UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

| ⊥. | OCCURRED | STRUCTURAL DAMAGE |
|----|--|---|
| | DATE: 21-MAR-2023 TIME: 0230 HOURS | CRANE |
| 2. | OPERATOR: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. REPRESENTATIVE: TELEPHONE: CONTRACTOR: REPRESENTATIVE: TELEPHONE: | OTHER LIFTING Top-Drive DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE OTHER |
| 3. | OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: | PRODUCTION |
| 4. | LEASE: G17015 AREA: WR LATITUDE: BLOCK: 758 LONGITUDE: | X DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. |
| 5. | PLATFORM: RIG NAME: VALARIS DS-18 (ROWAN RELENTLESS) | DECOMMISSIONING |
| 6. | ACTIVITY: X EXPLORATION(POE) DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD) | OTHER 9. CAUSE: |
| 7. | TYPE: INJURIES: HISTORIC INJURY OPERATOR CONTRACT REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days) RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days) | EQUIPMENT FAILURE X HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE |
| | FATALITY Other Injury | 10. WATER DEPTH: 6967 FT. |
| | | 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 204 MI. |
| | POLLUTION FIRE EXPLOSION | 12. WIND DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H. |
| | LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND SURFACE DEVERTER | 13. CURRENT DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H. 14. SEA STATE: FT. |
| | SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURE | S 15. PICTURES TAKEN: |
| | COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K | 16. STATEMENT TAKEN: |

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On March 21, 2023, a dropped object incident occurred on the drillship Valaris DS-18, under contract for Chevron U.S.A. Inc. on Walker Ridge Block 758, OCS-G17015. The drill crew was in the process of running marine riser for Well PS001, when a 25 pound riser bolt insert dislodged out of the riser flange and fell approximately 75 feet to the rig floor. It passed between two Floorhands, landing on an aluminum stairway and damaging two steps.

On the morning of March 21, 2023, the "A" drill crew held a pre-tour meeting, and the Driller discussed the topics of running riser with the Top Drive and good communication during the operation. At 00:00 hours, the "A" drill crew came on tour and held a safety meeting and reviewed the Work Instruction Management System (WIMS) on running Blow Out Preventer (BOP) on marine riser. At 00:24 hours, work commenced, and the drill crew proceeded to pick up single marine riser joints, torquing the bolts and running through the rotary table.

At 02:30, the Driller, utilizing the Top Drive, hoisted riser joint # 36 from the riser skate to the vertical position and secured it in the riser skate trap. While the joint was suspended from the Top Drive, two Floorhands were standing on the spider and gimbal platform inspecting and lubricating the riser seals and bolts, before installing the stabbing pins. A third Floorhand was on the top step of the stairs, and a fourth Floorhand was on the bottom step waiting to access the gimbal to fill the riser with water. The Floorhands then heard a noise and discovered something struck and damaged the third and second step from the bottom on the portable aluminum steps used to access the spider and gimbal.

Neither Floorhand stopped the job, and they continued to make up the riser bolts on the spider. It took several minutes before one of the Floorhands realized they were nearly struck by a 25 pound riser bolt insert that dislodged out of the riser flange and fell approximately 75 feet. It was then reported to the Assistant Driller (AD), who notified the Driller, who then informed the Toolpusher (TP) inside the Driller's cabin. The Senior TP, Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and the Well Site Leader (WSL) were contacted to investigate the incident and implement a Safety Standdown.

Investigation:

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) inspectors conducted an onsite investigation on March 22, 2023. The BSEE investigation team consisting of Well Operations Inspectors were able to collect incident documentation, photos and video footage from the operator and contractor at the team's request. The BSEE investigation team reviewed all the provided documentation and found the riser had been recently serviced by a third party in January 2023 as part of the 5-year inspection cycle and had not been used since the inspection. The riser retainer pin used to hold the riser bolt insert in place was either never installed or it fell out on the transport to the drill floor. Furthermore, in Step 6, Item "d" of the WIMS states, "Confirm inserts are secured with sling." In this case, the sling is a retention cable secondary to the retaining pin which is weaved in and out of each riser bolt insert to secure them to the flange and was not installed at the time of the incident. According to WIMS, the Subsea Engineer or other person assigned by the Sr. Subsea Engineer were to inspect the joint of riser to confirm all six bolt inserts were secured with a sling. The On Tour Driller and Off Tour Driller did not review the entire WIMS and did not discuss Step 6, Item "d," with personnel.

Since the incident, a checklist was developed with all pertinent safety steps for running riser, and it will be attached to the WIMS. In the case of a long WIMS or repetitive operations, the crews will break down the WIMS into stages and designate a second crew member to verify the steps in the WIMS are being followed to confirm riser bolt inserts are secured. Also, the OIM will be responsible for developing a Stop Work

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For Public Release Authority Drill program to increase the personnel's comfort level in stopping the job

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human Performance Error: Not following proper procedures - Personnel failed to install the slings on the riser flanges.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

n/a

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Contributing Factor:

Human Performance Error: Not following proper procedures - Personnel failed to stop the job when the incident occurred.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Portable Steps

(2) Bent steps

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE Houma District has no recommendations for the Office of Incident Investigations at this time

- NO 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT:
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

None

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION: 25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

22-MAR-2023

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Amy Pellegrin

APPROVED

25-APR-2024 DATE:

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