

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

For Public Release

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **24-MAY-2026** TIME: **1138** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Cantium, LLC**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- ☐ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
☐ CRANE
☐ OTHER LIFTING
☐ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
☐ INCIDENT >\$25K
☐ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
☐ REQUIRED MUSTER
☐ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
☐ OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G01315**

AREA: **MP** LATITUDE:

BLOCK: **298** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: ☐ EXPLORATION(POE)
☒ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION(DOCD/POD)
☐ DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

☐ HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR

CONTRACTOR

☐ REQUIRED EVACUATION

☐ LTA (1-3 days)

☐ LTA (>3 days)

☐ RW/JT (1-3 days)

☐ RW/JT (>3 days)

☐ FATALITY

☐ Other Injury

☐ POLLUTION

☒ FIRE

☐ EXPLOSION

LWC ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT

☐ UNDERGROUND

☐ SURFACE

☐ DEVERTER

☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION ☐ HISTORIC ☐ >\$25K ☐ <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- ☒ PRODUCTION ☐ TEMP ABAND
☐ DRILLING ☐ PERM ABAND
☐ WORKOVER ☐ DECOM PIPELINE
☐ COMPLETION ☐ DECOM FACILITY
☐ HELICOPTER ☐ SITE CLEARANCE
☐ MOTOR VESSEL
☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
☐ OTHER

9. CAUSE:

- ☒ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
☒ HUMAN ERROR
☐ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
☐ WEATHER RELATED
☒ LEAK
☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
☐ OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **210** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **16** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

At 1138 hours on 24 May 2026, a fire occurred at Main Pass (MP) 298 A located on Lease G01315. MP 298 A is a production platform owned and operated by Cantium, LLC (Cantium). The fire was observed in the vicinity of the Gas Compressor and Glycol Dehydration System. The fire was extinguished by the production operator with a water hose. The platform was shut in and remained out of service pending investigation and verification of the equipment's condition prior to restart. There were no personnel injuries or pollution as a result of this incident.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On 24 May 2026, at approximately 1138 hours, a small flash fire was observed by the Cantium Production Operator during his morning rounds. The Operator was responding to a Pressure Alarm Low (PAL) for the glycol pump when the operator observed a fire on the top deck. The fire was observed near the Glycol Dehydration System and where the Gas Compressor (located on the lower deck) exhaust piping penetrates through the top deck. The Operator immediately grabbed a nearby water hose and quickly extinguished the flame on the top deck. As he continued his inspection of the area, he noticed another flame on the Gas Compressor exhaust piping, on the lower deck. The Operator immediately went down to the lower level and used another water hose to extinguish the flame on the lower deck. Once both fires were extinguished, the Operator shut down both the Compressor and Glycol Dehydration system. The Operator then notified Cantium management of the event and then continued to monitor and cool down the area with water to prevent re-ignition.

Shortly after being notified of the incident, Cantium personnel arrived on location and initiated evidence preservation and began an incident investigation. Cantium's investigation consisted of collecting witness statements, equipment photographs, safety system information, operational timelines, and affected equipment documentation.

BSEE INVESTIGATION:

On 29 May 2026, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) investigation team arrived at MP 298 to perform their investigation. The team consisted of a New Orleans District (NOD) Accident Investigator (AI), a NOD Lead Inspector (Lead) and an additional Investigator with the Office of Incident Investigations (OII). The team requested and reviewed documentation of the event, photos of the incident location, interviewed personnel on the facility, and performed a walkthrough of the incident area as well as the rest of the facility.

Cantium's investigation determined that glycol leaked from a failed hose connection on one of the glycol pumps (PBA 1210/11). The glycol leaked onto solid decking, flowed across the deck approximately 8 feet until it reached a breach in containment caused by corrosion (pinholes). The pinholes in the deck allowed the glycol to drip onto the gas compressor's hot exhaust piping at the deck penetration. When the glycol contacted the compressor's hot exhaust piping, the glycol ignited.

As a result of reviewing the documentation provided to the investigation team, the BSEE investigation aligned with Cantium's Root Cause Analysis (RCA), which suggested that a loose glycol pump hose fitting allowed glycol to leak onto the solid deck below the pump. The glycol then "flowed" across the solid deck until it leaked through pinholes in the containment deck and then impacted the compressor hot exhaust piping

where it ignited.

During the investigation, the Platform Operator stated that the glycol pump had been replaced a week earlier. As such, it's possible that the hose fittings may not have been properly secured/ tightened after the pump was replaced. As a result of the incident, Cantium personnel did a "blitz" inspection of their facilities to look for similar containment deficiencies across their entire fleet. There is a Hot Work Plan in place to correct all these containment breeches while the platform is shut in.

IN CONCLUSION:

After performing a walkthrough of the facility, and investigating the incident location, the BSEE investigation team determined that this incident was caused by poor containment which allowed glycol to drip through pinholes in the containment deck onto a hot compressor exhaust on the deck below. Once the glycol came into contact with the hot exhaust piping, the fire occurred.

BSEE recognizes that leaks from production equipment are common throughout the Gulf of America and are experienced by all companies involved in the production of oil and gas. The primary method of minimizing the effects of leaks is through good containment systems beneath the equipment.

The investigation revealed that Cantium had been operating the facility with multiple breaches in containment. As a result of this fire, Cantium has allocated additional resources to address similar containment issues across this facility and other Cantium facilities across the gulf.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human Performance Error: Inattention to task.

- Personnel failed to adequately secure or tighten the fittings associated with the glycol pump installation after swapping out the glycol pump.
- Personnel failed to identify containment breeches in the Glycol Dehydration System skid.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment maintenance or equipment repairs.

- Containment breeches under the Glycol Dehydration System allowed glycol to leak onto the hot exhaust piping of the Gas Compressor where it ignited.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

No fire damages to equipment

Fire

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$

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22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECCURANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE New Orleans District has no recommendations to the Office of Incident Investigations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G- 111 Code C Cantium failed to maintain the containment system at MP 298 A in good condition to prevent the release or discharge of fluids onto hot surfaces, lower decks, or into the Gulf of America Waters. Leaking glycol from a loose hose connection ignited as it fell through pinholes in containment onto the Gas Compressor hot exhaust piping below.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

OCS REPORT:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Brody Vial

APPROVED
DATE:

01-JUL-2026