

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

For Public Release

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **02-DEC-2024** TIME: **0830** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Talos Petroleum LLC**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- ☐ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
☐ CRANE
☐ OTHER LIFTING
☐ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
☒ INCIDENT >\$25K **Repair to segment 10688**
☐ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
☐ REQUIRED MUSTER
☒ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
☐ OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G06898**

AREA: **VK** LATITUDE: **28.97303233**

BLOCK: **989** LONGITUDE: **-88.62598209**

5. PLATFORM: **A**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: ☐ EXPLORATION(POE)
☒ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
☐ DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

☐ HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR

CONTRACTOR

☐ REQUIRED EVACUATION

☐ LTA (1-3 days)

☐ LTA (>3 days)

☐ RW/JT (1-3 days)

☐ RW/JT (>3 days)

☐ FATALITY

☐ Other Injury

☐ POLLUTION

☐ FIRE

☐ EXPLOSION

LWC ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT

☐ UNDERGROUND

☐ SURFACE

☐ DEVERTER

☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION

☐ HISTORIC

☐ >\$25K

☐ <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- ☒ PRODUCTION ☐ TEMP ABAND
☐ DRILLING ☐ PERM ABAND
☐ WORKOVER ☐ DECOM PIPELINE
☐ COMPLETION ☐ DECOM FACILITY
☐ HELICOPTER ☐ SITE CLEARANCE
☐ MOTOR VESSEL
☒ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. **10688**
☐ OTHER

9. CAUSE:

- ☒ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
☐ HUMAN ERROR
☐ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
☐ WEATHER RELATED
☒ LEAK
☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
☐ OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **1290** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **26** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 02 December 2024, an incident occurred at Viosca Knoll (VK) 989, platform A. VK 989 A is a fixed leg platform that is owned and operated by Talos Petroleum LLC (Talos). The incident occurred when a gas release was detected during the pressurization of the subsea flowline pipeline segment 10688 (flowline). The flowline was being pressurized for testing and commissioning of a Subsea Control Module (SCM) pod which was recently replaced.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On 02 December 2024, at approximately 0830 hours, a gas release was discovered by a Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) on the flowline after operators suspected a possible leak in the flowline during pressure testing of a newly replaced SCM pod. The week prior to the gas leak being discovered, template wells TB-04, TB-05 and Mt. Providence subsea wells had lost communication with the control room. Due to the wells losing communications with the control room, the SCM pod was replaced to reestablish communications with these wells. Once the control pod was replaced, the new control pod was tested.

During testing of the control pod, the control room operators received data that indicated there was a possible gas release coming from the flowline. The suspected gas release resulted in the use of a ROV that was currently on-site to investigate the location and source of the suspected gas release. The ROV was deployed while gas from VK-989 A was used to pressurize the flowline. While the flowline was pressured, the ROV was able to identify gas bubbles coming from the flowline at a 90-degree bend segment in the flowline. Once the source of the release was identified by the ROV, VK-989 A suspended all pressure testing and the ROV returned to surface.

BSEE INVESTIGATIONS:

On 05 December 2024, an incident report was submitted to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and assigned to a BSEE Accident Investigator (AI). The report consisted of a brief description of the incident, the flowline information and a field layout map identifying the flowline's location. The AI began collecting additional information from Talos concerning the incident.

Based on the information that was reviewed by the AI, when the gas leak was discovered on 02 December 2024, VK-989 A operators were able to isolate the pipeline segment to mitigate the possibility of further gas leaks occurring from the subsea pipeline segment. Talos engineers and project managers have been in contact with third party vendors to evaluate their options to repair the flowline segment. Once Talos has a plan in place for the repairs or replacement of the flowline segment, Talos will submit the plan to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) pipeline division for approval. There is currently no definitive timeframe for the completion of the engineering evaluations to submit to BSEE pipeline division.

Per Talos internal conversations, the repairs to the flowline could consist of installing an engineered clamp on the damaged section or installing an engineered flexible pipe to replace the damaged section of flowline. The options will not be solidified until additional subsea investigation and engineering are completed and BSEE pipeline division has reviewed and approved the repair plan. Further subsea investigations will determine the proper repair for the affected pipeline segment.

Without knowing the exact cause of the gas release, Talos provided casual factors that could have caused the gas release. Talos believes that there might have been a repair in the flowline at some point in the past and the field weld that would have been made

to repair the flowline could have possibly had imperfections leading to corrosion in the repaired area. The corrosion could have led to the weakening of the flowline, allowing the flowline to crack and release the gas inside the flowline.

IN CONCLUSION:

When the possibility of a gas release was discovered on 02 December 2024, while testing a newly installed (SCM) pod, Talos took action to confirm there was a gas release by deploying a ROV to investigate. Once the gas release was confirmed by the ROV, Talos then shut down the testing operations and isolated the pipeline segment to prevent any further releases from occurring. Talos communicated with their engineering team and project managers to implement a plan of action to repair the leaking pipeline segment. Once Talos can perform their engineering evaluations of the affected pipeline segment, they will be submitting their plan to the BSEE pipeline division for approval. Once approved, Talos will be able to perform the repairs needed on the leaking pipeline segment, with the intent to return to service once repaired.

Talos suspects that the gas release was due to a previous field repair that may have been completed on the affected section of flowline piping. When Talos visually inspected the area where the gas release occurred, they noticed that the insulation looked slightly different than the rest of the insulation on the remaining jumper section of the flowline. Talos believes this could indicate that a field repair was performed in the past and the repaired area was re-dressed in a newer or different insulation than the original insulation on the jumper. Talos believes that if the field repair was made on-site, corrosion could have negatively affected the repaired area due to field welds being more susceptible to imperfections. The exact cause will not be able to be determined until the faulty flowline section can be fully inspected and tested for specific indications of imperfections

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment failure: Inadequate equipment repair- Possibility of an old field repair to the flowline being subjected to corrosion due to the repair being made in the field instead of in a controlled environment which may have caused the flowline to develop a leak.

Equipment failure: Flawed equipment design or construction- Suspected flaw in the field weld and testing of the weld during suspected past field flowline repair.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Work environment: Poor layout or design of work area- Suspected repair being performed in an uncontrolled environment allowing for environmental condition to affect the repair that may have been performed.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Leaking subsea pipeline segment

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$5,000,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE New Orleans District has no recommendations for Office of Incident Investigations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Michael Saucier

APPROVED

DATE: **23-JUL-2025**