UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR -BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT -GULF OF MEXICO REGION -

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1.	OCCURRED DATE: 20-OCT-2014 TIME: 1000 HOURS		STRUCTURAL DAMAGE CRANE OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
2.	OPERATOR: Energy XXI GOM, LLC REPRESENTATIVE: TELEPHONE: CONTRACTOR: - REPRESENTATIVE: TELEPHONE:		DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE OTHER
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6.	OPERATION:
4.	LEASE: G01619 AREA: SP LATITUDE: BLOCK: 93 LONGITUDE:-		<pre>X PRODUCTION DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL</pre>
5.	PLATFORM: - A RIG NAME:		<pre>PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. OTHER</pre>
	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE) DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD) TYPE: HISTORIC INJURY- REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days) RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	8.	CAUSE: X EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE - SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER
	Other Injury- FATALITY POLLUTION		WATER DEPTH: 446 FT. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 17 MI.
	X FIRE EXPLOSION LWC - HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND		WIND DIRECTION: - SPEED: M.P.H.
	SURFACE DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	12.	CURRENT DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <- \$25K	13.	SEA STATE: FT.

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On October 20, 2014 at 1000 hours, a fire occurred on an Energy XXI Facility, Lease OCS-G 1619, South Pass 93-A platform involving an Energy XXI contractor, Island Operating Company (IOC) Lead Operator (LO). The LO was loading the #4 Arial Compressors after a shutdown. The LO restarted the compressor using the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). After the compressor went through its sequence, it then cranked up and went down again. The LO reset the panel for a second time and cranked the unit again. When the unit was loaded in manual mode all was working properly, but when switching the governor from manual mode to automatic mode, the LO heard a loud popping sound from the compressor turbine area. The compressor unit then shut down and a small flash fire about 6" long was seen by the LO around the turbine area. The LO called out on the radio a fire at the compressor then proceeded to station #102 to grab a 30 lb fire extinguisher. The fire was put out in seconds and no injuries were reported from this accident.

On October 21, 2014, BSEE Investigators arrived on location to investigate the fire on compressor #4. It was revealed that the compressor turbine had small fragments that went unnoticed from previous repairs, causing coolant to enter into the right bank (RB) cylinder from cracked heads causing a cascade affect. Once metal entered the combustion area, the failure became critical. The cylinder head was destroyed on (RB-6) and passed metal to (RB-5) which was scarred. The major internal breakdown included instant damages to the lube oil sealing systems/components that then allowed lube oil to communicate with the manifold, then a small flame developed causing the turbine side impeller to be destroyed along with the turbine housing internally. The vibration switch was changed out after numerous shutdowns before accident occurred. The vibration switch is a major component to warn of some type of damage to the compressor package.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1) Minor fragments from previous repairs of the right bank #6 cylinder went unnoticed during installation of the new cylinder.

2) The major internal breakdown included instant damages to the lube oil sealing systems/components that then allowed lube oil to communicate with the manifold, that developed a small flame causing the turbine side impeller to be destroyed along with the turbine housing internally.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

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20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE: The BSEE New Orleans District makes no recommendations to the Agency.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

21-OCT-2014

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO Alan Williams / Pierre Lanoix /

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

David Trocquet

APPROVED DATE: 04-MAR-2015

FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT For Public Release

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: Lube Oil Sealing Systems -

2.	TYPE	OF	FUEL:		GAS		
					OIL		
					DIESEL		
					CONDENSA	TE	
					HYDRAULI	C	
				x	OTHER	Lube	Oil

- 3. FUEL SOURCE: Natural Gas
- 4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? YES

5.	TYPE	OF	FIREFIGHTING	EQUIPMENT	UTILIZED:	x	HANDHELD
							WHEELED UNIT
							FIXED CHEMICAL
							FIXED WATER
							NONE
						\Box	OTHER

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENTOR Public Release

x OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER	INJURY FATALITY X WITNESS
NAME :	
HOME ADDRESS:	
CITY:	STATE:
WORK PHONE:	TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: 17 YEARS
EMPLOYED BY:	
BUSINESS ADDRESS:	
CITY:	STATE:
ZIP CODE:	