UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: **09-APR-2026** TIME: **0800** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **W & T Energy VI, LLC**
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G19931**
   AREA: **MC** LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: **243** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A(Matterhorn Se**
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
   - [ ] EXPLORATION(POE)
   - [X] DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION(DOCD/POD)
   - [ ] DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:
   INJURIES:
   - [ ] HISTORIC INJURY

	OPERATOR	CONTRACTOR
[ ] REQUIRED EVACUATION		
[ ] LTA (1-3 days)		
[ ] LTA (>3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (1-3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (>3 days)		
[ ] FATALITY		
[ ] Other Injury		

   - [ ] POLLUTION
   - [ ] FIRE
   - [ ] EXPLOSION

   LWC
   - [ ] HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   - [ ] UNDERGROUND
   - [ ] SURFACE
   - [ ] DEVERTER
   - [ ] SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

   COLLISION [ ] HISTORIC [ ] >$25K [ ] <=$25K

- [X] STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- [ ] CRANE
- [ ] OTHER LIFTING
- [ ] DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- [X] INCIDENT >$25K **2000000**
- [ ] H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- [ ] REQUIRED MUSTER
- [ ] SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- [ ] OTHER

8. OPERATION:
   - [X] PRODUCTION
   - [ ] DRILLING
   - [ ] WORKOVER
   - [ ] COMPLETION
   - [ ] HELICOPTER
   - [ ] MOTOR VESSEL
   - [ ] PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   - [ ] OTHER
   - [ ] TEMP ABAND
   - [ ] PERM ABAND
   - [ ] DECOM PIPELINE
   - [ ] DECOM FACILITY
   - [ ] SITE CLEARANCE

9. CAUSE:
   - [X] EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   - [ ] HUMAN ERROR
   - [ ] EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   - [ ] SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   - [X] WEATHER RELATED
   - [ ] LEAK
   - [ ] UPSET H2O TREATING
   - [ ] OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   - [ ] OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **2850** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **30** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On Thursday April 9, 2026 a Riser Guard (RG) failure occurred at Lease G19931 Mississippi Canyon (MC) 243 A (Matterhorn)Tension Leg Platform (TLP), which is operated by W&T Energy VI, LLC (W&T). There were no injuries to personnel, and no pollution or environmental impacts associated with this incident.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On Thursday, April 9, 2026, at 0800 hours, while making morning rounds, W&T production operators noticed that the RG had become dislocated from its standoffs on the northeast quadrant of the platform. On Thursday April 9, 2026 at 1235 hours, the incident was reported to Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). W&T immediately initiated efforts to identify and secure topsides construction and crane vessel resources to support recovery operations of the RG. As a precautionary measure, the risers that were protected by the RG were shut in, and all personnel were demobilized from the facility that evening.

On Friday, April 10, 2026, W&T remobilized a team of essential personnel via helicopter to Matterhorn to assess the situation. The team conducted an above-water assessment and began developing a plan to secure the RG using topsides tuggers and rigging equipment. The helicopter remained on standby to support the essential personnel while on the platform.

On Saturday. April 11, 2026, the Motor Vessel (M/V) Holiday departed Port Fourchon for the MC 108 Subsea (SS) Pipeline End Termination (PLET) for the gas sales pipeline to the facility. Additionally, the M/V C-Truc 10 mobilized to Matterhorn with topsides construction rigging equipment. Personnel utilized temporary straps to secure the RG to padeye’s located on top of the hull.

On Sunday, April 12, 2026, the M/V Holiday utilized Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) to confirm closure and isolation of the subsea gas pipeline valves at the PLET. The M/V then transitioned to Matterhorn, where the ROV performed an initial underwater inspection of the riser guard, risers, and hull.

On Monday, April 13, 2026, the topsides construction team continued installing tuggers and rigging systems to further secure the RG.

On Tuesday, April 14, 2026, installation of the topside tuggers and rigging system was completed.

On Wednesday, April 15, 2026, The M/V Holiday successfully removed the RG from Matterhorn and relocated it outside the 500-meter zone and lowered it to the seafloor in a safe location to not impact SS infrastructure. The vessel then returned to MC 108 to reopen the gas pipeline at the PLET.

On Thursday, April 16, 2026, the M/V Holliday rerigged the RG into a horizontal orientation on the seafloor. The RG was subsequently lifted from the seafloor and transferred onto the back deck of the M/V Robin. Following the transfer, the M/V Holiday conducted a subsea General Visual Inspection (GVI) of the hull column, pontoon, and pipeline risers. Concurrently, the topsides construction team began de-rigging the tugger system. The M/V Robin secured the RG and transported it to Inter-Marine Dock in Fourchon.

W&T developed and implemented a Marine Traffic and Avoidance Plan to protect the unguarded risers from damage, until a new riser guard can be fabricated and installed.

BSEE INVESTIGATIONS:

On Wednesday, April 22, 2026, the BSEE Accident Investigator (AI) Specialist arrived on location to perform an incident investigation. The AI requested and received documentation about the incident. The AI reviewed email correspondence between W&T management and BSEE management, Job Safety Analysis (JSA) for construction, crane, and boat operations, Production and downtime reports, and Personnel On Board (POB) list. The AI also reviewed W&T's Marine Traffic and Avoidance Plan that was developed to protect the unguarded risers until a new riser guard can be installed. Additionally, a platform walkthrough and observation of the incident location was performed. Interviews were conducted, and witness statements and photos were also provided to the AI.

The BSEE investigation revealed that the operator had classified the RG as a secondary structural appurtenance and was not included as a targeted inspection location under the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) approved In-Service Inspection Plan (ISIP), which is primarily focused on primary structural members. As a result, degradation at these connection points was not identified prior to failure.

IN CONCLUSION:

After performing the investigation, the BSEE AI agrees with the findings provided by W&T that the cause of the RG failure was due to fatigue within the riser guard metal support hangers. The RG failure was due to fatigue cracking at all 3-riser guard-to-hull connection points on the east side of the hull column, resulting in loss of structural integrity over time. BSEE concluded that over twenty years of rough weather and being in a highly corrosive marine environment degraded and fatigued the riser guards and supports. Additionally, it was determined that W&T classified the RG as a secondary structural appurtenance to the platform in their ABS approved ISIP, which focuses on primary structural members on the facility. Because of this, W&T did not include the RG as a targeted inspection item on the facility, which allowed the loss of structural integrity to be overlooked by W&T.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate inspection.

The RG failure was due to fatigue cracking at all 3-riser guard-to-hull connection points on the east side, resulting in loss of structural integrity over time.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Management Systems: Inadequate hazard analysis.

The operator classified the RG as a secondary structural appurtenance and was not included as a targeted inspection location under the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) -approved In-Service Inspection Plan (ISIP), which is primarily focused on primary structural members. As a result, degradation at these connection points was not identified prior to failure.

Work Environment: Other weather influences.

The RG is affected by all sea conditions: waves, strong currents, temperatures, and boat strikes and normal swaying motion.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

W&T has developed plans to redesign and reinstall a RG to provide protection for the risers on the hull column. The operator is working with BSEE Office of Structural and Technical Support (OSTS) on a repair plan for the riser guard.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Riser Guard (RG) located on the northeast quadrant of the TLP.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Equipment degradation

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): The estimated cost of damage is approximately $2,000,000. The estimated cost for repair/replacement of the RG and associated components is approximately $500,000.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **$2,000,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE New Orleans District has no recommendations to the Office of Incident Investigations (OII) at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

22-APR-2026

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Brody Vial

APPROVED DATE: **01-JUL-2026**