

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

For Public Release

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 15-NOV-2024 TIME: 0837 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Anadarko Petroleum Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: Valaris

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- ☐ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
☐ CRANE
☐ OTHER LIFTING
☐ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
☐ INCIDENT >\$25K
☐ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
☒ REQUIRED MUSTER
☐ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
☐ OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G17407

AREA: GB LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 668 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM:

RIG NAME: VALARIS DS-16 (ROWAN RESOLUTE)

6. ACTIVITY: ☐ EXPLORATION(POE)
☒ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
☐ DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

☐ HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR

CONTRACTOR

☐ REQUIRED EVACUATION

☐ LTA (1-3 days)

☐ LTA (>3 days)

☐ RW/JT (1-3 days)

☐ RW/JT (>3 days)

☐ FATALITY

☐ Other Injury

☐ POLLUTION

☐ FIRE

☐ EXPLOSION

LWC ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT

☐ UNDERGROUND

☐ SURFACE

☐ DEVERTER

☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION

☐ HISTORIC

☐ >\$25K

☐ <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- ☐ PRODUCTION ☐ TEMP ABAND
☐ DRILLING ☐ PERM ABAND
☒ WORKOVER ☐ DECOM PIPELINE
☐ COMPLETION ☐ DECOM FACILITY
☐ HELICOPTER ☐ SITE CLEARANCE
☐ MOTOR VESSEL
☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
☐ OTHER

9. CAUSE:

- ☐ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
☒ HUMAN ERROR
☐ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
☐ WEATHER RELATED
☐ LEAK
☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
☐ OTHER

10. WATER DEPTH: 3142 FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 134 MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

On 15 November 2024, at 0837 hours, a gas release incident occurred in the shaker house onboard the Valaris DS-16 drillship operated by OXY/Anadarko, located in Garden Banks 668 while conducting well abandonment operations. The gas release initiated a hydrocarbon (HC) alarm which in turn required a full muster of the crew.

Sequence of events

On 14 November 2024, at 1845 hours, during attempts to bullhead well SS011 with 12.2 ppg CaBr₂, 1.25 bbl. was pumped when the tubing pressure increased from 2400 psi to 7000 psi indicating a hydrate plug in the production tubing. The decision was made to displace the landing string and kill line with nitrogen to dissipate the hydrate. With both the landing string and kill line displaced with nitrogen, the rig floor monitored pressures to observe if the hydrate was dissipating. After monitoring for 8 hours, the decision was made to displace the kill line and landing string back to 12.2 ppg CaBr₂. The return flow path would be from the choke manifold through the mud gas separator to the shakers. After pumping an initial 4 bbl. of CaBr₂, at 5 bbl./min, a hydrocarbon alarm activated in the shaker house. Personnel in the shaker house evacuated the space, the abandonment crew members shut down the mud pumps and closed the choke, the Quick Response Team was dispatched, and other crew members mustered accordingly. Bridge personnel monitored gas levels and observed them returning to zero, and an all clear was announced. After discussing the incident, abandonment crew members continued to displace SS011 well to CaBr₂ with no further issues.

On 2 December 2025, an onsite investigation was conducted by BSEE. The drilling crew stated they were taking returns through the choke and mud gas separator. The drilling crew stated the liquid leg of the mud gas separator was compromised allowing hydrocarbon gas to flow through the mud gas separator into the shakers. Investigators reviewed the following documentation: Daily reports, Abandonment Permit, Well Activity Reports, Anadarko Incident Report, and Valaris Corrective and Preventive Action Report

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human performance error Abandonment crew failed to control returns through the choke and mud gas separator to prevent hydrocarbons passing through the liquid leg of the mud gas separator and entering the shaker house atmosphere.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Anadarko/Oxy corrective action was to have a safety meeting with all four crews expressing the importance of circulating fluids/gases from well and how it could impact the mud gas separator liquid leg. Possible loss of mud gas separator liquid leg while bleeding off nitrogen through mud gas separator which set off hydrocarbon gas alarm. Liquid leg can be impacted differently with mud, brine, and in this case nitrogen in the circulating system. BSEE Lake Jackson District agrees with corrective actions

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None

none

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

none

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

02-DEC-2025

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Stephen Martinez

APPROVED

DATE: **19-FEB-2025**