

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MARINE MINERALS ADMINISTRATION
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

For Public Release

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **14-APR-2026** TIME: **0600** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **GOM Shelf LLC**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- ☒ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
☐ CRANE
☐ OTHER LIFTING
☐ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
☒ INCIDENT >\$25K **\$1,324,000**
☐ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
☐ REQUIRED MUSTER
☐ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
☐ OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **00133**

AREA: **GI** LATITUDE: **28.93288**

BLOCK: **47** LONGITUDE: **-90.026192**

5. PLATFORM: **L**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: ☐ EXPLORATION(POE)
☒ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION(DOCD/POD)
☐ DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

☐ HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR

CONTRACTOR

☐ REQUIRED EVACUATION

☐ LTA (1-3 days)

☐ LTA (>3 days)

☐ RW/JT (1-3 days)

☐ RW/JT (>3 days)

☐ FATALITY

☐ Other Injury

☐ POLLUTION

☐ FIRE

☐ EXPLOSION

LWC ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT

☐ UNDERGROUND

☐ SURFACE

☐ DEVERTER

☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION ☐ HISTORIC ☒ >\$25K ☐ <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- ☒ PRODUCTION ☐ TEMP ABAND
☐ DRILLING ☐ PERM ABAND
☐ WORKOVER ☐ DECOM PIPELINE
☐ COMPLETION ☐ DECOM FACILITY
☐ HELICOPTER ☐ SITE CLEARANCE
☐ MOTOR VESSEL
☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
☐ OTHER

9. CAUSE:

- ☒ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
☒ HUMAN ERROR
☐ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
☐ WEATHER RELATED
☐ LEAK
☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
☒ OTHER Communication

10. WATER DEPTH: **100** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **10** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION: **SE**
SPEED: **20** M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: **4** FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 14 April 2026, at approximately 0600 hours, an allision incident occurred at Grand Isle (GI) 47 L platform. GI 47 L is a fixed leg production platform owned and operated by GOM Shelf LLC (GOM Shelf), located in the Gulf of America. The allision occurred as the Towing Vessel Genesis Glory (Genesis Glory) was towing the GM 8001 Tank Barge (Barge) and the Barge struck the GI 47 L platform. Both the Genesis Glory and the Barge are owned and operated by Genesis Marine LLC (Genesis Marine). At the time of the allision, the facility was unmanned and producing. The platform navigational aids were functioning properly at the time of the allision. Due to the allision, there was damage to the Barge and the GI 47 L platform. There were no injuries reported and no pollution due to the allision.

At the time of the investigation, Marine Minerals Administration (MMA) personnel were operating under the former Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Therefore, all MMA personnel referenced in this report will be identified as BSEE personnel.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On 13 April 2026, Genesis Glory retrieved the Barge near Eugene Island (EI) and initiated towing operations to Southwest Pass under a pre planned transit route. On the morning of 14 April 2026, while transiting through the GI 47 field, the Training Second Mate—who was left conducting an independent navigational watch—encountered several fishing vessels operating near the Genesis Glory's intended course. To maintain safe separation, the Training Second Mate executed minor course deviations around these vessels; however, these adjustments resulted in gradual divergence from the original planned route. According to evidence provided by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Casualty Investigators (Investigators), the Training Second Mate continued navigating independently between approximately 0450 hours and 0550 hours, during which time the vessel drifted increasingly off its designated track.

At approximately 0550 hours, the Master entered the wheelhouse and observed that the Genesis Glory was approximately 0.5 nautical miles off course and on a heading that placed it in direct proximity to an offshore production platform. Upon recognizing the developing hazard, the Master issued urgent helm and throttle instructions to the Training Second Mate to regain the planned course and avoid contact with the platform. Despite these corrective maneuvers, the vessel's offset position, the towing configuration, and limited reaction time prevented effective avoidance of the platform. The Barge, still under tow, could not be sufficiently redirected to clear the platform.

At approximately 0600 hours, the barge's forward port side allided with the southwest corner of the GI 47 L platform, resulting in significant structural damage to the facility and damage to the Barge. Following the allision, the Master made multiple attempts to contact the Genesis Marine operations office to report the incident and receive further directions. Once contact was established, the incident was formally reported to Genesis Marine, and dispatch instructed the Genesis Glory to continue the tow to Southwest Pass.

Around the time of the event, personnel stationed on the nearby GI 47 AQ platform observed the Genesis Glory and Barge maneuvering unusually close to GI 47 L. In response, GOM Shelf deployed two workers by boat to assess GI 47 L. Upon boarding, the workers reported extensive structural damage affecting multiple components. Due to the

severity of the damage and safety concerns, personnel vacated the platform and shut in all production wells as a precaution to mitigate risk to personnel and the environment. No pollution or hydrocarbon release was observed during the initial survey.

After the allision, Genesis Marine notified USCG, who then advised GOM Shelf of the confirmed allision with the GI 47 L platform. GOM Shelf initiated formal damage assessments including structural inspections and engineering evaluations, to determine the platform's integrity and identify required repairs. Once top-sides and underwater assessments confirmed the platform could be safely accessed by personnel, crews boarded GI 47 L and initiated steps to restore operations. The platform was returned to production on 03 May 2026. GOM Shelf has completed its damage evaluation and is proceeding with repairs as outlined in its approved repair plan.

BSEE INVESTIGATIONS:

On 14 April 2026 at approximately 0935 hours, the USCG notified the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) of an allision involving the GI 47 L platform. After several hours without receiving the operator's required oral notification, the BSEE New Orleans District Production Operations Section Chief contacted GOM Shelf to request preliminary information on the allision. At 1412 hours, GOM Shelf provided additional information to BSEE via email, and followed up with an electronic incident report on 15 April 2026, which contained photographs and descriptions of the platform damage.

Upon receipt of the electronic report, the case was assigned to a BSEE Accident Investigator (AI). The AI immediately coordinated with the USCG Investigators and requested all records collected by USCG from the towing vessel Genesis Glory. The USCG Investigators subsequently provided witness statements, recorded interviews, vessel work/rest logs, an interview summary from the GI 47 Field Person in Charge, the USCG Marine Casualty Report, drug and alcohol test results, the vessel's Certificate of Inspection, and the ABS Preliminary Report documenting damage to Tank Barge GM 8001. A BSEE Inspector also conducted an aerial overflight of GI 47 L on 14 April 2026 and photographed the damage to the platform. GOM Shelf later supplied additional photos of the damage to the platform.

Although BSEE and the USCG exchanged information, each agency conducted an independent investigation. On 15 April 2026, at Buck Kreihs Shipyard, USCG Investigators interviewed the Master, Chief Mate, Training Second Mate, and Able-Bodied Seaman (AB) Tankerman/Deckhand (AB Tankerman) and provided full recordings of these interviews to the BSEE AI. The interviews established that the Training Second Mate, having only an Apprenticeship Mate of Towing license, independently navigated the Genesis Glory under wire tow from approximately 0450 hours and 0550 hours on 14 April 2026. The Chief Mate stated that although his scheduled watch ended at 0400 hours, he remained in the wheelhouse until approximately 0450 hours, during which time he briefed the Training Second Mate on hazards including fishing vessels and nearby platforms, instructed him not to approach any hazards, and confirmed understanding by having him repeat the instructions.

The Chief Mate indicated that he had previously discussed watch relief with the Master at approximately 2330 hours on 13 April 2026. The Master stated that, if the vessel was in a stable situation, the Chief Mate could secure from the wheelhouse around 0500 hours because the Master planned to return at that time. The Chief Mate stated he left the wheelhouse at approximately 0450 hours, entered his cabin around 0456 hours, and fell asleep around 0520 hours.

During the period of independent navigation, the Training Second Mate deviated from the planned track line to maneuver around fishing vessels. While attempting to reestablish the track line, the Training Second Mate observed the GI 47 L platform ahead. Around this time, the Master entered the wheelhouse and noted the vessel was off course, although the chart display was zoomed out, preventing him from determining the full extent of the deviation. The Training Second Mate and AB Tankerman reported to the Master that the GOB chain had been lost, but the "donut" remained attached, indicating the tow wire was still secured. The Master directed gradual starboard course corrections and avoided large heading changes due to the missing GOB chain.

Despite corrective efforts, it became evident that the Barge would contact the platform, prompting the Master to place the engines out of gear immediately before impact. The Barge subsequently struck the GI 47 L platform. Following the allision, the Master maneuvered back toward the Barge cautiously to recover the tow chain while minimizing the risk of propeller entanglement. Once the tow was recovered, the Master continued the tow to Southwest Pass.

In his interview, the Master confirmed that both he and the Chief Mate had agreed the Training Second Mate was not authorized to stand an independent navigational watch during a wire-tow operation due to insufficient credentials and experience. The Master acknowledged that his communication with the Chief Mate regarding the timing of his return to the wheelhouse may have been unclear and stated that he would not have intentionally left the Training Second Mate alone to navigate the vessel.

The AB Tankerman reported in his interview that after completing his routine vessel rounds, he proceeded to check on the Training Second Mate at approximately 0500 hours. During their discussion, he noted an issue involving the GOB chain coming off. While observing through the wheelhouse windows, he saw platform lights and advised the Training Second Mate that the vessel appeared to be heading toward the platform. He stated that he intended to begin his scheduled engine room rounds at approximately 0530. At about 0545, the Master entered the wheelhouse. The AB Tankerman postponed his rounds to brief the Master on the GOB chain issue. He reported that while he was relaying this information, the vessel continued closing distance with the platform. The Master then instructed the Training Second Mate to initiate a turn to starboard. The AB Tankerman subsequently left the wheelhouse to begin his rounds. As he looked aft, he observed the barge in very close proximity to the platform. Assessing that a collision was likely, he immediately alerted the crew over the radio. The barge then contacted the platform.

The AB Tankerman further stated that upon initially entering the wheelhouse, he did not hear any autopilot off course alerts. However, after he had been in the wheelhouse for approximately 30 minutes, the autopilot began indicating that the vessel was deviating from its set track.

IN CONCLUSION:

The allision between the barge under tow by the Genesis Glory and the GI 47 L platform resulted primarily from unauthorized independent navigation by the Training Second Mate, inadequate watch-standing practices, and delayed recognition of the vessel's deviation from the planned track. This situation was exacerbated when the Chief Mate departed the wheelhouse around 0450 hours, leaving the Training Second Mate alone in the wheelhouse despite his lack of authorization and experience to stand an independent navigational watch during a wire-tow operation. Course alterations made to avoid fishing vessels were not properly corrected, allowing the tug and tow to drift significantly off course. The absence of qualified oversight during this period, combined with late intervention by the Master, left insufficient time and distance to regain safe separation of the Barge from the platform.

Equipment issues, including the loss of the GOB chain, further constrained maneuverability and limited the Master's ability to execute more aggressive heading changes once the developing hazard was identified. By the time corrective actions were initiated, the tug and barge were already positioned such that avoiding the allision was no longer feasible.

The subsequent allision caused substantial structural damage to the GI 47 L platform but did not result in pollution or hydrocarbon release. Both BSEE and USCG investigations determined that procedural lapses, unclear communication regarding watch relief, and reliance on an inadequately qualified watch stander were key causal factors.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human Performance Error: Inexperience doing task related to the incident- The Training Second Mate did not have the licensure, credentials, or experience to independently navigate the Genesis Glory under wire tow.

Supervision: No or inadequate supervision- Due to neither the Chief Mate nor Master being in the wheelhouse with the Training Second Mate, proper supervision was not maintained while the Training Second Mate was navigating the Genesis Glory between 0450 hours and 0550 hours, prior to the allision.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment used- Due to the GOB chain not being installed properly, the Genesis Glory was not able to make more aggressive maneuvers which could have prevented the barge from alliding with the platform.

Personnel Training: Personnel not trained on equipment used- Training Second Mate was not adequately trained to independently perform wire tow operations.

Communication: Instructions Misunderstood- The Chief Mate misunderstood the directions of the Master concerning what time the Master would be coming to the wheelhouse and when the Chief mate could leave the wheelhouse. This misunderstanding left the Training Second Mate unsupervised in the wheelhouse for longer than expected.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Note: 14 April 2026 - Fly Over (Could not board platform due to damages)

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Barge, GI 47 L platform

Bent, Broken, Structural Damage

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):\$ 1,324,000.00 USD
GI 47 L Platform/ \$300,000.00 Tank Barge
Total Damage cost: \$1,624,000.00 USD

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$1,624,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECCURANCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE New Orleans District has no recommendations for Office of Incident Investigations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
Brody Vial

APPROVED
DATE: **03-AUG-2026**