

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
DATE: 03-NOV-2025 TIME: 1205 HOURS

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K \$81,618
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

2. OPERATOR: GOM Shelf LLC
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:
CONTRACTOR:
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

8. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

- TEMP ABAND
- PERM ABAND
- DECOM PIPELINE
- DECOM FACILITY
- SITE CLEARANCE

4. LEASE: G01294

AREA: SP LATITUDE:
BLOCK: 62 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: C
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
 DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR

CONTRACTOR

- REQUIRED EVACUATION
- LTA (1-3 days)
- LTA (>3 days)
- RW/JT (1-3 days)
- RW/JT (>3 days)
- FATALITY
- Other Injury

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER

10. WATER DEPTH: 325 FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 17 MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 03 November 2025, at 1205 hours, an incident occurred on South Pass (SP) 62 C platform. SP 62 C is a fixed leg platform located in the Gulf of America that is owned and operated by GOM Shelf LLC (GOM Shelf). The incident on SP 62 C occurred while a Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) Inspector was conducting an annual production inspection of the platform. The BSEE Inspector was in the process of conducting the inspection when he noticed suspected gas fumes coming from a corroded area of gas piping. The platform operators then used a gas detector to verify the inspector's suspicions and confirmed that there was a gas release from the corroded area of the pipe. After confirming the gas release, the platform was manually shut in. There was no muster associated with this event, as the gas release was not detected by the platform safety system, and did not initiate any alarms. There were no injuries or pollution associated with the event.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On 03 November 2025, a BSEE Inspector arrived on-site at SP 62 C to conduct an annual production inspection. During the inspection and while testing the PBA-1410 / 1420 LACT BOOST PUMPS (LBPs) the Inspector was observing the surrounding area of the platform. While observing the area, the BSEE Inspector thought he saw vapors coming from piping located on the platform level above his location. After testing the LBPs, the Inspector went up to the level above and saw the vapors coming from a corroded area on an 8-inch gas vent line.

After noticing the suspected gas vapors, the Inspector notified the Person in Charge (PIC) of the platform to investigate the vapors. The PIC then retrieved a portable gas detector from the PIC's office to check the area for a gas leak and confirmed gas to be leaking out of the pipe. The source of the gas release was determined to be emanating from an 8-inch gas vent line and was blowing under the wet and dry oil tanks. After confirming the release, the platform was shut in to prevent any further gas release. Due to the unidentified gas release being caused by corrosion, GOM Shelf was issued a G-111 "C" - Component Shut in Enforcement Incident of Non-Compliance (INC), which resulted in the facility being shut in.

On 03 November 2025, the platform was shut in until repairs were completed on 09 November 2025. On 10 November 2025, GOM Shelf provided an INC correction notification to BSEE with photographs of the repairs to document that the affected gas line had been replaced.

BSEE INVESTIGATIONS:

On 03 November 2025, a BSEE inspector was conducting an annual production inspection of the SP 62 C platform when the BSEE Inspector noticed a gas release coming from a corroded area on an 8-inch gas vent line. The platform operators confirmed the release with a gas detector and then shut in the platform.

On 06 November 2025, GOM Shelf submitted an electronic report notifying BSEE of a gas release incident that occurred on SP 62 C. The electronic report provided a description of the incident and photographs of the incident location. The photographs that were submitted documented both the damaged piping, as well as repair photographs showing the damaged section of piping had been replaced.

On 06 November 2025, the incident was assigned to a BSEE Accident Investigator (AI). After being assigned the incident, the AI requested additional information. The requested documents included the most current American Petroleum Institute (API) Level 1 survey performed on 07 June 2025 and the previous year's Level 1 Survey conducted in

November 2024. An on-site investigation was conducted on 13 November 2025. During the on-site investigation, additional photographs were taken of the area in which the incident occurred and multiple other areas of the platform. Prior to the AI conducting the on-site investigation, repairs to the affected 8-inch gas line had already been made and the platform was back in service. The BSEE AI verified that the affected gas line had been replaced.

While performing the on-site investigation, the AI observed evidence of current and previous repairs to process piping, stairwells, handrails, grating and metal deck plating around the platform. Most of the repairs that were identified during the on-site investigation corresponded with the most recent API Level 1 surveys. Review of the Level 1 surveys also revealed that the corroded area of the 8-inch gas vent line where the gas release occurred was not identified on the level 1 surveys.

IN CONCLUSION:

The BSEE investigation concerning the incident that occurred at SP 62 C on 03 November 2025, identified that GOM Shelf is actively performing maintenance to correct corroded areas of the platform. Some of the discrepancies that were noted on the Level 1 surveys have been corrected. The affected 8-inch gas pipe was not listed on the most recent Level 1 Surveys.

Due to the corroded section of piping not being identified by the Level 1 surveys or by platform operators, the operators were unaware of the on-going hazard presented by the gas release. A more severe incident could have occurred if an ignition source had been introduced to the area of the unidentified gas release. Luckily, there were no known ignition sources near the gas release while ongoing. In the future, it is recommended that further attention should be given to identifying corrosion issues on all platform process piping. Additional efforts in identifying corrosion on process piping could prevent future gas releases and limit the possibility of explosion hazards. The Operator should consider establishing routine corrosion inspections in addition to the Level 1 surveys. This would help better identify any possible corrosion of process piping before allowing it to escalate to the level of a gas release.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment inspection- Operators and third-party inspectors failed to identify the corroded area of the 8-inch gas vent line.

Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment maintenance- Operators failed to perform necessary maintenance to prevent corrosion on production piping.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Management System: Inadequate job procedures- Operator should develop and incorporate a company specific policy to conduct routine corrosion inspections in addition to the third-party level 1 surveys conducted annually.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

8-inch gas vent line**Corroded**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$81,618

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE New Orleans District recommends the Office of Incident Investigations should consider issuing a Safety Alert regarding the incident.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-111 INC 30 CFR.250.107

- At the time of the BSEE Inspection the following was found; Vent line by the oil tanks has severe corrosion resulting in significant loss of material, gas was leaking out of said pipe under the oil tanks and we were using the Platform Gas Detector for a reading.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

13-NOV-2025

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:

NO

OCS REPORT:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Michael J. Saucier

APPROVED

DATE:

12-JAN-2026