

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **21-SEP-2023** TIME: **0745** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Whitney Oil & Gas, LLC**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **00694**

AREA: **SP** LATITUDE: **28.971302**
BLOCK: **28** LONGITUDE: **-89.266766**

5. PLATFORM: **13 V**
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - FATALITY
 - Other Injury
- OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 - UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- DECOMMISSIONING
- PA PIPELINE SITE CLEARANCE
- TA PLATFORM
- OTHER

9. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **65** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **4** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION: **E**
SPEED: **29** M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 21 September 2023, at 0745 hours, a loss of well control event occurred on South Pass 28 13(V) jacket, Lease OCS-G 0964 (surface location). The production operators discovered an external leak on the production casing of Well 0693 #98 (bottom location). A hydrocarbon sheen was observed leaking into the Gulf of Mexico waters creating a pollution event. The National Response Center (NRC) was notified via NRC #1379690. The total estimated spill volume was calculated to 65.7 gallons of oil on the water. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) New Orleans District (NOD) was notified shortly thereafter, around 12:45 hours. Whitney Oil & Gas (Whitney) is the designated operator of the lease.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Around 0745 hours on the morning of 21 September 2023, Whitney production personnel were traveling through the South Pass field on a field boat. As they approached the SP 28 #13V jacket, a sheen was observed in the Gulf of Mexico waters originating from the jacket. After inspecting the area, the release was determined to be gas and oil blowing from a hole in the side of the "B" casing on SP 28 13(v) Well 0694 #98. The Whitney production personnel immediately shut in the well and closed the Surface-controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) and bled the hydraulic control line pressure on the SCSSV to zero. However, hydrocarbons continued to escape through the hole in the "B" casing.

At 1244 hours, a phone call was made to the BSEE NOD after-hours engineer and an email sent to report a loss of well control. The BSEE engineer responded, requested photos of the leak and periodic updates of the casing pressures. The immediate plan from Whitney was to bleed down the 900 psi on the "A" Annulus and then determine if the 480 psi on the "B" Annulus would also bleed to zero. Whitney personnel began working to stage equipment for response if/when needed.

By 23 September 2023, Whitney began working with Wellsite Consultant, H and H Wireline, and the EBI Lift boat Matt Jeanfreau. Whitney made numerous attempts to kill the well and isolate the leak from Well #98. Whitney attempted to pump kill weight fluid but was unsuccessful. They then attempted to set a bridge plug in the production tubing and bail cement on top, but encountered restrictions in the tubing when trying to get to depth. Whitney worked with the NOD Well Operations Engineer to permit the operation as necessary. The well continued to leak.

On 29 September 2023, at 0546 hours, Whitney set a bridge plug in the tubing isolating the source of the pressure and release. The leak continued until the well bled off and stopped releasing hydrocarbon at 0132 hours on 30 September 2023. The well had 0 psi in the tubing, "A" annulus, and "B" annulus. The total oil leaked into the Gulf was estimated to be 65.7 gallons, or 1.6 barrels. No oil was recovered due to sea conditions.

On 6 October 2023, a follow-up incident report was submitted in BSEE's Ewell Incident Reporting system. On 9 October 2023, at 0600 hours, a permit was submitted to repair the wellhead by performing hot work to patch the hole in the 10 3/4 casing of the SP 28 13(V) #98 well. Due to the location of the hole in the casing, a section of grating had to be cut away before the "patch" could be welded onto the casing. Once the hole in the casing was patched, the grating around the tree was replaced.

BSEE INVESTIGATION:

The BSEE investigation consisted of production engineers, well engineers, and accident investigators. The BSEE Investigator requested, received, and reviewed all documents, reports, photos, permits, approval letters, and emails associated with this pollution incident.

On 22 September 2023, the NOD Production Supervisory Inspector (SI) and an Investigator from the Office of Incident Investigations (OII) conducted an on-site investigation at East Bay. Prior to taking a field boat to the SP 28 #13 (V) jacket, the NOD SI and OII Investigator requested documentation for the facility. Upon arrival at the SP 28 #13 (V) jacket, they observed oil spraying from the well and an operator present on the platform equipped with a fire extinguisher. Citing safety as a primary concern, the BSEE halted the operation and requested the immediate removal of the operator from the jacket. Despite the operator's placement of absorbent booms around the platform to contain the oil, it was still spraying past it. The BSEE investigators followed the sheen to its end, which was determined to be 4 miles long and 50 feet wide. Photos and videos were taken of the jacket and sheen by the BSEE investigators.

The BSEE AI visited the field on several occasions throughout the course of the investigation. Upon arrival to the platform, after the jack up boat had departed, the AI observed severe corrosion on most of the equipment on location. One of the access ladders used to board the platform was damaged and unsafe to use. All production was shut in at the time of the investigation and there was no discharge or leak into the Gulf waters while the AI was onsite. The #98 well was identified as plugged; however, proper Lock Out/ Tag Out (LOTO) identification was not displayed at that time. Supply lines to the automated wing valve, automated Shutdown Valve (SDV), and SCSSV were still attached and had not been disconnected as required by the regulations for an out-of-service (OOS) well. No navaid lights were visible on the SP 28 #13(V) jacket. These issues will be addressed in the upcoming fiscal year annual inspection by BSEE inspectors.

On 3 November 2023, Whitney was issued three Incident(s) of Noncompliance (INC), an E-100 component shut-in, a G-111 warning, and a G-111 component shut-in. The INCs were issued as the result of the BSEE investigation.

CONCLUSION:

The investigation revealed that SP 28 #13 (V) jacket as well as other structures in the field, are located in a extremely harsh, shallow saltwater environment, and are being adversely affected by sea and weather conditions. Heavy weather, extreme corrosion, aging infrastructure, etc. have battered this field in recent years. There is no heliport on location and platform visits are only allowed by boat as sea and weather conditions permit.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate preventive maintenance. Corrosion, erosion.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Work Environment: Other weather influences: rough seas, shallow water.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

(Item 25) DATES OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:
Production casings **Hole**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$260,723**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

- E-100 C 30 CFR 250.300 - POLLUTION**
- G-111 C 30 CFR 250.107 - MAINTAIN EQUIPM.**
- G-111 W 30 CFR 257.107 - MAINTAIN ACCESS LADDER**

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: **22-SEP-2023** 28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: **Gerald Taylor / Pierre Lanoix / Darryl Williams /** 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: **NO**

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE: OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
David Trocquet

APPROVED
DATE: **25-JAN-2024**