

# ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **07-DEC-2025** TIME: **2330** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **W & T Offshore, Inc.**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: **Crosby Energy Services**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K **\$83,000**
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR  
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G02063**

AREA: **EC** LATITUDE:

BLOCK: **338** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
- EXPLORATION (POE)
  - DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
  - DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

- HISTORIC INJURY
  - REQUIRED EVACUATION
  - LTA (1-3 days)
  - LTA (>3 days)
  - RW/JT (1-3 days)
  - RW/JT (>3 days)
  - FATALITY
  - Other Injury
- OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
  - UNDERGROUND
  - SURFACE
  - DEVERTER
  - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
  - DRILLING
  - WORKOVER
  - COMPLETION
  - HELICOPTER
  - MOTOR VESSEL
  - PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
  - OTHER
- TEMP ABAND
  - PERM ABAND
  - DECOM PIPELINE
  - DECOM FACILITY
  - SITE CLEARANCE

9. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

10. WATER DEPTH: **270** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **101** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

**Summary:**

On December 7, 2025, at approximately 11:30 p.m., an oil leak was discovered at a W&T Offshore, Inc. production facility. The leak originated from a dry oil tank and resulted in an estimated 0.4 barrels of oil being released into the Gulf of America (GOA). The incident occurred on the East Cameron Block 338A, Lease Number G02063 (EC-338A) platform.

A Chemical Technician onboard detected the smell of hydrocarbons inside the living quarters and notified the Person in Charge (PIC). At the time of the incident, there were five crew members on board: the PIC, two Production Operators, one Chemical Technician, and one Mechanic.

The platform's Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system was activated, and all personnel mustered. Platform crew members then began taking measures to minimize the amount of hydrocarbons released and reduce pollution into GOA waters.

**Sequence of events:**

On December 7, 2025, at approximately 11:30 p.m., a chemical technician in the living quarters detected a strong hydrocarbon odor. Upon stepping outside to investigate, he observed clear evidence of a leak. He immediately notified the Platform PIC, who quickly dressed and proceeded outside. Upon inspection, the PIC discovered that the Dry Oil Tank had developed a leak on the south side near the bottom. The leak appeared to be coming from a hole approximately  $\frac{1}{4}$  inch in size. The PIC then initiated an ESD of the platform. All personnel mustered and donned personal flotation devices (PFDs), and a full headcount confirmed that everyone was accounted for. With the platform in ESD status, the firewater pump automatically engaged, cranking and beginning to deluge the platform.

Crew members were dispatched to the Dry Oil Tank while the PIC proceeded to the Sump Tank to verify proper operation of the Sump Pump. The crew collected plywood and industrial trash-compactor bags to contain the leak within the Dry Oil Tank's containment berm/skid. They then opened fire hoses around the platform to flush oil on the deck toward the drains and reduce vapor accumulation. After stabilizing the area, the crew connected a diaphragm pump from the bottom of the Dry Oil Tank to the bottom of the Wet Oil Tank and began transferring the Dry Oil Tank's contents into the Wet Oil Tank.

Once the oil transfer began, the PIC contacted W&T's EC-321A platform to alert them to the situation. The field boat was notified and instructed to stand by while the platform remained in ESD status. The PIC then contacted W&T's office to report the incident and provide an operational update.

After the leak was contained, at approximately 1:30 a.m. on December 8, 2025, a notification was made to Witt O'Brien's. Witt O'Brien's later called back requesting an estimate of the volume released overboard. It was reported that no more than one barrel of oil entered the Gulf of America.

**BSEE Investigation:**

On December 9, 2025, investigators from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), Lake Charles District, conducted an onsite investigation of the incident. The team interviewed personnel on board and requested relevant documentation, including production reports, and the spill report completed by the Platform PIC. BSEE investigators also inspected and photographed all platform areas affected by the incident.

While approaching the platform by helicopter, BSEE investigators captured aerial photographs of the facility. The images show the Dry Oil Tank stained with oil, and the piping above the tank visibly coated as well. The aerial photos also confirm that no active sheening was occurring at the time of the overflight.

Upon arrival, BSEE investigators were met by the Platform PIC and began interviewing the personnel on board. The PIC provided an account of the incident, explaining that he initiated the ESD, which automatically started the firewater pump. Crew members were then dispatched to the Dry Oil Tank, while the PIC proceeded to the Sump Tank to confirm that the Sump Pump was operating properly.

The PIC reported that the crew connected a diaphragm pump from the bottom of the Dry

Oil Tank to the bottom of the Wet Oil Tank and began transferring the Dry Oil Tank's contents. To help contain the leak, they placed plastic sheeting and plywood inside the containment berm/skid surrounding the Dry Oil Tank. Personnel also stated that they used firewater hoses to wash oil from the deck surfaces into the platform drains, directing it to the Sump Tank, where the Sump Pump transferred the recovered oil into the Wet Oil Tank.

The PIC stated that at the time of the incident the Dry Oil Tank contained approximately 5 feet of oil (~70 bbls), while the Wet Oil Tank held approximately 2 feet (~28 bbls). After the contents of the Dry Oil Tank and the recovered oil from the containment system were transferred, the Wet Oil Tank measured 8.5 feet (~119 bbls), according to W&T's EC-338A daily production report dated December 10, 2025. Based on the Safety Flow Diagram, both the Dry Oil Tank and the Wet Oil Tank have a total capacity of 210 bbls each.

The BSEE investigators proceeded to inspect and photograph the platform and the Dry Oil Tank. They noted that the tank had already been temporarily repaired using a cold-curing epoxy composite. Areas of corrosion-related metal loss were identified in the containment berm/skid surrounding the Dry Oil Tank, including holes that allowed oil to escape. The temporary repair to the tank had been applied to mitigate the leak while the platform was shut in and awaiting BSEE approved permanent repairs.

Evidence also indicated that oil had blown up and over the firewall into the booster gas compressor deck area. At the time of the incident, winds were from the north/northeast at approximately 30 knots, which is consistent with the pattern of oil observed on the upper deck surfaces. BSEE investigators observed and photographed oil on the compressor package, including coating the compressor vessels and engine, and saturating the thermal insulation on high-temperature components and the compressor exhaust. Portions of the platform deck, walls, and piping still had oil present from the leak that occurred two days earlier.

On December 12, 2025, the Lake Charles District Office requested an estimated volume of oil released into Gulf of America waters. W&T was also instructed to provide supporting documentation and calculations used to develop the estimated volume released.

W&T provided calculations prepared by their engineering staff following a detailed technical evaluation. The submitted documentation included estimated oil-discharge volumes and the basis for those calculations. The spill-volume determination relied on the following inputs:

- A calculated estimate of oil released from the Dry Oil Tank: 12.8 bbl
- A calculated estimate of oil coating the deck and equipment, including areas where oil had pooled: 1.7 bbl
- The volume of oil recovered in the Sump Tank: 10.7 bbl

To determine the estimated amount of oil released into Gulf of America waters, the total volume retained within platform limits (1.7 bbl + 10.7 bbl = 12.4 bbl) was subtracted from the total estimated volume released from the tank (12.8 bbl). This resulted in an estimated 0.4 bbl discharged to the environment.

On December 17, 2025, BSEE investigators learned that photographs existed showing the tank hole prior to repairs. They requested all photographs taken in connection with the incident before, during, and after the repair work, including any taken with personal phones. BSEE investigators also requested the Personnel on Board (POB) lists for December 6, 7, and 8, 2025, as well as a complete chemical inventory with the specific use of each chemical on board.

W&T provided all requested information, including documentation of the permanent repairs made to the Dry Oil Tank. The chemical inventory confirmed that no chemicals were being used to treat the oil in the Dry Oil Tank, and the Personnel on Board (POB) lists were consistent with the work activities described.

Photographs of the permanent repair showed that an approximately 24-inch-long patch had been welded to the bottom of the tank. Pre-repair photographs revealed coating failures at the base of the tank that led to corrosion and ultimately the formation of a hole. BSEE investigators also noted stainless-steel tubing attached to the bottom

lip of the tank in an area where moisture tends to accumulate. No barriers or isolation materials were present between the tubing and the tank to prevent vibration-induced rubbing or contact between dissimilar metals.

Conclusion

The investigation determined that the oil release on the EC-338A platform on December 7, 2025, originated from a corrosion-related failure at the base of the Dry Oil Tank. The hole, approximately 1/4 inch in diameter, allowed an estimated 12.8 barrels of oil to escape the tank. Through containment efforts, deck-washing, and sump-pump recovery, approximately 12.4 barrels were retained within platform systems, resulting in an estimated 0.4 barrels discharged into Gulf of America waters.

The BSEE investigation identified underlying integrity issues with the Dry Oil Tank, including coating failures, corrosion at the tank base, and the presence of stainless-steel tubing in direct contact with the tank shell without protective isolation. These conditions created an environment conducive to moisture retention and metal loss, ultimately contributing to the tank failure. Evidence of oil migration beyond the containment berm, including contamination of the compressor deck, equipment, and insulation, further demonstrated that the tank's condition had deteriorated to a point where a localized leak could rapidly affect multiple areas of the facility.

Overall, the incident underscores the importance of rigorous corrosion-control practices, routine inspection of tank bottoms and containment systems, and ensuring that all attached components are properly isolated to prevent metal-to-metal wear. While the crew's actions effectively mitigated the immediate consequences, the root cause reflects preventable degradation of critical production equipment. Strengthening mechanical-integrity inspections will be essential to reducing the likelihood of similar failures in the future.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure

Corrosion-related equipment failure at the base of the Dry Oil Tank.

The presence of stainless steel tubing in direct contact with the tank shell, without isolation or an isolation barrier, created additional conditions for vibration induced wear of the tank coating.

Work Environment

This failure occurred in a salt-rich environment where moisture accumulated at the tank bottom, accelerating metal loss.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure

The containment berm, which allowed oil to migrate beyond intended barriers.

Work Environment

High winds at the time of the incident further contributed to oil spreading across multiple deck levels.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Dry Oil Tank

Corrosion-related equipment failure

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$83,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Lake Charles District recommends the Office of Incident Investigations issue a Safety Alert regarding this incident.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G111 DOES THE LESSEE MAINTAIN ALL EQUIPMENT IN A SAFE CONDITION TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE LEASE AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES?

Authority: 30 CFR 250.107 Enforcement Actions: C

The following issues were found at the time of inspection and need to be addressed:

- The area of the tank with temporary epoxy composite must be permanently repaired.
- All corroded deck penetrations with holes and/or significant metal loss must be repaired or replaced before production resumes. There are numerous penetrations throughout the platform covered with metal grating and plates that are unsecured.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**09-DEC-2025**

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:  
**NO**

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**Beau Boudreaux**

APPROVED

DATE: **26-FEB-2026**