

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MARINE MINERALS ADMINISTRATION
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **16-MAY-2026** TIME: **0915** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Eni US Operating Co. Inc.**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- ☐ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
☐ CRANE
☐ OTHER LIFTING
☒ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. **generator**
☐ INCIDENT >\$25K
☐ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
☐ REQUIRED MUSTER
☐ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
☐ OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G19996**

AREA: **MC** LATITUDE: **28.20875531**
BLOCK: **773** LONGITUDE: **-88.73747383**

5. PLATFORM: **A(Devils Tower)**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: ☐ EXPLORATION(POE)
☒ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION(DOCD/POD)
☐ DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

- ☐ HISTORIC INJURY
☐ REQUIRED EVACUATION
☐ LTA (1-3 days)
☐ LTA (>3 days)
☐ RW/JT (1-3 days)
☐ RW/JT (>3 days)
☐ FATALITY
☐ Other Injury
- OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

- ☐ POLLUTION
☐ FIRE
☐ EXPLOSION

- LWC ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT
☐ UNDERGROUND
☐ SURFACE
☐ DEVERTER
☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION ☐ HISTORIC ☐ >\$25K ☐ <=\$25K

8. OPERATION:

- ☒ PRODUCTION
☐ DRILLING
☐ WORKOVER
☐ COMPLETION
☐ HELICOPTER
☐ MOTOR VESSEL
☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
☐ OTHER
- ☐ TEMP ABAND
☐ PERM ABAND
☐ DECOM PIPELINE
☐ DECOM FACILITY
☐ SITE CLEARANCE

9. CAUSE:

- ☒ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
☐ HUMAN ERROR
☐ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
☐ WEATHER RELATED
☐ LEAK
☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
☐ OTHER

10. WATER DEPTH: **5610** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **58** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: **0** FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 16 May 2026, at 2115 hours, Mississippi Canyon (MC) 773 A (Devil's Tower), OCS Lease No G19996, operated by ENI US Operating Co. Inc (ENI), experienced an unplanned shutdown of the platform's Main Turbine A Gas Generator 1 (T-Gen 1). Upon shutdown of T-Gen 1, the Emergency Diesel Generator (E-Gen) automatically started, but failed to take the load needed to restore power to the facility. Due to the loss of power, there was a full platform production shut in. The facility was without power for approximately 24 hours.

At the time of the incident, there were 74 Personnel of Board (POB). There were no injuries and no pollution as a result of the incident. Non-essential personnel were evacuated to two standby motor vessels that were in the field at the time of the incident. Only a small production and maintenance crew remained on Devil's Tower. A rental diesel generator (referred to as the Hurricane Generator) was brought on board and used to provide temporary power to the platform for essential loads, until the T-Gen 1 was repaired and brought back online

At the time of the investigation, Marine Minerals Administration (MMA) personnel were operating under the former Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Therefore, all MMA personnel referenced in this report will be identified as BSEE personnel.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

On 16 May 2026, at 2115 hours, Devil's Tower unexpectedly lost power from its T-Gen 1, due to a back up overspeed sensor failure. The backup E-gen automatically started, then shut back down. Due to a faulty Electronic Control Module (ECM), the E-gen failed to produce electricity to carry the load of the facility. ENI Technicians immediately attempted to restart the E-Gen but were unsuccessful. Subsequently, the Un-interrupted Power Supply (UPS) and battery chargers throughout the platform were unable to keep a charge on the backup batteries, which provide power to the Emergency Motor Control Center (EMCC). The Technicians replaced the Electronic Control Module (ECM) and the Load Shed Modules on the E-Gen, but the unit was still having issues creating the steady voltage needed to startup T Gen 1 or T Gen 2. Due to the lack of power on the facility, ENI made the decision to evacuate all non-essential personnel onto two vessels that were standing by in the field.

On 17 May 2026, the ENI Technicians brought a rental diesel Hurricane Generator on location and were successful putting it in-service. The Hurricane Generator was able to provide the necessary electrical power needed to start T-Gen 1. The Hurricane Generator (1000 kw) is normally kept on board throughout the hurricane season as an extra backup power source. However, it was not onboard at the time of the incident and instead had to be sent out to the facility once the issues with the T-gens and E-gen were observed. ENI Regulatory Advisor submitted a written package requesting verbal approval from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), to utilize the Hurricane Generator as their temporary main platform power source. BSEE sent approval to utilize this Hurricane Generator to provide power to the facility, and asked the operator to submit a formal "Temporary Generator" submittal in FSS to document the approval.

On 18 May 2026, all power generation was finally restored to the facility at 0100 hours after the ENI Technicians completed troubleshooting and repairing the power generation issues. T Gen 1 had a backup overspeed sensor failure replaced, and the E Gen had it's faulty ECM replaced. Additionally, the rental diesel Hurricane Gen was

now on location serving as an additional backup to the E-gen.

BSEE INVESTIGATIONS:

The Bureau of Safety and Environments Enforcement (BSEE) incident investigation team arrived on location on 26 May 2026 to perform an investigation of this incident. Prior to their arrival, the BSEE Accident Investigator (AI) requested and reviewed all email correspondence between ENI representatives and BSEE personnel concerning the incident. The AI requested the following documentation as well and reviewed the list of Personnel on Board (POB), ENI Morning Report, Morning Flash Report, and ENI's Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for the incident. The onsite investigation consisted of a thorough walk through and inspection of the facility, focusing on the Generators, MCC Rooms, and Control Room. The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) provided detailed descriptions of the events that occurred prior to, during, and after the loss of power. At the time of the onsite investigation, T-Gen 1 was back in-service, while the E-Gen was on standby.

On 21 August 2026, the AI reached out to ENI representatives via email to get additional details on the loss of power event. Specifically, the AI was looking into what caused the original failure of T-Gen 1 and T-Gen 2, why was the E-gen unable to restore power to the facility, and how did they eventually get power restored to the facility.

The investigation determined that both T- Gen 1 and T-Gen 2 are manual start, and identical setups. However, there is no way to start the T-Gens without the E Gen first providing electrical power to their electrical starters. T Gen-2 never had an issue during this timeframe. However, T-Gen 2 was unable to be started as there was no power from the E-Gen to the electric starter for T-Gen 2. Prior to the event, the E-Gen was tested a week earlier and found to be in good working order.

IN CONCLUSION:

The unplanned shutdown of the platform T-Gen 1, along with the failure of the E-Gen to provide power to the facility when needed, caused the facility to shut down production and disabled the safety system for just over 24 hours. While there were several factors that contributed to the event, ENI provided a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) report to BSEE detailing all the findings and the appropriate corrective actions.

Their investigation revealed that T-Gen 1 shut down due to a back up overspeed sensor failure. When T-Gen 1 shut down, T-Gen 2 was unable to start, as it has an electric starter, which requires E-Gen power to be started. The E-Gen was able to be started. However, the E-Gen would not take the load necessary to power the facility, or start the T-Gen 2 due to a faulty ECM. Eventually, ENI had to bring a rental diesel Hurricane Generator onboard to provide power to the facility, and to be utilized to start up T-Gen 1 after the backup over speed sensor was replaced.

Additionally, ENI's RCA found that, as the generators were installed in 2001, and were now almost 25 years old, repair/replacement parts were obsolete and hard to get a hold of. Additionally, the software licenses required to troubleshoot the generators were outdated, which complicated troubleshooting the generator issues.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate preventive maintenance/ Inadequate equipment repairs:
Initially, the potential cause was identified as a speed sensor failure on the Gas Generator. When a turbine generator fails for any reason the Emergency Generator (E-Gen) is supposed to start and automatically connect the generator breaker to the switchgear buss to power the E-MCC. By the E-Gen failing to start, the UPSs and battery chargers throughout the platform were unable to keep a charge on the backup batteries, which led to a full facility loss of power.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment repair / Obsolete Control System;
• T Gen 1 (A Generator) had a backup over speed sensor failure. T-Gen 2 could not be started, as the electric starter could not get power, due to E-gen not producing power.
• The Emergency Generator (E-Gen) started, but failed to generator electricity due to faulty ECM.
• The generator packages were built in 2001, and are old and outdated. The Control Panel and Engine Controls are old/obsolete, and parts almost impossible to find, which makes them challenging to repair. No new parts are available. Only remanufactured or used parts.
• Also, there is a lack of updated software for technicians to use to troubleshoot problems on these generators when they arise.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

The failure of worn, obsolete equipment

Worn and obsolete

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$26,200**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE New Orleans District has no recommendations to the Office of Incident Investigations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

21-MAY-2026

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
Brody Vial

APPROVED
DATE: **09-SEP-2026**