destruction in hurricanes, and this fact was demonstrated in these storms. Platform owners need to be aware of the fact that design to L-2 or L-3 conditions may result in the failure of even the newest platforms.

Out of the nine L-2 and L-3 destroyed platforms, 5 were categorized as L-2. Per Appendix F, the number of L-2's exposed during Katrina and Rita was approximately 211. A breakdown by API Bulletin 2INT-MET Region reveals 32 were exposed in the Central Region and 179 in the West Central Region. The percentage destroyed in the Central Region was 3.1%, while there was 2.2% in the West Central Region. Again there seems to be a correlation in the percentage destroyed by Region with what one would expect when studying API Bulletin 2INT-MET; however, this needs further investigation.

Appendix F provides further information and discussion on platform destroyed statistics.

5.0 PLATFORMS WITH MAJOR DAMAGE

This section describes the platforms with *major d*amage including their characteristics and general trends. Major damage was defined as significant damage either below or above water, or both. Major damage below water included separated or torn members, cracked members, members with numerous holes, dents or a combination of these, cracked welds, missing members or buckled members. Similar damage to the jacket legs was also considered major. Major damage above water included bent deck beams or any other form of significant damage to primary structural members. Generally these types of damage required some sort of above or below water repair or similar mitigation. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 provide examples of major underwater damage to platforms. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 provide examples of major above water damage. Appendix A provides additional examples of platform damage.

In the early phases of the project, it was attempted to also determine the number of platforms with minor to moderate damage, for example, damaged walkways, stairs, boatlandings, handrails, deck grating, etc. However, it proved difficult to ascertain the actual extent of damage in some cases. The data available from the MMS and from HEAT was sometimes vague and open to interpretation. It was therefore decided not to report the amount of minor damage in a quantitative format (such as number of platforms with minor damage) since there was a high level of uncertainty and such results may be misleading. In contrast, reports of major damage were much more descriptive and the level of accuracy higher, so the emphasis was put on the study of these results. The study of major damage is much more important in terms of recommendations for improvements to design codes.

5.1 Number of Platforms with Major Damage

Appendix A contains a list of all of the platforms with major damage including specific details such as year installed, water depth, deck elevation, etc. There were a total of 163 major damage platforms from Katrina and Rita combined. The platform name, owner name and specific location for damaged platforms have been removed since many of these platforms are still in service. This information is not necessary for the purposes of this study.

Similar to destroyed platforms, it is in some cases difficult to determine if the platform was damaged by Katrina or Rita. This is particularly true for the Eastern regions of the West Central region where the two storms overlapped. In some cases the damage was not located until months or over a year after the hurricanes passed when the underwater inspections could be performed. Hence the hurricane causing the damage was not included in Table A.2 in Appendix A.

Figure 5.1 Major Damage – Missing Underwater Brace

Figure 5.2 Major Damage – Severed Underwater Brace



Figure 5.3 Major Damage – Buckled Underwater Brace

Figure 5.4 Major Damage – Underwater Cracked Joint at Leg

Figure 5.5 Major Damage – Above Water Bent Deck Beams Caused by Waves

Figure 5.6 Major Damage – Above Water Vertical Diagonals Separated from Truss Row Beam

Similar to the destroyed platforms, there may also be an increase in the number of platforms with major damage as additional inspection information becomes available or is clarified. However, it is felt that at this time, 18 months since the hurricanes, that most of the significant damage has been located and that the number of platforms with major damage will not increase greatly.

5.2 Damaged Platforms by Location

Figure 5.7 shows the location of the damaged platforms compared to the paths of the hurricanes. Also shown is the relative size of the hurricanes at selected locations based upon the Saffir-Simpson Intensity (SSI) Scale of hurricane intensity.

For Rita, a majority of the damaged platforms were located to the East of the eye path, as expected since this has the highest winds and waves. The area to the East of the Rita path is also the area of highest concentration of platforms exposed to extreme hurricane conditions.

For Katrina, the number of damaged platforms is about equal on both sides of the eye path based on engineering judgment. There are more damaged platforms to the East of the eye path than was observed for destroyed platforms as previously shown in Figure 4.5

Similar to the discussion for destroyed platforms, there seems to be no clear correlation of the eye path and distance to the damaged platform or location. If all platforms were of equal strength, then this indeed may be the case since metocean conditions are greatest near the eye path. However, the damage is primarily based upon the platform strength, which varies by location.

5.3 Damaged Platforms by Vintage

Figure 5.8 shows the number of platforms with major damage according to installed date sorted by decade. This figure is similar to Figure 4.6 which shows the same relationships for destroyed platforms. For damaged platforms, the largest concentration is the 1970's vintage, although the number is barely larger than the 1960s vintage. In comparison, the largest number of destroyed platforms was by far the 1960s vintage as shown in Figure 4.6. Similarly, there is not as large a reduction in the number of damaged platforms when going from the 1970s to the 1980s vintage as there was for destroyed platforms.

In fact, overall for damaged platforms, there is a reduction in the number of damaged platforms from 1970 onward, but the reduction is not as dramatic as for destroyed platforms. This can be seen by close comparison of Figure 4.6 for destroyed platforms and Figure 5.8 for damaged platforms. One explanation is that the older, pre RP2A platforms have less damage tolerance, and hence are more likely to be destroyed, while the newer platforms designed to RP2A standards (even the older standards) have higher damage tolerance, and are more prone to damage than destruction. This can be seen through the evolution of RP2A with respect to development of improved member and joint strength design and a consistent environmental loading recipe. Indeed, detailed review of some of the 1970's vintage platform major damage indicates that it occurred in some of the key joints. Had these joints had even a slightly thicker wall thickness, as called for in the more modern versions of RP2A, several of these platforms would have escaped these hurricanes with little or no damage. This is further evidence of the impact of RP2A on the improvement of platform designs.



Figure 5.7 Location of Platforms with Major Damage Compared to Path of Hurricanes.
The dots indicate platforms with major damage. The SSI Category of the hurricanes at selected locations is also shown.



Figure 5.8 Platforms with Major Damage by Vintage and API Category

5.4 Damaged Platforms by API Category

Figure 5.8 also shows the damaged platforms according to API category. The various API categories have been previously described in Section 4.4 for the destroyed platforms. Similar to the destroyed platforms, the A-2 platforms have the most damage, followed by A-3 and then A-1. An important point is that there were no L-1 platforms damaged, indicating again the exceptional performance of the L-1 platform designs.

Some observations by Region reveal there were a total of nine A-1's damaged in the Central or 20.5% compared to 11 or 7.6% in the West Central. Fourteen Central Region A-2's experienced damaged while the West Central experienced 45 having major damage. This equates to 6.6% in the Central and 4.2% in the West Central. Both the A-1 and the A-2 Central Region damage seems to relate to the increased conditions found in API Bulletin 2INT-MET.

Although the A-1's and A-2's follow the concept that the environmental conditions are more severe in the Central Region and thus it is expected for more damage or destruction to occur there, the A-3's do not follow this theme. There were less than 2% of the A-3's in the Central that experienced major damage compared to 4.7% in the West Central Region. This also will require further investigation.

Appendix F provides further information and discussion on platform damage statistics.

6.0 HURRICANE CONDITIONS AND PLATFORM PERFORMANCE

There has been much discussion in the offshore industry about the severity of these hurricanes, particularly related to large waves. There were many platforms with reported wave in deck (WID) damage, attributed to the crest of the large hurricane wave hitting the platform decks and causing major damage. WID loading is also the suspected cause of many of the destroyed platforms, as previously shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. Previous study of hurricanes Andrew, Lili and Ivan all reported destruction and major damage due to WID [Energo, 2006].

As a result, special effort was made in this study to gather WID damage information and related metocean data to further understand this phenomenon. These are discussed in this section. First, the type of WID observations are described. Second, this data is correlated to metocean estimates of the wave crests for Katrina and Rita. The information is also correlated to RP2A design and assessment guidance.

6.1 Observed Wave In Deck Damage

As was the case during past hurricanes, WID loading on the older vintage platforms with lower decks is not necessarily a surprise. However, modern platform designs adhering to the 21st Edition of RP2A sustaining varying amounts of WID is a surprise. Whether or not major jacket or deck structural damage occurred, significant non-structural damage was present which caused significant production downtime and repair costs. Although this report is limited to fixed platforms, Katrina and Rita also caused WID damage on floating platforms.

Typical damage as a result of WID can be broken down into structural and non-structural damage. Typical topsides structural damage consists of distorted deck beams and sometimes the more severe cracking or severing of the deck leg from the jacket pile. Typical non-structural topsides damage consists of toppled control panels, dangling cable trays, missing handrails or grating, deck drains below cellar deck, missing or severely distorted stairs.

Figures 6.1 shows typical topsides structural damage as a result of WID. To be noted is the fact that only one of the superstructure wide flange beam is bent while the other is still in its intact "as-built" condition. This particular example clearly indicates the randomness of WID loading. Most engineers think of WID loading as a "long-crested" wave that impacts the full side of the deck. In fact, this is the basis for platform design and assessment – a long crested wave of particular height and period that passes by the platform. However, in reality, a hurricane sea state is a random sea with a combination of long and "short-crested" waves. The short crested waves do not have the long crest hence called short crest, but may have the height. The damage shown in Figure 6.1 was caused by such a localized, short crested wave.

Figure 6.1 Structural Damage from Local WID



Figure 6.2 Non-Structural Damage from Local WID

Figure 6.2 shows another example of non-structural, localized damage caused by a short crested wave. In this case the WID moved some large heavy process vessels and safety equipment across the deck. Buildings can also be subject to such damage as shown in Figure 6.3. Note that this type of non-structural damage can in some cases be more detrimental to platform operations than major structural damage as shown in Figure 6.1, since it may take a longer time to repair the associated topsides buildings and equipment and bring the platform back into operation after a storm compared to structural damage. The location of critical process vessels and piping on cellar decks makes them prone to such damage and operators should locate (or relocate) such equipment on a higher deck or elevation if possible.

Even though the majority of the WID cases only show damage on or below the cellar deck, Katrina accounted for bent main deck beams much higher up in the platform (approx. elevation (+)71') as can be seen in Figure 6.4. A noteworthy observation regarding WID is the apparent wave crest heights and the apparent wave during both Katrina and Rita. There are numerous documented accounts that Katrina produced wave crest elevations in excess of 65' from the mean waterline. Specific wave crest elevations estimated for the hurricanes are discussed in Section 6.3.

One significant observation pertains to structural assessment of platforms to check for fitness for purpose. One method of confirming if a platform is fit for purpose is to conduct a prior exposure assessment, per RP2A Section 17.5.1. This involves using hindcast data to justify that the platform saw equal or greater environmental loading than what is required according to the platforms API category. Using observed WID measurements as part of the environmental loading recipe might in some cases yield incorrect results. The most common approach is to assume a long crested wave and develop a silhouetted area. Examples of platform damage that can be attributed to long-crested waves are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. With Katrina and Rita, there were various accounts of platform survival with observed WID on the order of ten plus feet in the cellar deck. However, in some of these cases, it was in fact localized short-crested WID damage, similar to Figure 6.1 or 6.2. The assumption of a long-crested wave would be unconservative in this case for a prior exposure assessment. Care needs to be taken to determine if the platform deck was indeed inundated by a long crested wave, or a short crested wave, when conducting a prior exposure assessment on such a structure.

Another significant observation deals with deck height requirements. The development of deck height requirements take into account metocean data to help set a deck height for a given area and water depth. Because of Katrina and Rita, deck height requirements for new build platforms need to look at the long-crested wave versus a short-crested wave in determining proper deck height requirements. API Bulletin 2INT-DG [API-DG, 2007] for design of new platforms contains additional deck elevation to account for this phenomenon.

Approximately 76 platforms that survived Katrina and Rita reported WID of some form. The number of platforms that were destroyed as a result of WID will likely never be known.

Section 6.3 further discusses these WID cases including comparison of estimated crest elevations at these platform locations.

Figure 6.3 Destroyed Building Typical Non-Structural Local WID Damage

Figure 6.4 Bent Main Deck Beams at a Higher Elevation in a Platform

Figure 6.5 Bent Cellar Deck Beams Indicating a Long Crested WID

Figure 6.6 Bent Stair and Cellar Deck Beams Indicating a Long Crested WID

6.2 Deck Height Comparisons to API Requirements

Figure 6.7 shows a plot of deck height vs. water depth for 76 of the destroyed platforms where the cellar deck elevation was available. Also shown for comparison are the RP2A minimum deck elevation curves for the Section 17 A-1 and A-2 existing platforms as well as the Section 2 minimum deck elevation curves for New Design platforms. The plot provides a feel for the range of deck elevations among the destroyed platforms. One observation to be drawn from this curve is that a majority of the platforms that were destroyed had deck elevations below the Section 2 minimum deck elevation curve for new design. The A-1 minimum deck elevation curve for high consequence platforms is also above most of the destroyed platform deck elevations. However, the A-2 deck elevation curve is below most of the deck elevations. Not shown is the A-3 curve which is below almost all of the deck elevations. Similar relationships were found for hurricane Ivan [Energo, 2006].

Many operators categorize their platforms as A-2 and use the associated Section 17 guidelines to establish the adequacy of the platform in hurricanes. According to Figure 6.7, a platform that has a minimum deck elevation above the A-2 criteria but below the A-1 criteria is at significant risk of damage or destruction in large hurricanes. A better indicator for adequacy is the A-1 and preferably the Section 2 New Design deck elevation curves. Given all of the observed damage to platform decks in these hurricanes, and given the increased risk of platform failure if the deck is hit by a wave, API is considering raising the required minimum deck elevation for new-build platforms, especially in the Central region. Actual performance of platforms in hurricanes, according to their deck elevations as shown in Figure 6.7 will be a useful reference to help establish these types of design improvements. API Bulletin 2INT-DG has interim guidelines for minimum deck elevation.

Figure 6-8 shows the same deck height relationships for the platforms with major damage. Similar trends as described for the destroyed platforms are apparent. Again, numerous platforms sustained major damage even though the deck heights meet the Section 17 A-2 deck height requirements. Platform owners are again cautioned that platforms that meet the A-2 deck height criteria are at risk of major damage in large hurricanes. The A-2 criteria is meant to ensure life-safety and environmental requirements as is common in codes. It is not intended to meet economic criteria in terms of damage and repair costs as well as potential downtime and deferred production. According to the results of this study, the A-1 and preferably the Section 2 New Design deck height requirements are much better design criteria that a platform owner should use to minimize economic risks.



Figure 6.7 Destroyed Platforms by Platform Deck Elevation

Notes: 1. 76 Platforms plotted with known deck elevation. Others unknown.
2. All deck height curves are based on API RP2A 21st Ed.



Figure 6.8 Major Damage Platforms by Platform Deck Elevation

Notes: 1. 112 Platforms plotted with known deck elevation. Others unknown.
2. All deck height curves are based on API RP2A 21st Ed.

6.3 Deck Height Comparisons to Hindcast Data

Hindcast data for Katrina and Rita was provided to the study by Oceanweather as part of an agreement with the MMS [Oceanweather, 2006]. In addition, API HEAT funded some additional work by Forristall to further update the Oceanweather hindcast data with findings from recent API studies on these hurricanes, with special attention to wave crest heights [Forristall, 2007].

Energo first supplied Forristall with a set of several hundred specific platform locations of interest, primarily those of the destroyed platforms, damaged platforms and platforms with known WID. Forristall then used the new procedures to provide back to Energo the Hmax, and Hcrest for these locations. Details of these procedures are provided in the Forristall report. The intent is to provide a comparison of the platform performance (destroyed, damaged or survived) and platform deck height to the best available metocean data for the location.

Figure 6.9 shows a comparison of the deck elevation for the destroyed platforms (76 cases where the deck elevation was available) to the estimated Hcrest at the location, based upon the Forristall work. The circle shows the deck height and the triangle shows the predicted Hcrest. The Hcrest used is the Forristall 50% or mean value (the Forristall report provides probabilistic distribution of Hcrest). For example, at a water depth of about 325 ft, the destroyed platform's deck height is about 42 ft and the Hcrest is about 60 ft. So the platform is estimated to have almost 18 feet of WID. It is then no surprise that the platform was destroyed.



Figure 6.9 Destroyed Platforms – Platform Deck Height Compared to Predicted Wave Crest Height

Because there are so many data points, the figure becomes confusing and the data was therefore split into two parts. The first part shown in Figure 6.10 is for all platforms where the Forristall Hcrest exceeds the platform deck height. A vertical bar is used to connect the platform deck height to the associated Hcrest for the platform location. In these cases the platforms are generally expected to fail. The amount of WID varies from a few feet to more than 20 ft in several cases. There are a total of 40 cases for this condition, or about 60 % of those shown in Figure 6.9.

The second part shown in Figure 6.11 is for all platforms where the Forristall Hcrest is below the platform deck height. A vertical bar is again used to connect the platform deck height to the associated Hcrest for the platform location. In these cases the platforms are generally expected to not fail, however the platforms did fail. The distance that the Hcrest was below the deck varies from nothing (deck height equal to Hcrest) to about 12 ft. There are a total of 27 cases for this condition, or about 40% of those shown in Figure 6.9. Note that even if there is no WID the platform may have been destroyed for other key reasons. It may have been older vintage, had prior damage or additional loading beyond its original design due to owner installed extra conductors, risers or additional facility loads.

Figure 6.12 shows the location of the WID platforms compared to the paths of the hurricanes. Also shown is the relative size of the hurricanes at selected locations based upon the Saffir-Simpson Intensity (SSI) Scale for hurricane category. For Rita, all of the WID platforms were located to the East of the eye path, as expected since this has the highest waves. For Katrina, there is about the same number of platforms on either side of the eye path. In addition, there are more platforms with WID for Katrina than for Rita. This is as expected since Katrina was a larger hurricane than Rita with Katrina having higher waves. For both Katrina and Rita, there seems to be a number of platforms right on the edge of the continental shelf as indicated by the red arrows (lined up in almost a "picket fence" alignment), indicting that there may be some wave run-up or wave breaking effects in these regions. Prior work for hurricane Ivan also reported an unusual high number of platform destruction and damage near the shelf edge, perhaps due to similar phenomena [Energo, 2006].



Figure 6.10 Destroyed Platforms – Platform Deck Height Compared to Predicted Wave Crest Height – Wave Crest Exceeding Platform Deck Height



Figure 6.11 Destroyed Platforms – Platform Deck Height Compared to Predicted Wave Crest Height – Wave Crest Below Platform Deck Height



Figure 6.12 Location of Confirmed Wave-In-Deck Platforms Compared to Path of Hurricanes.
The dots indicate platforms with reported WID. The SSI Category of the hurricanes at selected locations is also shown. The red arrows show platform located on the edge of the continental shelf that may have seen breaking waves.

6.4 Performance of A-2 Platforms

It is important to understand the performance of the A-2 manned-evacuated platforms in the GOM since these platforms are expected to at a minimum survive conditions equal to a Sudden Hurricane. A Sudden Hurricane is a hurricane that develops quickly and may not allow sufficient time to safely evacuate all of the GOM platforms as is normally done for larger hurricanes when there is several days advance notice (such as Katrina and Rita). Therefore, personnel may have to remain aboard some of the platforms should such a Sudden Hurricane occur.

The criteria for the Sudden Hurricane is based on a 100 yr return period Sudden Hurricane and is defined by the A-2 “Design Level” curve provided in RP2A Section 17. In this case, Design Level means a check of the platform with all normal factors of safety included. To check for platform failure, the Section 17 Ultimate Strength curve should be used, which is the maximum condition that the platform should be able to sustain without collapse, although damage may occur.

Since the site specific hindcast Hmax data is available via the Oceanweather and Forristall work, it was decided to check the Hmax conditions at the locations of all of the A-2 platforms that were destroyed to ensure that the Hmax condition was equal to or larger than the Section 17 A-2 criteria. This would demonstrate that all of the A-2 platforms that failed had experienced waves larger than the Sudden Hurricane criteria.

Figure 6.13 shows a comparison of the hindcast Hmax at the locations of the destroyed A-2 platforms in Katrina and Rita. This information was taken from the data in the Destroyed Platforms table contained in Appendix A. There were a total of 62 destroyed A-2 platforms, of which 19 were identified as manned-evacuated (shown as the filled-in red dots). As shown in Appendix F, there were approximately 1278 platforms in the Central and West Central regions exposed to hurricane conditions. Also shown on Figure 6.13 is the Section 17 A-2 Ultimate Strength curve. Per Section 17, an A-2 platform should have a capacity larger than or equal to this curve – in other words it should not collapse for this condition. Considering that the indicated destroyed A-2 platforms are essential “collapse” cases, that all but three collapsed at an Hmax equal to or greater than the Section 17 requirement. There were three unmanned platforms in water depth less than 60 ft that are slightly below the curve, but further investigation for these structures indicates that they were shallow water minimal structures, more likely an A-3 category, that would always be unmanned. In these cases the owner elected to categorize the platform as A-2.

In summary, these results indicate that A-2 platforms are performing as expected. API HEAT is further investigating metocean criteria in the GOM including Sudden Hurricanes. These results can be used to assist in understanding how A-2 platforms would perform against any changes in Sudden Hurricane criteria that may be recommended.

There were no A-2 platforms that failed in wave conditions less than Sudden Hurricane even though approximately 1278 were exposed to high winds and waves in Katrina and Rita.



Figure 6.13 Performance of Destroyed A-2 Category Platforms

7.0 PLATFORM DAMAGE OBSERVATIONS

7.1 General Types of Observed Damage

Studies of post storm damage and destruction to platforms always have spectacular underwater damage photos, and this is indeed the case again with these two hurricanes. In general, the damage has been the same as reported in the prior hurricanes, with buckled braces, cracked joints, cracked legs, etc., primarily due to strength overload.

The general types of platform damage both to main structure and secondary structure are as follows. Appendix A contains photos from Katrina and Rita of some of these types of damage.

Braces. Buckles, dents, holes, cracks, tears, out-of-plane bowing, severed members.

Legs. Buckles, dents, holes, cracks, tears, pancake leg sever (see Section 7.2), broken crown shim at top-of-jacket.

Joints. Cracks at weld, cracks into chord, cracks into brace, punch-through of brace, pull out of brace (including a piece of the leg material, leaving a hole in the leg).

Conductor trays. Cracks at joints (typically at 6 and 12 o'clock), conductor torn loose from guide, tray drops and jams between conductors.

Risers. Broken water caissons, broken riser standoffs.

Deck. Bent wide flange beams, bent deck legs, bent stairways and landings.

Miscellaneous. Usually at first elevation above waterline (+10 ft to +15 ft). Broken or missing walkways, boatlandings, riser guards, boat bumpers and damage to other non-structural items.

7.2 Pancake Leg Damage

This type of damage was first observed in Lili [ABS Consulting, 2004] and subsequently in Ivan [Energo, 2006], and now Katrina and Rita. Figure 7.1 shows the final form of this damage. This type of damage has been tentatively called "pancake leg" due to the flattening of the leg in the damaged area point. The damage is believed to develop as a result of the significant stiffness change between the thin walled nominal section of the jacket leg and the thicker joint can section at the horizontal elevations. This type of damage has been found in either the top two bays of the jacket or the bottom bay of the jacket. The majority of the platforms that experienced this type of damage were older 60's and 70's vintage platforms with the exception of one platform from the mid 80's, and three newer platforms one from the early 90's and the other two from the mid to late 90's.

Figure 7.2 shows the initiating local buckle for this type of damage that occurs in the thin wall leg section just above the thicker joint can. This is caused by excessive loads in the nominal leg section due to the hurricane loading. Note that a thicker leg walls section here (perhaps by as little as ¼ inch) or a grouted leg-pile annulus would have prevented this initial buckle from ever occurring.

Figure 7.3 illustrates the next phase of the damage, usually found near a longitudinal weld seam. As the jacket leg begins to acquire more loading, the leg will usually separate within the heat affected zone between the two differing wall thicknesses.

After the jacket leg separates the pancaking of the leg occurs as was previously shown in Figure 7.1. Back and forth motion of the platform due to waves, coupled with the fact that the jacket leg is no longer connected and platform movement is significantly increased, allow the platform to hammer the separated sections into each other resulting in the flattened pancake region.



Figure 7.1 Pancake Leg Damage – Final Damage Configuration



Figure 7.2 Initiating Damage – Local Buckle of Leg

Figure 7.3 Separation of Leg at Buckle

The Lili research uncovered one leg with the bulge and subsequent separation; however, recent inquiry into damage caused by Katrina uncovered another platform with similar damage. Therefore, Hurricane Lili accounted for two pancake legs. Hurricane Ivan accounted for two pancake legs and three local leg buckles. The three local leg buckles in Ivan are thought to be in the initial phase of the eventual separation and subsequent flattening on the leg member as mentioned above. Hurricane Katrina introduced three more pancake legs while Rita introduced one leg buckle, one separation, and three pancake legs (five total for Rita) bringing the total number of platforms with this type of damage since Lili to 15.

Based on some limited review by this study, platforms with exceptionally thin nominal leg thickness and thick joint cans appear to be prone to this type of damage. Of the cases where data was available the majority of platforms had a nominal leg wall thickness on the order of ½ inch transitioning to a joint can on the order of 1 5/8 inch. During discussions with a couple of the operators with this type of damage it was noted that the leg pile annulus should have been grouted and was not. Structural analyses on several of these platforms was able to predict this damage (local leg buckle)

Recommendations to prevent this type of damage include grouting the leg-pile annulus. This should be considered by owners that have a platform that is critical to their operations and may be susceptible to this type of damage (e.g., has very thin nominal leg wall thickness on order of ½ inch). Structural analysis appears to be able to identify this vulnerability. Since there are not only older platforms but also three modern platforms, it is recommended that this local buckling phenomenon be investigated further. The damage indicates there is critical sensitivity in the transition between the joint can and the nominal leg can. Given the fact that the majority of the platforms with this damage also had major structural damage to major framing indicates the high probability that if the leg damage does not occur then the jacket would survive intact. Conversely, if the jacket does sustain major framing damage the susceptibility of the platform to this type of damage might contribute to total platform failure.

Appendix A contains more pictures of this type of damage.

8.0 PERFORMANCE OF PLATFORM FOUNDATIONS

Most of the damage discussed in this report is related to the jacket or deck structural members. There is little mention of foundation related failures such as the piles plunging into the soils, piles pulling out of the soils or piles shearing at the mudline. This is because there were few, if any observed foundation failures in Katrina and Rita. However, ultimate strength analysis of platforms that were damaged in the hurricanes shows in some cases that the pile foundation should have failed in plunging or pullout but this was not observed. Instead, inspection showed damage to the jacket or other area of the platform but the piles performed adequately. This same observation has been reported in prior hurricanes – analysis shows that foundation damage should have occurred, but it did not [Energo, 2006].

For Katrina and Rita there are two "reported" cases of foundation failures, one of which is shown in Figure 8.1. The figure shows what looks like rigid-body rotation of the jacket thought to be caused by pile plunging on one side and pile pullout on the other. At the time of this report, the specific damage was not confirmed by this study via underwater inspection reports or other evidence. Note that a similar platform that was found to be leaning with a rigid body rotation in a similar manner and originally thought to be a foundation failure was confirmed later by diver inspection to not be a foundation failure. Instead, the foundation had held and the jacket members had failed on one side near the mudline and this caused the jacket to lean. Even if these two foundation failures are confirmed for Katrina and Rita, the amount of foundation failures observed is surprising low given the number of damaged and destroyed platforms.

There may be foundation failures for some of the destroyed platforms, but this is most difficult to determine. However, in many cases owners have reported that underwater sonar images and diver reports indicate that the platform was destroyed when the jacket broke at a location above the mudline. This project is unaware of any operator indicating that the platform was destroyed due to a foundation failure. Discussions with underwater salvage companies performing removal of the destroyed platforms indicates they have always noticed the failure in the jacket, not in the foundation.

Because of these observations, this project enlisted the help of the University of Texas at Austin to separately investigate foundation performance in Katrina and Rita. The objective was to independently review several of the analytical studies that show foundation damage should have occurred but did not and make comments. The other objective is to develop an initial list of possible reasons for these differences. For example, conservatisms in the way soil strengths are estimated by geotechnical engineers or conservatisms in the way that structural engineers use the soil strength data provided by geotechnical engineers. The goal is not to solve this problem fully, but instead to identify possible causes and make recommendations for further study.

The University of Texas report is contained in Appendix C.

Figure 8.1 Destroyed Platform Suspected to be a Foundation Failure

9.0 QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT

9.1 Bias Factors for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

The quantitative assessment involves a probabilistic comparison of "observed" performance of fixed platforms in hurricanes Katrina and Rita to performance predicted "analytically". Performance is either that the platform survived, had major damage or was destroyed. The analytical prediction is based upon the "recipe" contained in API RP2A for checking a platform's *load* and *resistance*.

The probabilistic approach was first developed and used in 1992 during hurricane Andrew and via a Joint Industry Project [PMB, 1993; PMB, 1996; Puskar et. al., 1994]. The Andrew work was used to help benchmark Section 17. The issue was further studied in 2004 for hurricane Lili via an MMS sponsored study [ABSC, 2004; Puskar et. al. 2004], and in 2006 for hurricane Ivan study [Energo, 2006; Puskar et. al., 2006] also under MMS sponsorship. The same approach used for these studies was used here for Katrina/Rita.

The platform's resistance is determined according to API RP2A procedures for steel and pile foundation design. The load that the platform experienced in Katrina and Rita is based upon the hindcast Katrina and Rita wave heights. These are then compared to see if the API analytical approach would have predicted the observed platform performance in Katrina and Rita.

The bias factor is a quantity which indicates the ratio between the true capacity of a platform versus its predicted strength (as analyzed per API RP2A recipe). If a platform survives after a hurricane, while the API RP2A recipe predicts it should have been destroyed, this platform has a bias factor greater than 1.0. In this case it would imply that the API RP2A recipe is conservative. The bias factor can be mathematically written as

$$\left[\frac{R}{S}\right]_{true} = B \cdot \left[\frac{R}{S}\right]_{computed} \tag{9.1}$$

in which R is the structural resistance capacity, and S is the maximum load induced during the Hurricane.

The bias factor is calculated via probabilistic analysis. This is because many quantities are best described by probabilistic variables. For example, the maximum wave height during a storm hour is best described by a probability distribution following a Forristall distribution. There are also uncertainties associated with hindcast data as well as platform capacity predictions. This probabilistic analysis is coupled with a "Bayesian Updating" technique to calculate bias factors from an assumed "prior" bias factor (assumed initially as 1.0), meaning there is neither conservatism, or unconservatism, in the API recipe. In other words, the API recipe predicts the platform performs perfectly.

Detailed formulations of the probabilistic bias factors and associated Bayesian updating can be found in previous bias factor studies [Energo, 2006].

Table 9.1 shows the capacity and load summaries for six platforms analyzed for bias factor calculations. These six represent a combination of survived and damaged cases where quality analysis results were available. Another effort is under way in API HEAT to analyze up to 10 additional platforms and these results should be published toward the end of 2007. The HEAT work will include several destroyed cases, resulting in a blend of survived, damaged, and destroyed cases. Most of the readily available analysis results are for damaged cases, since this has been the focus of operators. Consequently, it has limited the selection of platforms for the bias work (additional analysis is beyond the scope of this study).

For these six platforms, five were damaged (A, C, D, E and F), and one survived without damage (B) during Hurricanes Katrina or Rita. The capacities for these platforms were divided into two categories called Platform Damage Resistance and Platform Ultimate Resistance. The Platform Damage Resistance is the base shear at the time of first damage, measured as the base shear at which the first member or joint has a unity check of 1.0. The Platform Ultimate Resistance is the base shear at collapse of the platform as determined by a Section 17 pushover type analysis. This is also called the ultimate capacity of the platform. Also included in Table 9.1 is the Maximum Hindcast Base Shear for these platforms during Hurricanes Katrina or Rita based on the maximum wave height and associated current derived from the hindcast.

Table 9.1 – Six Platforms Analyzed for Hurricanes Katrina/Rita

Case	Category	Hurricane	Platform Damage Resistance (kip)	Platform Ultimate Resistance (kip)	Maximum Hindcast Base Shear (kip)
A	Damaged	Katrina	2825	3650	4230
B	Survived	Katrina	1200	3070	4035
C	Damaged	Rita	4804	5638	3956
D	Damaged	Rita	2531	4181	3715
E	Damaged	Katrina	1337	2554	999
F	Damaged	Rita	2000	2800	2533

The jacket bias factors calculated for the six platforms in Table 9.1 are shown in Figure 9.1. The “prior” bias factor is also shown in the figure in which it is assumed the mean value is 1.0 (no bias) and a COV (coefficient of variation) of 30% [Energo, 2006]. The case A platform has a bias factor of 1.15 after the Bayesian updating calculation. This is explained by comparing the capacity and the load values for this platform as listed in Table 9.1. For this platform, the Maximum Hindcast Base Shear during the hurricane is 4,230 kips, while the Platform Ultimate Resistance or collapse strength of the jacket is 3,650 kips. Thus this platform is expected to be destroyed during the hurricane, yet it only sustained damage to some joints.

The bias factor for the case C platform is calculated as 0.90, and can be explained similarly as described above. The maximum base shear during Hurricane Rita is predicted at 3,956 kips, with the damage capacity predicted at 4,804 kips. This platform is expected to survive Hurricane Rita intact, yet it sustained substantial damage to a horizontal frame. As a result, the bias factor is 0.90 and on the unconservative side.



Figure 9.1 – Jacket Bias Factors for Six Platforms Analyzed for Hurricanes Katrina/Rita

The bias factors for the six platforms analyzed can be combined probabilistically into a single bias factor, which is also shown in Figure 9.1. This combined bias factor was calculated to be 1.06, i.e., there is a 6% conservatism in the API RP2A recipe platform strength from the combined set of 6 platforms. See ABSC [2004] and Energo [2006] for more detailed explanations of this approach. Appendix B contains further details of the quantitative assessment.

9.2 Combined Bias Factor for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Ivan, Lili and Andrew

The bias factors calculated for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (6 platforms analyzed) can also be combined with previous results as analyzed for Hurricanes Andrew (9 platforms analyzed, [PMB, 1993]), Lili (3 platforms analyzed, [ABS, 2004]) and Ivan (6 platforms analyzed, [Energo, 2006]). This is shown in Figure 9.2 in which Hurricane Andrew has a bias factor of 1.09, Hurricane Lili has a bias factor of 1.24 and Hurricane Ivan has a bias factor of 1.0. After combining these results with the latest Katrina/Rita bias factor, the combined bias factor for jacket is 1.09.

It is important to note that the bias factor results are influenced by the following factors:

- The number of platform analyzed.
- The behavior of platform versus expectations. For example, if a large number of platforms chosen has unexpected failures, then the bias factor will be lower.

Due to these differences in the platforms chosen for these three different hurricanes, the bias factors obtained from these hurricanes should not be expected to match exactly between each other. Rather, they compliment each other and the combined bias factor is more representative than their individual components.

Based upon these results, the overall performance of API RP2A, considering all of these hurricanes, is conservative by about 10%. Note that this is in addition to the normal factors of safety that are included in design of platforms.

API HEAT plans to continue on with additional bias factor work from Katrina and Rita, considering 4-8 more platforms. This work should be published in later 2007.



Figure 9.2 – Jacket Bias Factor of Combined Results for Hurricanes Andrew, Lili, Ivan, Katrina and Rita

10.0 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This project has evaluated a large amount of information related to how fixed platforms performed in hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Some of these evaluations and findings were similar to those from other studies of fixed platform performance in hurricanes. For example, the fact that most of the destroyed platforms were older vintage structures of 1960s or 1970s design when there was little or no industry guidance on how to properly design a platform. Other findings were new to Katrina and Rita such as the destruction of newer generation platforms installed in the year 2000 or later. Further study determined that these failed platforms were medium and low consequence (of failure) platforms designed to lower environmental criteria.

Once again, the overall findings indicate that there was no life-loss or major environmental problems as a direct result of the hurricanes. This is attributable to the prior evacuation of the platforms and to the use of sub-surface safely valves and shut-in of wells prior to the hurricane arrival. This is similar to the overall findings in prior hurricanes.

The following summarizes the specific key results and associated recommendations identified by this study. The description is intentionally brief since this is a summary of prior discussion elsewhere in this report. See the indicated section for full details. The findings are listed in relative order of importance.

<u>1. Performance of A-2 manned-evacuated platforms.</u>
Result - All of the A-2 manned-evacuated platforms that were destroyed experienced metocean conditions equal to but mainly larger than the Section 17 A-2 Ultimate Strength Criteria. This confirms that these structures should be able to withstand the API defined Sudden Hurricane conditions in the event that a Sudden Hurricane occurs in the GOM. This ensures life safety. See Section 6.4. See also Result/Recommendation 4 in this section related to general performance of A-2 platforms.
Recommendation – API is still investigating the Sudden Hurricane conditions and if they have changed then the findings of this report need to be reconfirmed. Initial indications are that the Sudden Hurricane conditions are the same as before Katrina and Rita.

<u>2. Performance of L-1 platforms</u>
Result - There were no L-1 platforms that were destroyed or damaged in Katrina or Rita. L-1 represents the High Consequence API exposure category for fixed platforms and also the latest API approach for metocean loading including design to 100 yr conditions. Katrina and Rita essentially “proof loaded” several of these platform to loads at or above the L-1 criteria and the platforms survived with no major damage. This validates the L-1 design approach. See Sections 4.4 and 5.4.
Recommendation – No specific recommendation.

3. Performance of L-2 and L-3 Platforms

Result – There were nine (9) medium consequence L-2 and low consequence L-3 platforms destroyed that were installed since the year 2000. Several of these were installed in 2004. These failures are not a surprise since these platforms use lower design criteria than an L-1 platform. L-2 platforms are designed to 50 yr conditions and L-3 platforms are designed to 15 yr conditions. The lower design criteria allows these platforms to be installed at a lower cost than L-1 platforms as dictated by economics for marginal production. However, the failures did come as a surprise to some in the industry including in some cases the platform owner. See Section 4.4.

Recommendation: Owners need to be better educated that platforms designed to L-2 and L-3 are lower cost, but are designed to lower criteria and are susceptible to damage and destruction in large storms. One possible method to assist with this is better descriptions and limitations of categorizing L-2 and L-3 platforms, for example limits on production rates, water depth, etc.

4. Performance of A-2 platforms.

Result: There were more A-2 platforms damaged and destroyed than any other assessment category. Many owners assess their platform to A-2 and assume that it will be safe from hurricane damage, but this is not the case. In particular, the minimum A-2 deck elevation curve is used to determine if the platform is adequate. As noted in Item 5 below, the A-1 criteria should alternatively be considered for platforms that are determined to be of economic value to an owner. See Section 6.2.

Recommendation: Similar to L-2 and L-3 platforms, platform owners need to be better educated that a platform that passes A-2 assessment may still be damaged or destroyed in a large storm. The A-1 criteria is a better assessment target for platforms critical to the owners operation (even if the platform can be categorized as A-2).

5. Performance of A-1 platforms.

Result: There were 6 destroyed A-1 platforms of the 116 destroyed fixed platforms in Katrina and Rita. This is a relatively low percentage and confirms that the A-1 criterion is a reasonable assessment threshold. See Section 4.2.

Recommendation: Platforms that can pass the Section 17 A-1 check have a higher likelihood of survival in large storms. Platform owners should be educated that this is a preferred criteria for platforms critical to their operations. See Item 4 above.

6. Wave in Deck (WID) platform damage.

Result: There was significant destruction and damage to platforms and topsides equipment in these hurricanes due to WID. This resulted in significant costs and downtime to make repairs or find alternate means of production. See Section 6.1.

Recommendation: Platform owners should be educated on the destruction or damage and associated potential downtime that can occur for platforms that have low decks or when critical production or other equipment and systems are located on lower decks that can be impacted by waves. Consideration should be given to relocate such equipment to higher decks.

7. API Bias Factor.

Result: The API Bias factor that describes the accuracy of API RP2A in terms of being able to predict platform performance was determined to be 1.06 for Katrina and Rita and 1.09 for a combination of all recent hurricanes. In simple terms, this implies that the API platform design approach has a conservatism of about 6 to 9 percent, above and beyond all known conservatisms related to factors of safety, etc. This is about the same value as determined for other hurricanes and has not changed with the addition of Katrina and Rita results.

Recommendation: The detailed probabilistic assessment that has been used since hurricane Andrew continues to show that RP2A does a good job and is adequate for design of fixed platforms. This quantitative approach to assess the accuracy of RP2A should be continued for future large hurricanes.

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Appendix A

Qualitative Assessment – Additional Data

A.1 Destroyed Platforms

A.2 Damaged Platforms

A.3 Damage Photos

Table A.1 – Destroyed Platforms

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
Katrina	GI 32 J	1965	106	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	56.8	43.1
Katrina	GI 40 B	1956	83	No	OTHER	A-2	Unknown	50.5	41.1
Katrina	GI 40 F	1960	86	No	8-P	A-2	Unknown	53.2	44.1
Katrina	GI 41 A	1964	91	No	4-P	A-2	Unknown	53.5	44.3
Katrina	GI 47 C	1957	88	No	OTHER	A-2	Unknown	53.2	42.5
Katrina	GI 48 D	1959	86	No	8-P	A-2	Unknown	50.5	42.6
Katrina	MP 138 A	1991	158	Yes	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	76.2	56.8
Katrina	MP 298 B-VALVE	1972	222	No	4-P	A-2	43	79.5	55.7
Katrina	MP 306 D	1969	255	Yes	8-P	A-2	46	83.8	58.9
Katrina	MP 312 JA	1997	248	No	TRI	A-2	37.1	80.9	56.4
Katrina	PL 20 39	1987	30	No	Unknown	A-3	Unknown	24.7	22.4
Katrina	SP 62 A	1967	340	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	85.0	57.7
Katrina	SP 62 B	1968	322	No	8-P	A-2	42	85.6	59.9
Katrina	ST 21 1	1958	37	No	TRI	A-3	26.1	31.1	28.5
Katrina	ST 21 22	1961	36	No	TRI	A-3	24.9	30.3	27.8
Katrina	ST 21 25	1961	40	No	TRI	A-3	24	33.5	30.6
Katrina	ST 21 27	1961	40	No	TRI	A-3	21.8	33.5	30.6
Katrina	ST 21 31	1961	36	No	TRI	A-3	24.7	30.3	27.8
Katrina	ST 21 66	1965	45	No	TRI	A-3	32.4	37.4	34.2
Katrina	ST 21 67	1964	46	No	TRI	A-3	28.6	38.1	34.9
Katrina	ST 21 71	1965	48	No	TRI	A-3	29.5	38.6	35.4
Katrina	ST 21 75	1965	47	No	TRI	A-3	33.7	38.6	35.4
Katrina	ST 21 E	1973	40	No	4-P	A-2	29.5	33.5	30.6
Katrina	ST 135 M	1966	116	No	6-P	A-2	37.8	53.8	41.7
Katrina	ST 151 G	1961	137	No	8-P	A-2	38	57.5	42.4
Katrina	ST 151 I	1963	128	No	8-P	A-2	38.3	55.1	41.7
Katrina	ST 151 O	1967	137	No	8-P	A-2	42.7	57.5	42.4
Katrina	ST 161 A	1964	117	Yes	8-P	A-2	46.1	55.1	41.3
Katrina	ST 161 B	1969	120	Yes	4-P	A-2	41.3	53.6	39.2
Katrina	ST 176 A	1963	140	No	8-P	A-2	38.4	57.0	41.3
Katrina	WD 69 C	1962	121	No	OTHER	A-2	Unknown	56.8	43.1
Katrina	WD 69 K	1966	134	No	6-P	A-2	Unknown	60.3	45.3
Katrina	WD 70 H	1965	141	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	61.7	45.9
Katrina	WD 94 G	1964	153	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	61.7	45.9
Katrina	WD 103 A	1965	223	Yes	8-P	A-2	39	70.9	50.7
Katrina	WD 103 B	1965	228	Yes	8-P	A-2	41	70.9	50.7
Katrina	WD 104 C	1965	228	Yes	8-P	A-1	39.7	70.9	50.7
Katrina	WD 117 C	1965	214	No	8-P	A-2	39.8	68.5	49.4

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
Katrina	WD 117 D	1969	195	No	8-P	A-2	43	68.5	49.4
Katrina	WD 117 E	1969	208	No	8-P	A-2	43	68.5	49.4
Katrina	WD 117 F	1974	200	No	8-P	A-2	47	68.5	49.4
Katrina	WD 117 QRT	1982	214	Yes	4-P	A-2	50	68.5	47.6
Katrina	WD 133 B	1966	285	Yes	8-P	A-1	43.7	74.7	52.8
Katrina	WD 137 A	2000	310	No	TRI	L-2	50	72.8	48.8
Katrina	ST 161 D	1979	120	Yes	4-P	A-2	52.4	58.2	40.2
Rita	EC 71 8	2004	53	No	Unknown	L-3	Unknown	41.3	34.3
Rita	EC 151 C	2000	80	No	B-CAS	L-3	52	55.4	42.0
Rita	EC 160 A-Aux	1983	85	No	B-CAS	A-3	13.5	55.8	41.2
Rita	EC 160 C	1984	84	No	B-CAS	A-3	24.7	55.8	41.2
Rita	EC 161 A	2000	85	No	CAS	L-3	30.8	55.5	40.9
Rita	EC 195 A	1969	103	Yes	4-P	A-2	47.8	58.5	41.1
Rita	EC 222 A - AUX	1973	110	Yes	4-P	A-2	43	59.9	41.8
Rita	EC 222 D	2004	123	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	60.5	41.0
Rita	EC 254 B	1972	164	No	4-P	A-2	43.7	64.7	42.4
Rita	EC 272 A	1971	182	Yes	4-P	A-2	46	66.5	43.0
Rita	EC 272 A-AUX1	1972	182	No	4-P	A-2	46	66.5	43.0
Rita	EC 286 B	1990	188	No	TRI	A-2	55	64.8	41.8
Rita	EC 322 A	1974	230	Yes	8-P	A-2	38.5	68.7	45.2
Rita	EI 276 B-PRD	1965	172	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	64.1	41.7
Rita	EI 276 D	1968	176	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	64.1	41.7
Rita	EI 294 A	1980	204	Yes	4-P	A-2	Unknown	68.2	43.5
Rita	EI 313 B	1976	240	Yes	8-P	A-2	51	72.7	47.7
Rita	EI 313 C	1991	230	No	TRI	A-2	39.8	70.6	44.8
Rita	EI 314 F	1972	230	No	4-P	A-2	27.7	70.5	44.7
Rita	EI 314 J	1985	230	Yes	4-P	A-1	40.3	70.5	44.7
Rita	EI 330 S	1972	254	No	4-P	A-1	39.9	72.4	45.9
Rita	EI 333 A	1973	231	Yes	8-P	A-2	53.5	72.7	47.7
Rita	EI 338 A	1972	253	Yes	8-P	A-2	55	74.5	48.9
Rita	GC 237 A-Typhoon	2001	2107	Yes	Mini TLP	Floater	Unknown	78.7	51.8
Rita	HI A 467 D	1997	195	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	44.1	28.2
Rita	SM 11 B	1969	68	No	4-P	A-2	30.2	49.8	38.1
Rita	SM 11 J	1968	68	No	TRI	A-3	16.5	49.8	38.1
Rita	SM 11 K	1970	68	No	TRI	A-3	43.9	49.8	38.1
Rita	SM 49 B	1966	98	No	4-P	A-2	42.3	55.5	38.3
Rita	SM 66 A	1962	128	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	59.5	39.4
Rita	SM 66 E	2000	134	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	61.2	40.1
Rita	SM 76 B	1964	140	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	61.2	40.1
Rita	SM 90 A	1996	163	No	B-CAS	A-2	52.5	65.0	41.8

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
Rita	SM 108 D	1968	183	No	6-P	A-1	35.8	67.6	44.1
Rita	SM 128 A-PRD	1976	228	No	4-P	A-2	44.6	70.7	44.8
Rita	SS 69 16	1997	28	No	CAS	A-3	19	20.8	19.0
Rita	SS 148 H	1995	44	No	CAS	A-3	54	33.3	30.2
Rita	SS 169 A	1961	54	No	8-P	A-2	44.3	41.1	36.8
Rita	SS 177 C	1984	92	No	4-P	A-3	40.5	56.4	39.6
Rita	SS 181 K	2004	67	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	51.3	38.6
Rita	SS 193 B	1997	86	No	CAS	A-3	52.7	57.1	41.4
Rita	SS 218 D	2004	112	No	Unknown	L-2	Unknown	59.7	40.9
Rita	SS 219 C	1972	113	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	60.0	42.2
Rita	SS 253 A-AUX	1970	165	Yes	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	65.4	42.4
Rita	SS 269 A	1965	170	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	66.3	44.4
Rita	ST 51 CH	1977	62	No	CAS	A-3	14	47.4	37.7
Rita	ST 146 A	1998	96	No	B-CAS	A-2	57.5	56.1	41.4
Rita	VR 131 5	1964	56	No	4-P	A-3	30.1	43.4	35.2
Rita	VR 131 CF	1971	57	No	4-P	A-2	37.6	44.2	36.0
Rita	VR 201 A	1972	83	Yes	4-P	A-2	43.3	58.3	40.7
Rita	VR 217 A	1966	121	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	60.0	40.5
Rita	VR 245 B	1965	126	Yes	4-P	A-2	41.5	62.9	41.7
Rita	VR 245 C - DRILL	1965	131	No	4-P	A-2	51.5	62.9	41.7
Rita	VR 255 A	1964	158	No	4-P	A-2	42.3	64.3	41.8
Rita	VR 255 B	1970	152	Yes	8-P	A-1	43.3	64.3	43.3
Rita	VR 273 A	1995	185	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	67.2	43.0
Rita	VR 340 JA	1995	227	No	TRI	A-2	49	72.2	45.4
Rita	WC 45 5	1966	28	No	4-P	A-3	29.8	22.3	21.3
Rita	WC 56 CAIS.#15	1997	34	No	CAS	A-3	19.8	27.0	25.7
Rita	WC 110 1	1964	40	No	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	31.5	30.4
Rita	WC 110 10	1980	40	No	CAS	A-3	Unknown	31.5	30.4
Rita	WC 110 3	1968	40	No	CAS	Unknown	Unknown	31.4	30.4
Rita	WC 110 9	1977	41	No	CAS	Unknown	Unknown	32.2	31.2
Rita	WC 168 CAIS.#2	1999	44	No	CAS	A-3	Unknown	34.5	32.6
Rita	WC 172 E	1999	47	No	Unknown	A-3	Unknown	36.9	34.8
Rita	WC 176 2	1964	49	No	4-P	A-3	31.1	38.9	35.1
Rita	WC 229 A	1969	65	No	4-P	A-3	35	47.6	37.2
Rita	WC 313 1	1985	59	No	CAS	A-2	68	42.6	34.1
Rita	SS 169 A-AUX1	1960	54	No	4-P	A-3	37		
Rita	VR 313 A	1976	210	No	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	71.2	45.1
Rita	WC 225 6	2001	58	No	CAS	L-3	Unknown	45.8	37.8
Rita	WC 537 A-AUX1	1979	187	No	CAS	A-2	12	58.8	39.7

Note: Non-highlighted cells match the "Impact Assessment of Offshore Facilities from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita" MMS release. Highlighted cells were identified by Platform Owner after the MMS release as having been destroyed.

Table A.2 – Damaged Platforms

Platform Location	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
VR	1958	25	No	Unknown	A-1	24.5	19.9	18.7
EI	1980	146	No	4-P	A-1	46.5	61.9	40.7
SP	1970	260	No	Unknown	A-1	48.75	80.1	58.2
SP	1980	300	No	8-P	A-1	50	81.8	57.7
EI	1979	320	Yes	Unknown	A-1	45.17	76.1	48.4
MP	1968	320	No	Unknown	A-1	45	80.1	53.7
MC	1978	425	Yes	Unknown	A-1	49	77.9	53.9
SS	1985	438	Yes	Unknown	A-1	43.5	74.1	48.2
SP	1991	531	No	Unknown	A-1	51.9	85.7	60.2
MC	1980	651	Yes	Unknown	A-1	52	87.3	61.4
EI	1949	17	No	OTHER	A-1	29.5	12.9	11.8
SM	1964	130	Yes	Unknown	A-1	55	60.3	39.8
VR	1972	165	No	Unknown	A-1	53	65.9	44.2
SM	1978	190	Yes	Unknown	A-1	41.5	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1972	241	Yes	12-P	A-1	49.5	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1979	316	Yes	4-P SK	A-1	49.5	Unknown	Unknown
VK	1999	1130	Yes	Unknown	A-1	47	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1956	27	No	40-P	A-2	22.16	21.0	19.6
WC	1986	44	No	TRI	A-2	57.1	34.5	32.9
EC	1967	47	No	Unknown	A-2	45	36.7	31.3
EC	1962	51	No	10-P	A-2	37.8	40.4	35.1
EI	1964	52	No	10-P	A-2	31.0	39.6	34.7
SM	1988	54	Yes	4-P	A-2	63.3	41.9	37.3
ST	1985	56	No	Unknown	A-2	51	42.7	35.4
SS	1965	62	No	8-P	A-2	42	47.4	41.0
WD	1964	83	No	Unknown	A-2	48.6	43.8	36.9
WD	1964	87	Yes	Unknown	A-2	36	43.8	35.6
ST	1982	100	No	Unknown	A-2	48	53.9	40.7
VK	1991	102	No	Unknown	A-2	51	63.9	54.5
ST	1971	105	No	Unknown	A-2	41	58.6	41.4
ST	1982	108	No	Unknown	A-2	51	57.7	42.6
VR	1976	131	No	Unknown	A-2	46	62.9	41.9
SM	1963	132	No	Unknown	A-2	39.5	62.0	41.3
EI	1963	139	No	Unknown	A-2	42.5	61.2	40.5
EI	1964	139	No	Unknown	A-2	40	61.2	40.5
ST	1962	140	No	Unknown	A-2	44	59.1	42.7
ST	1966	145	No	Unknown	A-2	35.1	55.8	39.7
MP	1994	158	Yes	4-P	A-2	52	75.8	56.7
ST	1962	160	No	Unknown	A-2	38.4	55.8	40.7

Platform Location	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
VR	1971	169	No	8-P	A-2	42.9	65.8	43.2
ST	1961	180	No	Unknown	A-2	38.5	60.5	42.6
EC	1972	182	Yes	Unknown	A-2	46	66.5	42.9
EI	1973	225	Yes	Unknown	A-2	38	70.0	46.1
MP	1969	241	Yes	8-P	A-2	46	82.3	57.6
EI	1971	244	Yes	8-P	A-2	43	72.4	46.5
EI	1971	248	Yes	8-P	A-2	39	74.5	48.9
EI	1972	254	Yes	8-P	A-2	45.5	72.4	46.5
EI	1982	268	Yes	6-P	A-2	52	74.5	48.0
MP	1982	270	Yes	Unknown	A-2	47.7	81.8	58.9
MP	1978	271	Yes	4-P SK	A-2	49	83.8	56.2
MP	1968	289	No	Unknown	A-2	42	80.1	56.1
WD	1970	373	Yes	Unknown	A-2	63	82.4	56.8
EW	1990	477	Yes	Unknown	A-2	58	75.9	50.5
EI	1951	22	No	OTHER	A-2	23	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1979	32	Yes	4-P	A-2	54	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1959	45	No	6-P	A-2	32	Unknown	Unknown
EC	1955	52	No	Unknown	A-2	51	Unknown	Unknown
WC	1957	56	No	Unknown	A-2	34.4	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1964	65	Yes	Unknown	A-2	52.9	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1993	77	No	Unknown	A-2	54.6	Unknown	Unknown
EC	1957	85	Yes	4-P SK	A-2	51	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1972	110	No	Unknown	A-2	46.5	Unknown	Unknown
ST	1973	116	Yes	Unknown	A-2	53	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1971	165	Yes	Unknown	A-2	53	65.9	44.2
SS	1978	166	No	4-P	A-2	44.5	Unknown	Unknown
EC	1989	177	Yes	Unknown	A-2	55	Unknown	Unknown
WD	1968	180	Yes	Unknown	A-2	37.3	59.6	43.5
SM	1978	190	No	Unknown	A-2	44.8	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1977	202	Yes	4-P	A-2	48	Unknown	Unknown
MP	1986	207	No	Unknown	A-2	62.8	79.1	56.6
VR	1979	324	Yes	4-P	A-2	47.8	Unknown	Unknown
SP	1987	325	No	Unknown	A-2	55	85.0	59.9
SP	1986	356	Yes	Unknown	A-2	50	84.4	58.0
SM	1984	10	No	Unknown	A-3	13.5	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1983	28	No	Unknown	A-3	39.5	22.1	20.2
VR	1965	33	No	4-P	A-3	32.4	25.7	23.1
MP	1995	45	No	Unknown	A-3	14.2	Unknown	Unknown
MP	1996	45	No	Unknown	A-3	18.7	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1971	55	No	4-P	A-3	32.6	42.7	34.7
WC	1998	56	No	Unknown	A-3	19.4	Unknown	Unknown

Platform Location	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
VR	1979	57	No	4-P	A-3	32	44.2	35.8
EC	1998	58	No	B-CAS	A-3	49	Unknown	Unknown
WC	1989	75	No	CAS	A-3	14.5	Unknown	Unknown
WC	1988	75	No	CAS	A-3	14.5	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1988	20	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1972	22	No	TRI	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1983	23	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1979	24	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
VR	1983	24	No	Unknown	A-3	36	18.9	17.8
SS	1985	25	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1972	25	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1992	30	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1981	30	No	CAS	A-3	3	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1986	32	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1979	32	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1974	40	No	4-P	A-3	4.83	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1973	43	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1982	45	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1986	47	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1987	48	No	TRI	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1967	48	No	TRI	A-3	10	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1986	48	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1967	49	No	TRI	A-3	10	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1978	49	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
ST	1963	49	No	Unknown	A-3	28.2	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1969	49	No	CAS	A-3	3	Unknown	Unknown
ST	1965	49	No	Unknown	A-3	27.8	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1992	50	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1980	50	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1968	51	No	CAS	A-3	10	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1982	55	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1989	55	No	CAS	A-3	15	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1957	85	No	Unknown	A-3	48.6	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1998	151	No	Unknown	A-3	54	52.3	40.2
SM	2000	23	No	Unknown	L-3	0	Unknown	Unknown
WC	2000	26	No	Unknown	L-3	13.5	Unknown	Unknown
EI	2001	60	No	Unknown	L-3	20	Unknown	Unknown
WC	1942	30	Yes	36-P	Unknown	Unknown	23.8	22.3
WC	1961	33	No	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	26.2	24.9
MP	2002	47	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
EC	1963	50	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	39.7	35.9
MP	2004	59	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
ST	1956	65	No	24-P	A-2	Unknown	49.8	39.3

Platform Location	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned / Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
WC	2005	73	No	CAS	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
EC	1996	81	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	52.9	38.4
GI	1970	86	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	53.3	43.6
GI	1976	90	No	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	50.9	41.9
SS	1963	103	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	58.9	40.5
ST	1966	120	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	58.8	42.4
VR	1993	121	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	60.2	42.8
WD	1962	137	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	61.7	47.4
WD	1967	148	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	62.9	47.8
WD	1968	150	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	65.1	48.9
WD	1973	150	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	65.1	48.9
GI	1989	203	No	Unknown	A-2	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
MP	2003	205	No	TRI	Unknown	Unknown	75.3	54.6
EI	1973	235	Yes	8-P SK	Unknown	Unknown	72.6	46.6
EI	1973	235	No	4-P SK	Unknown	Unknown	72.6	46.0
EC	1982	240	Yes	Unknown	A-2	47	66.9	44.2
WD	1963	30	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
MP	1991	36	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
CA	1984	40	No	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
MP	1985	45	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1984	60	No	Unknown	A-3	20.2	Unknown	Unknown
WD	1962	63	No	OTHER	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
GI	1966	91	Yes	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	53.6	43.9
WD	1965	135	Yes	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	61.7	47.4
GI	1967	140	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
WD	1970	156	No	6-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1962	165	No	Unknown	A-1	Unknown	63.5	43.0
VR	2004	176	No	TRI	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
VR	2003	177	Yes	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1972	205	No	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
GI	1974	210	Yes	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1975	235	Yes	8-P SK	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
EI	1976	235	No	4-P SK	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
SS	1976	240	Yes	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	69.3	46.2
MP	1998	302	No	TRI	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
SP	1968	325	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	85.0	57.7
SP	1985	450	Yes	8-P SK	Unknown	Unknown	88.9	60.0
SP	1990	472	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	85.6	58.4
SP	1977	552	Yes	8-P SK	A-1	Unknown	88.9	60.0
VK	1994	1290	No	Unknown	A-1	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

A.3 Damage Photos

Vertical Diagonal Damage

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Damaged vertical diagonals and horizontal noted to be around (+) 10'.

Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Damaged vertical diagonals around (-) 147'.

Damaged East Cameron Area Platform – Severed vertical diagonal around (-) 40'.



Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Missing vertical diagonal around (-) 147'.

Damaged South Marsh Island Area Platform – Damaged vertical diagonals and horizontal noted to be around (+) 10'.

X-Brace Damage

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Damaged X-brace.



Damaged Vermillion Area Platform – Crushed X-Brace. Through member wall thickness not thick enough. Damage located at approximately (-) 60'

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Crushed X-Brace.

Figure 6: GI-40 I photograph of damage to X-brace on Row 2

Joint Damage

Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Cracked horizontal member located at the (-)40'. Typical conductor guide framing fatigue damage.

Damaged East Cameron Area Platform – Cracked horizontal member. Typical fatigue damage.



Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Cracked horizontal member located at the (-)40'. Typical conductor guide framing fatigue damage.

Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Cracked horizontal member located at the (-)40'. Typical conductor guide framing fatigue damage.

Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Cracked horizontal member located at the (-)40'. Typical conductor guide framing fatigue damage.

Leg Buckles



Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Local bulge found at the (-) 90'.

Damaged Mississippi Canyon Area Platform – Buckled leg found at the (-) 16'.



Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Local bulge found at the (-) 96'.

Damaged Mississippi Canyon Area Platform – Buckled and fully separated "Pancake" Leg found at the (-) 35'.



Damaged South Timbalier Area Platform – Local buckle
and fully separated leg found at the (-) 38'.



Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Local buckle and fully separated leg found at the (-) 139'.

Damaged Eugene Island Area Platform – Buckle and fully separated "Pancake" leg found at the (-) 94'.

Damaged West Delta Area Platform – Buckled and fully separated "Pancake" leg at the (-)320'. Damage occurs in the nominal section of leg just under the joint can section of leg. Transition includes change in leg diameter from 54" to 53", material yield strength from 42 ksi to 36 ksi and a differential of 1" in material thickness.



Damaged Vermillion Area Platform – Buckled and fully separated “Pancake” Leg found at the (-) 84’.

Major Topsides Structural Damage

Major Structural Damaged Platform – Damaged Truss Row Node.
Cracked flange plate and separated vertical diagonal.

Major Structural Damaged Platform – Damaged Truss Row Node.
Wide flange beam separated from vertical diagonal extension plate.

Wave In Deck
Structural Damage

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Bent cellar deck beams typical wave in deck damage. Bent beams located at the southern edge of cellar deck and bottom of steel noted to be at (+) 50'.

Damaged Green Canyon Area Platform – Bent cellar deck beams typical wave in deck damage. Bottom of steel of cellar deck noted to be at (+) 50'.



Damaged East Cameron Area Platform – Bent cellar deck beams typical wave in deck damage.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Bent main deck beams typical wave in deck damage. Top of steel of main deck noted to be at (+) 73'.

Damaged Eugene Island Area – Bent cellar deck girder typical wave in deck damage.
Girder bent towards northwest indicating a wave from the southeast.
Measured bottom of steel of cellar deck noted to be at (+) 40'-3".

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Bent cellar deck beams and handrails typical wave in deck damage. Top of steel of cellar deck noted to be at (+) 55'.

Wave In Deck
Non-Structural Damage

Damaged Main Pass Area Platform – Destroyed Escape
Capsule on cellar deck typical wave in deck damage.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Damaged production equipment skids, piping, and cable trays typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be between (+) 50' and (+) 73' from MLLW.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Shifted MCC and Quarters Building and Generator Skid typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be on the south side of platform and above (+) 73'.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Damaged production equipment skids, piping, and cable trays typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be between (+) 50' and (+) 73' from MLLW. Wave impact from southeast direction.

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Destroyed Quarters Building typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be on the south side of platform and above (+) 55'.



Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Damaged production equipment skids, piping, and cable trays typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be between (+) 50' and (+) 73' from MLLW.



Damaged East Cameron Area Platform – Damaged production equipment skids, piping, and cable trays typical wave in deck damage.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Destroyed Communications building and missing grating on cellar deck typical wave in deck damage. Area of damage noted to be above (+) 50' from MLLW.

Damaged Mississippi Canyon Area Platform –
Debris pile on cellar deck typical wave in deck damage.

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Damaged bridge
between two platforms typical wave in deck damage.

Topsides Wind Damage

Damaged South Pass Area Platform – Collapsed vent tower on east side of platform.

Damaged Ewing Banks Area Platform – Displaced AC units due to wind.



Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Control Panel knocked over due to wind.

Damaged Grand Isle Area Platform – Helideck Panels missing due to wind.

Minor Topsides Non-Structural Damage



Minor Damaged Platform – Damaged grating from well movement.

Minor Damaged Platform – Missing grating and handrails at (+) 15' from MLLW.

Minor Damaged Platform – Loose timbers on drilling deck.

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Appendix B

Quantitative Assessment – Additional Data

Platform Summary during Katrina and Rita (for Bias Factor Calculations)

									Hindcast Hour 1			Hindcast Hour 2			Hindcast Hour 3							
Platform	**Category**	**Failure Mode**	**Year Installed**	**Design Water Depth (ft)**	**Jacket Resistance Damage (kip)**	**Jacket Resistance Ultimate (kip)**	**Max. Expected Base Shear (kip)**	**Wave Height Hitting Deck(ft)**	**Hs (ft)**	**Current (knots)**	**Tp (sec)**	**Hs (ft)**	**Current (knots)**	**Tp (sec)**	**Hs (ft)**	**Current (knots)**	**Tp (sec)**	**C1**	**C2**	**C3**	**C4**	**Hurricane**
A	Damage	Damage of 3 X-brace joints	1973	153	2825	3650	4230	74	34.8	1.6	16.2	35.8	1.9	15.9	34.6	2.2	15.5	0.585	5.975	2.058	0.013	Katrina
B	Survival	N/A	1965	137	1200	3070	4035	63	33.0	1.6	16.5	34.1	1.9	16.1	33.3	2.3	15.7	0.653	4.717	2.071	0.011	Katrina
C	Damage	Damage of conductor guide	1981	58	4804	5638	3956	53	24.5	4.1	13.2	26.1	4.3	13.0	26.1	4.2	12.4	3.993	4.261	1.656	0.703	Rita
D	Damage	Damage of 1 VD and HZs	1972	188	2531	4181	3715	79	36.8	2.9	14.5	36.8	3.2	14.2	36.0	3.6	13.4	0.441	5.667	2.042	5.24E-03	Rita
E	Damage	Damage of 2 VDs and 2 HZs	1967	91	1337	2554	999	76	24.3	1.8	12.7	25.0	2.0	13.0	24.6	2.1	13.0	0.381	5.124	1.958	0.046	Katrina
F	Damage	Damage of 2 VDs and 1 HZ members	1976	112	2000	2800	2533	68	31.6	3.2	14.2	32.0	3.2	14.1	31.7	3.0	13.9	0.96	3.99	1.853	0.054	Rita

Category: Platform state after hurricanes.
Jacket Resistance, Damage: Platform base shear when first structural component fails.
Jacket Resistance, Ultimate: Platform base shear at ultimate capacity.
Max. Expected Base Shear: Maximum base shear platform experienced (based on hindcast).
Wave Height Hitting Deck: The wave height as the crest reaches the cellar deck.
Hindcast Hour1: Hindcast data taken one hour before the wave reaches the max. at the location.
Hindcast Hour2: Hindcast data as the wave reaches the max. at the location.
Hindcast Hour3: Hindcast data taken one hour after the wave reaches the max. at the location.
C1, C2, C3, and C4: Coefficients used in the simplified base shear equation.

Platform A


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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0.4
0
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.1
0
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.80
1.20
0.60
0.00
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor

Platform B


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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1.2
0.9
0.6
0.3
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor

Platform C


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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1.2
0.9
0.6
0.3
0
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Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.2
0.1
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Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.8
1.2
0.6
0.0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor

Platform D


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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0.6
0.3
0
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Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.80
1.20
0.60
0.00
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Bias Factor

Platform E


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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0.6
0.3
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Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.8
1.2
0.6
0.0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor

Platform F


Prior Distribution
Probability Density
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0.9
0.6
0.3
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Likelihood
Probability
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0.5
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor


Posterior Distribution
Probability
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1.2
0.6
0.0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Bias Factor

Combined for All Platforms



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Appendix C

Performance of Fixed Platform Foundations

Foundation System Performance of Fixed Base Platforms in Hurricanes Rita and Katrina

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Introduction

One significant conclusion from the performance of jacket platforms in Hurricanes Andrew, Roxanne, Lili, Ivan, Katrina and Rita is that pile foundations perform better than expected (e.g., Aggrawal et al. 1996; Bea et al. 1999; Energo 2006). Push-over analyses for jackets subjected to forces greater than their design capacities commonly indicate that the foundation governs the capacity of the structural system. However, we know of few if any foundation failures that occurred in any of these hurricanes.

While the lack of foundation failures may be considered acceptable in terms of reliability, it is a cause for concern when the structural design is being governed by an unlikely failure mode. First, the design may be overly costly. The pile foundation can contribute nearly half the total cost of a new structure. Furthermore, existing structures may be unnecessarily limited in how they are operated (manning and production) because of a “weak” foundation. Second, less attention in design and analysis may be directed at more realistic failures modes above the mudline if the foundation is unrealistically governing the capacity of the structural system.

The objective of this report is to explore and discuss this discrepancy between predicted and observed performance for foundations. Background information on why actual pile capacities can be greater than those predicted is presented and then a platform that was loaded beyond its design capacity in Hurricane Katrina is analyzed in detail.

Background

There are two major reasons that explain why actual pile capacities may be greater than those predicted: (1) the API design method for pile foundations is intended for design and not necessarily to predict foundation capacity accurately and (2) the available data that have been used to develop the API design method are of limited relevance to field conditions for offshore piles.

API Method for Design and not Prediction

The intent of the API design method is to produce reliable and economic foundation designs, not necessarily to predict pile capacities accurately. While attempts have been made to calibrate the design capacities with pile load tests (e.g., Olson and Dennis 1982; and Tang and Gilbert 1992), there is significant scatter in the results. In addition, the design method includes comparing design loads and design capacities either through a factor of safety or through load and resistance factors. Therefore, it is difficult to change the design method without systematically considering all of the various combinations of design loads and design capacities that are used to arrive at a foundation design. Since there have been few (if any) unexpected failures of foundations in hurricanes, there has been little motivation to question or improve the design method.

Pile Load Databases are Limited

The API design methods for driven piles are ultimately empirical and based on databases of pile load tests. For reference, the data used to develop the API design methods for axially loaded piles in clay and in sand are shown on Figures 1 and 2, respectively (Shadi 2005). There are several notable features of these data that explain limitations in the design methods.

The measured axial capacities in the databases are generally smaller than 500 kips (Figs. 1 and 2), while offshore piles typically have design capacities that are between 1,000 and 10,000 kips. Therefore, the data used to develop the design methods are for piles that are considerably smaller than those used for offshore jackets. This difference in scale is important because of interactions between the pile and the surrounding soil when it is driven. For example, disturbance of the soil near the ground surface during driving may have a large impact on the axial capacity for a 25-foot long pile but be negligible for a 250-foot long pile. The difference in scale between the data and offshore piles is also important because it contributes uncertainty to the predicted capacity. Conservatism is used in design to compensate for this uncertainty.

There is significant scatter between measured and predicted capacities (Figs. 1 and 2) even though the design methods tend to produce unbiased predictions (that is, the methods work on average when compared to the pile load test data). This scatter, which is particularly large for piles in sand (Fig. 2), leads to uncertainty in the predicted pile capacity. Over the past twenty years, the offshore industry has conducted additional pile load tests and analyses in an attempt to improve the methods for predicting the capacity of piles in sand (e.g., Lehane and Jardine 1994). These newer prediction methods will be considered in the detailed analysis for the Katrina platform described below.

The axial loads in the pile load tests are not applied in the same way that an offshore pile is loaded in a hurricane. The two main differences are the time between installation and loading and the rate of loading. The pile load tests were generally conducted on piles within days or weeks after driving, while the offshore piles are generally loaded by hurricanes many years or even decades after they have been driven. Since the axial capacity of piles tends to increase with time after driving (called set up), it is difficult to predict the capacity of an offshore pile with the available data. In addition, loads in a load test are generally applied over a period of hours and constitute static loads. However, the peak loads applied to an offshore pile in a hurricane are dynamic and applied over about five to ten seconds. Again, since the axial capacity tends to increase with the rate of loading, it is difficult to predict the capacity of an offshore pile with the available data.

A final limitation in the pile load data bases is that the soil profiles in the load tests were generally simple, e.g. either primarily "clay" or "sand." However, actual profiles for long offshore piles can be more complicated with multiple layers of sand and clay over the length of the pile.



Figure 1 Measured versus Predicted Axial Pile Capacity for Pile Load Test Database – Cohesive Soil (Clay)



Figure 2 Measured versus Predicted Axial Pile Capacity for Pile Load Test Database – Cohesionless Soil (Sand)

Analysis of Katrina Platform

A platform that survived Hurricane Katrina but was expected to fail in the foundation was selected for a detailed analysis. This platform, labeled Case B in the main report, is an eight-pile jacket in 137 feet of water. According to the ultimate strength pushover analysis for this platform, the foundation for this platform was subjected to a load during Hurricane Katrina that was well in excess of its computed capacity. Figure 3 shows the results of the pushover analyses for this platform. The SACS results using the API design methods as input for the capacity indicate an overturning failure in the foundation at a base shear of about 3,070 kips (the curve labeled "original soils" in Fig. 3). For comparison, the required API Section 17, A-2 ultimate strength is a base shear of 3,300 kips and the estimated base shear applied by Hurricane Katrina is 4,050 kips.



Figure 3 Ultimate Strength Analysis for the End-On Direction for Case B Platform

Foundation System Capacity

In order to focus on the capacity of the foundation system, a simplified plasticity model for system collapse was used. This model, which was developed to analyze foundation systems by Murff and Wesselink (1986) and later extended by Tang and Gilbert (1992), is shown schematically in Figure 4. The structure above the foundation is assumed to behave rigidly and the internal work associated with plastic hinges forming in the piles and the piles rotating laterally and moving axially through the soil is calculated. It is a useful model in that the entire system of piles is represented, including the effects of batter and interactions between axial and lateral capacities. It is also a useful model because it is relatively simple and conducive to sensitivity analyses.



Figure 4 Schematic of Foundation System Model for Plastic Collapse

The estimated capacity of the Case B Platform foundation system is shown on Figure 5. This result is based on the geotechnical data for this platform, the geometry and properties of the piles, and the vertical load that was applied to the foundation at the mudline (estimated from the SACS results). The capacity is shown as combinations of horizontal force and overturning moment that will cause failure of the eight-pile system.

There are three distinct zones of interaction between the horizontal force and the overturning moment that cause failure. The zone labeled “Shear Failure” corresponds to a lateral failure at the pile heads (that is, the platform shears off at the mudline). Since the piles are battered, the platform will tend to rock back if there is no overturning moment to hold it down. Therefore, the maximum horizontal force that can be applied increases as the overturning moment increases in this zone. The zone labeled “Overturning Failure” corresponds to axial failures of the corner piles with the back piles pulling out from and the front piles plunging into the soil. The zone labeled “Combined Shear & Overturning Failure” is a more complicated failure mode where the failure of the foundation system is due to the interaction between the axial and lateral capacities of the individual piles.



Figure 5 Interaction Diagram Showing Predicted Capacity of Case B Platform Foundation System in End-On Direction

Based on the pile loads from the SACS analysis for the Section 17, A-2 pushover analysis (a horizontal force of about 1,600 kips and an overturning moment of about 300,000 kips-ft), the failure mechanism for the foundation is a combination of shear and overturning (Fig. 5). Note that the horizontal force on the foundation system is not equal to the base shear (approximately 3,100 kips) due to the horizontal force that is taken by the well conductors (approximately 1,500 kips).

The estimated horizontal force and overturning moment applied to the foundation by Hurricane Katrina is also shown on Figure 5. Based on the interaction diagram, the foundation system was able to sustain a combination of a horizontal force and overturning moment that was significantly beyond the predicted capacity. One interesting aspect of this loading is that it is in the zone where the foundation capacity is a combination of the interaction between lateral and axial capacity. Therefore, all aspects of the foundation system need to be considered in order to gain insight into why this platform survived Hurricane Katrina.

<u>Sensitivity Analysis</u>

In order to investigate possible explanations for why the Case B Platform foundation system performed better than expected, the sensitivity of the foundation capacity is analyzed with respect to the loading conditions, the structural properties of the piles, and the axial and lateral capacities of the piles.

Loading Conditions

There are two possible variations in the loading conditions that could affect the foundation capacity: the vertical load and the horizontal load that is applied to the foundation.

In the base case analysis, it was assumed that the eight piles took the entire vertical load applied to the mudline. However, structural elements such as mudmats and the mudline horizontal jacket framing could conceivably carry some of the vertical load. Figure 6 shows that even if mudline elements carried 50 percent of the total vertical load, the moment capacity of the foundation system increases by only four percent.



Figure 6 Sensitivity of Moment Capacity to Vertical Load Applied to Foundation System for Case B Platform

The horizontal load applied to the foundation is affected by how much of the base shear is taken by the well conductors. The interaction diagram on Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of the foundation capacity to the horizontal force taken by the foundation. In the region of interest, a decrease in the horizontal load does move the Katrina Hindcast closer to the system capacity because it both lowers the horizontal load applied to the foundation by Katrina (that is, moves the red triangle down) and increases the moment capacity of the foundation (that is, the moment capacity of the system is increasing as the horizontal load decreases in this region of the interaction curve). However, this effect is not large enough to explain the survival of this foundation system. For example, even if the well conductors took the entire horizontal force, the moment capacity of the foundation is still less than 90 percent of the moment applied by Katrina.

Structural Properties of Pile

The structural properties of the pile are essentially represented by the yield stress of the steel and the thickness of the pile wall. Steel rated as A-36 actually has an average yield stress that is greater than 36 ksi (36 ksi represents a nominal or minimum value). If the yield stress of the steel is increased to 42 ksi, the moment capacity increases by only one percent. The scheduled wall thickness of the piles decreases below the mudline: it decreases from a thickness of 1.5 inches at the mudline to a thickness of 0.75 inches 40 feet below the mudline. Since plastic hinges form in the piles just below where the pile wall becomes thinner, we conducted an analysis by placing the decrease in wall thickness further below the mudline so that the plastic hinge forms in the thicker pile section. This increase in the structural capacity of the piles at depth increases the moment capacity of the system by only eight percent.

Axial and Lateral Capacities of Piles

The capacity of this foundation system is dominated, although not entirely governed, by the axial capacities of the corner piles. The boring log for the platform location is shown on Figure 7. The piles tip in the medium dense sandy silt at a depth of about 135 feet below the mudline (the actual depth depends on the batter for each individual pile). Based on the boring data and the existing API RP2A, we developed a design profile for the unit side shear and unit end bearing versus depth (Figs. 8 and 9). These profiles are generally similar to those included in the original geotechnical report from 1979 (Figs. 8 and 9). The main difference is the earth pressure coefficient for the sand layers, which is used to calculate the unit side shear. The current API method uses a value of 0.8 in both tension and compression for the earth pressure coefficient in sand layers, while the older API method used values of 0.7 in compression and 0.5 in tension.

Based on our interpretation of the design profiles for unit side shear and unit end bearing, we obtain the following pile capacities for the 33-inch diameter, 135-foot long corner piles:

Loading Direction	**Axial Capacity (kips)**		
	Side Shear	**End Bearing**	**Total**
Tension	800	0	800
Compression	800	360	1160

The axial capacity of the piles is governed by the deep sand layers, which contribute nearly 60 percent to the axial capacity in tension and 75 percent to the axial capacity in compression.



Figure 7 Boring Log for Case B Platform Design



Figure 8 Design Unit Side Shear for Piles, Case B Platform



Figure 9 Design Unit End Bearing for Piles in Compression, Case B Platform

One possible mechanism for increasing the axial pile capacity is to increase the end bearing at the tips of the piles in the medium dense sandy silt. The rationale for increasing this tip capacity is that piles do not fail in a brittle manner when they bear on sand layers. As the displacement at the tip increases beyond what is deemed to be "failure," the tip continues to take on greater load. In fact, it is generally difficult and somewhat arbitrary to define failure in a pile-load test for piles tipping in sand. Therefore, the piles could possibly have sustained a load greater than the API capacity provided that the tip displacement was sufficient to mobilize this load. In order to investigate this effect on the capacity of the foundation system, the unit end bearing at the tip was increased by 50 percent for the piles in compression (Fig. 10). This rather large increase in end bearing is not enough to explain the survival in Katrina (Fig. 10).

Another possible mechanism for increasing the axial pile capacity is to account for reverse end bearing in tension. Even though the piles tip in sand, the sand is not clean and the loading is relatively fast; therefore, it is plausible that suction could develop at the pile tip and mobilize end bearing in the opposite direction. This effect is remarkably similar to increasing the end bearing in compression by 50 percent and still not enough to explain the survival in Katrina (Fig. 10).

Another possible mechanism for increasing the axial pile capacity is to simply increase the contribution of the sand layers to both side shear and end bearing. We multiplied the unit side shear and unit end bearing values in the sand by an "amplification" factor to investigate the sensitivity of the system capacity. One explanation for this amplification factor is set-up; these piles were loaded approximately 25 years after being installed. Chow et al. (1998) show increases in pile capacity after driving for piles in sand of two to three times at set-up times of 100 to 1,000 days. If the amplification factor for the sand layers is two, then the foundation capacity is about the same as the loading applied by Hurricane Katrina (Fig. 10). This mechanism is the most likely explanation for why the platform survived the Katrina loading.

There are several interesting considerations concerning the axial capacity of piles in sand. First, a new design method has been developed recently for piles in sand (e.g., Lehane and Jardine 1994, Randolph et al. 1994, Randolph 2003, Fugro 2004, and Jardine et al. 2005). We understand that this method (or one very similar to it) will be included in the next edition of API RP2A as an appendix. Interestingly, the axial capacity for the piles in this foundation system actually decreases using this new method. Therefore, the use of this method is not supported by this particular case history. Second, while the current API RP2A design method for pile in sands calls for an earth pressure coefficient of 0.8 in both tension and compression, we understand from practitioners that typically the earth pressure coefficient in tension is assumed to be smaller and about 0.7. Therefore, this design practice is also not supported by this case history of survival during Hurricane Katrina.



Figure 10 Sensitivity of Foundation System Capacity to Axial Capacity in Sand Layers for Case B Platform

Increasing the axial capacity of the piles primarily increases the moment capacity of the foundation system (Fig. 10). However, one interesting aspect of the combination of loading during Katrina is that increasing the moment capacity of the foundation system means that the failure mode becomes dominated by shear (Fig. 10). In order to investigate how the interaction between axial and lateral capacity of the piles affects the system capacity, the undrained shear strength of the clay layers was increased by 20 percent. One rationale for increasing this strength is due to the relatively high rate of dynamic loading during the hurricane. Another rationale for increasing the undrained shear strength is that the borings were drilled using wire-line percussion sampling methods, which tends to cause disturbance and reduce the measured undrained shear strength for soft clays (e.g., Quiros et al. 1983). For example, Gambino et al. (1999) found that this method of sampling resulted in design shear strength profiles for clays that were biased low approximately 10 to 20 percent compared to more modern sampling techniques. Since the upper portion of the pile is in clay, increasing the undrained shear strength of the clay both increases the lateral as well as the axial capacity of the piles. Therefore, the interaction curve for the foundation capacity moves both up and to the right (Fig. 11). If this increase is considered together with an increase in the axial pile capacity in the sand layers, then the foundation capacity is well above the load imposed by Hurricane Katrina (Fig. 11).



Figure 11 Sensitivity of Foundation System Capacity to Axial and Lateral Capacity for Case B Platform

Summary

There is substantial evidence from the observed performance of jacket platforms in hurricanes that the foundation designs are conservative and that the actual foundation capacity is greater than that predicted using API RP2A. The following factors potentially contribute to this conservatism:

1. **Set-up or Ageing:** The capacity of piles potentially increases with time well beyond several days or weeks after driving. This phenomenon can occur both in clays and sands. It could account for increases in capacity of two to three times the design capacity, which is based on short-term pile load tests.
2. **Rate of Loading:** Waves apply dynamic loads to piles at a much higher rate than the static loading conditions used in the pile load tests that form the basis for the design methods. The pile capacity could be 30 percent greater or more under dynamic versus static loading conditions.
3. **Scale:** The piles used for offshore platform foundations are much larger than the piles that have been load tested and form the basis of the design method. Disturbance to the soil during driving may cause greater relative reductions in capacity of shorter piles than longer piles, meaning that the design method is possibly biased low.

4. **Design Conservatism:** The inherent variability in soil, the difficulty in measuring in situ properties of soil, and the lack of pile load test data for large offshore piles taken to or beyond failure leads to uncertainty in predicting pile capacity. To account for this uncertainty, there is a tendency in engineering practice to be conservative in selecting the data that are input into the design method and in formulating the design method itself.

Given these factors, which have been well documented and the source of discussion in API committees for about 50 years, it is not surprising that the API RP2A design method provides a conservative estimate of the actual pile capacity. However, it is becoming increasingly important to quantify this conservatism because it is significantly impacting the cost of new platforms and the level of manning and production on existing platforms. Furthermore, the design methods for jacket foundation systems in shallow water have now been adapted to foundations for floating production systems, well systems and flowlines in deep water. Therefore, this potential conservatism in foundation design is affecting every aspect of the infrastructure for offshore production.

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Appendix D

Platforms Destroyed by Katrina

Figure D.1 - GI 32 J – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.2 - GI 40 B – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.3 - GI 40 F – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.4 - GI 40 A – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.5 - MP 138 A – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.6 - MP 298 B – Pre-Katrina


Figure D.7 - MP 306 D – Pre-Katrina


Figure D.8 - SP 62 A – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.9 - SP 62 B – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.10 - ST 21 E – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.11 - ST 135 M – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.12 - ST 151 I – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.13 - ST 151 O – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.14 - ST 161 A – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.15 - ST 161 B – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.16 - WD 69 C – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.17 - WD 69 K – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.18 - WD 70 H – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.19 - WD 103 A – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.20 - WD 103 B – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.21 - WD 104 C – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.22 - WD 117 C – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.23 - WD 117 D – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.24 - WD 117 E – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.25 - WD 117 F – Pre-Katrina

Figure D.26 - WD 133 B – Pre-Katrina

Appendix E

Platforms Destroyed by Rita

Figure E.1 - EC 195 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.2 - EC 222 D – Pre-Rita

Figure E.3 - EC 254 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.4 - EC 272 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.5 - EC 322 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.6 - EI 276 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.7 - EI 276 D – Pre-Rita

Figure E.8 - EI 313 B-1 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.9 - E 313 C1 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.10 - EI 314 F – Pre-Rita

Figure E.11- EI 314 J – Pre-Rita

Figure E.12 - EI 330 S – Pre-Rita

Figure E.13 - E 333 A 1 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.14 - HI A467 D – Pre-Rita

Figure E.15 - SM 11 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.16 - SM 49 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.17 - SM 66 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.18 - SM 66 E – Pre-Rita

Figure E.19 - SM 76 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.20 - SM 90 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.21 - SM 108 D – Pre-Rita

Figure E.22 - SM 128 A-PROD 2 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.23 - SS 148 H – Pre-Rita

Figure E.24 - SS 169 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.25 - SS 219 C – Pre-Rita

Figure E.26 - SS 253 A-AUX – Pre-Rita



Figure E.27 - SS 269 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.28 - ST 146 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.29 - VR 131 CF – Pre-Rita

Figure E.30 - VR 201 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.31 - VR 217 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.32 - VR 245 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.33 - VR 245 C – Pre-Rita

Figure E.34 - VR 255 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.35 - VR 255 B – Pre-Rita

Figure E.36 - VR 273 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.37 - WC 45 51 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.38 - WC 110 11 – Pre-Rita

Figure E.39 - WC 172 E – Pre-Rita

Figure E.40 - WC 229 A – Pre-Rita

Figure E.41 - WC 313 1 – Pre-Rita

Appendix F

Destroyed and Damaged Platform Statistics

Table F.1 General Observations:

Total GOM - Destroyed

- No L-1's destroyed of 24 exposed.
- 4.9% of 1278 exposed A-2's destroyed.

Total GOM – Damaged

- No L-1's damaged of the 24 exposed.
- 10.6% of 189 exposed A-1's sustained major damage.

Regional – Destroyed

- 4.5% of the Central A-1's destroyed versus 2.8% in the West Central.
- 8.0% of the Central A-2's destroyed versus 4.2% in the West Central.
- No Central A-3's destroyed versus 3.4% in the West Central.

Regional – Damaged

- 20.5% of the Central A-1's damaged versus 7.6% in the West Central.

Table F.1 – Exposure Category by API Bulletin 2INT-MET Region Platform Statistics

West Central Region - All Platforms					
Exposure Category	No. of Platforms	Destroyed		Damaged	
		#	%	#	%
L1	17	0	0.0	0	0.0
L2	179	4	2.2	0	0.0
L3	156	4	2.6	3	1.9
A1	145	4	2.8	11	7.6
A2	1065	45	4.2	45	4.2
A3	830	28	3.4	39	4.7
Unknown	642	9	1.4	19	3.0
Total	3034	94	3.1	117	3.9

Central Region - All Platforms					
Exposure Category	No. of Platforms	Destroyed		Damaged	
		#	%	#	%
L1	7	0	0.0	0	0.0
L2	32	1	3.1	0	0.0
L3	23	0	0.0	0	0.0
A1	44	2	4.5	9	20.5
A2	213	17	8.0	14	6.6
A3	168	0	0.0	3	1.8
Unknown	213	2	0.9	20	9.4
Total	700	22	3.1	46	6.6

West Central and Central Region - All Platforms					
Exposure Category	No. of Platforms	Destroyed		Damaged	
		#	%	#	%
L1	24	0	0.0	0	0.0
L2	211	5	2.4	0	0.0
L3	179	4	2.2	3	1.7
A1	189	6	3.2	20	10.6
A2	1278	62	4.9	59	4.6
A3	998	28	2.8	42	4.2
Unknown	855	11	1.3	39	4.6
Total	3734	116	3.1	163	4.4

Note: Statistics in Table F.1 are close approximations on total numbers exposed to hurricane conditions. The total numbers above exposed to hurricane conditions assumes the entire West Central Regions platforms were exposed to hurricane winds and waves. While this is a close approximation, the platforms in the far west portion of the West Central, west of the MMS NTL line, might not have seen hurricane conditions. See Figure 2.1

Table F.2 – Exposure Category by Decade Installed Platform Statistics

Year Installed	Exposure Category	No. of Platforms	Destroyed	Damaged
1940's	A1	1	0	1
	A2	1	0	0
	A3	1	0	0
	Unknown	7	0	1
1950's	A1	7	0	1
	A2	62	3	7
	A3	50	1	1
	Unknown	52	0	0
1960's	A1	28	3	3
	A2	181	29	17
	A3	218	14	7
	Unknown	104	8	13
1970's	A1	69	2	8
	A2	341	18	18
	A3	151	2	9
	Unknown	130	3	11
1980's	A1	48	1	4
	A2	345	3	13
	A3	259	5	18
	Unknown	139	0	3
1990's	A1	36	0	3
	A2	347	9	4
	A3	319	6	7
	Unknown	172	0	5
2000's	L1	22	0	0
	L2	199	5	0
	L3	171	4	3
	Unknown	247	0	6
Unknown	A2	1	0	0
	L1	2	0	0
	L2	12	0	0
	L3	8	0	0
	Unknown	4	0	0
Grand Total		**3734**	**116**	**163**

Note: Statistics in Table F.2 are close approximations on total numbers exposed to hurricane conditions. The total numbers above exposed to hurricane conditions assumes the entire West Central Regions platforms were exposed to hurricane winds and waves. While this is a close approximation, the platforms in the far west portion of the West Central, west of the MMS NTL line, might not have seen hurricane conditions. See Figure 2.1