

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
 BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
 GULF OF MEXICO REGION

## ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **27-SEP-2012** TIME: **0130** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Black Elk Energy Offshore Operati**  
 REPRESENTATIVE:  
 TELEPHONE:  
 CONTRACTOR:  
 REPRESENTATIVE:  
 TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Loss of Well Control**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR  
 ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G03241**  
 AREA: **HI** LATITUDE:  
 BLOCK: **A 443** LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: **A**  
 RIG NAME: **NABORS SUPER SUNDOWNER XXI**

6. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION(POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION  
 (DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY

REQUIRED EVACUATION **3**

LTA (1-3 days)

LTA (>3 days)

RW/JT (1-3 days)

RW/JT (>3 days)

Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

9. WATER DEPTH: **182** FT.

LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT

UNDERGROUND

SURFACE

DEVERTER

SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **81** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:  
 SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
 SPEED: M.P.H.

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K 13. SEA STATE: FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 27 September 2012, a well control incident occurred at HI A 443. At the time of the incident, the Nabors Sundowner platform rig was on location contracted for recompletion work by Black Elk Energy. As the rig was pulling 2 7/8" tubing out of the well, the well started flowing and wellbore fluids spewed out to a height of 30-40 feet in the air. As the well was flowing, well control procedures called for the stabbing of the Texas Iron Works (TIW) valve into the 2 7/8" tubing by using the hydraulic hoist on the rig floor; however, the hoist was unavailable at the time because it was being used to lower 2 7/8" tubing down the V-door. This resulted in an uncontrollable timed event that subsequently mandated the activation for shearing the 2 7/8" tubing with the shear rams in order to shut the well in. An estimated 9.34 gallons of oil was determined to have entered the Gulf waters. Three floor hands sustained injuries and were sent to shore for treatment; all returned to full duty in less than three days.

Investigation revealed that the probable cause of the incident is that the Lessee failed to maintain the proper mud weight of 9 ppg to control the well. The Mud Engineer noticed condensate or oil mixed with the returns in the trip-tank but failed to stop the operation or re-weigh the mud entering the well as 2 7/8" tubing was being pulled.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The Lessee failed to maintain proper weight of well control fluid.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. The Mud Engineer failed to stop the operation when he noticed oil in the returns.
2. The TIW was not in the ready state to be stabbed due to the unavailability of the hoist.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

The Lessee needs to do a better job of training people on the rig floor, especially roughnecks need to know their duties during a well control event. The Lessee needs to have a TIW of the right size and the correct lifting equipment on the rig floor. The Lessee should conduct well control drills with all crews at the beginning of each tour. Operator should maintain proper fluid weight at all times to overcome downhole pressure.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

2 7/8" tubing that was cut

1 joint of 2 7/8" tubing is going to junk

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$300

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:  
The Lake Jackson District makes no recommendations to the Agency at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

The Loss of Well Control caused oil to go into the Gulf of Mexico. Several INCs were written after this event. An E-100 INC was written because the Lessee failed to prevent unauthorized discharge of pollutants into offshore waters. A W-102 was written because of failure to instruct rig personnel on the safety requirements of the operations they were performing. A G-802 was written because of failure to conduct operations according to the approved permit. A W-138 was written because the safety valve was not readily available for insertion into the work string. A G-110 was written because the Lessee failed to perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservation and consideration of property and the environment.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

02-OCT-2012

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

James Holmes / Bobby Carrillo /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

John McCarroll

APPROVED

DATE: **20-NOV-2012**

# BLOWOUT ATTACHMENT

1. WELL NAME: **A002** WELL NO.: **427094035801** LEASE: **G03241**
2. OPERATION:  DRILLING  COMPLETION  
 WORKOVER  PRODUCTION
3. SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS? **NO**
4. FLUID TYPE: **SEAWATER** WEIGHT: **8.8** PPG
5. BOP STACK CONFIGURATION: SIZE: **11** IN  
PRESS RATING: PSI
6. BOP STACK - LAST TEST DATE PRIOR TO INCIDENT: **25-SEP-2012** PRESSURE: PSI
7. LAST CASING STRING SET: FT SIZE: IN
8. SIZE OF DRILLING/WORKOVER STRING IN HOLE: IN
9. KICK SIZE: **10** BBLs
10. FLUID KILL WEIGHT: PPG
11. INITIAL S.I.C.P.: PSI
12. S.I.D.P./W.S.P.: PSI
13. PRIOR HOLE PROBLEMS? **NO**
14. WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT INITIALLY ACTIVATED:
- |   |                                      |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> ANNULAR BOP            | <input type="checkbox"/> SCSSV       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PIPE                   | <input type="checkbox"/> SSV         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BLIND                  | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BLIND SHEAR |                                      |
15. EVACUATION: **YES**

16. DIVERTER SYSTEM VALVE SIZE:  
LINE SIZE:
- |  |
|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SINGLE SPOOL |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DUAL SPOOL              |
17. WAS WELL DIVERTED? **NO**
18. BOTTOM HOLE ASSEMBLY:
19. DRILLING DEPTH: TVD MD
20. DATE LAST FORMATION INTEGRITY TEST:

21. SSSV TYPE:
- DATE LAST TESTED:
22. TREE: ON  OFF
23. SURFACE SAFETY EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE? **NO**
24. WELL TD: TVD MD
25. OPEN PERF? **YES**

# INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

WITNESS

NAME :

HOME ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

WORK PHONE :

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE :

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY :

BUSINESS ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

ZIP CODE :

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

WITNESS

NAME :

HOME ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

WORK PHONE :

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE :

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY :

BUSINESS ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

ZIP CODE :

# INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

WITNESS

NAME :

HOME ADDRESS :            CITY :

WORK PHONE :

STATE :

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE :            YEARS

EMPLOYED BY :

BUSINESS ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

ZIP CODE :

