For Public Release

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF AMERICA REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: **11-AUG-2026** TIME: **0515** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Shell Offshore Inc.**
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR: **Transocean Offshore**
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

- [ ] STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- [X] CRANE
- [ ] OTHER LIFTING
- [ ] DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- [X] INCIDENT >$25K **800,000**
- [ ] H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- [ ] REQUIRED MUSTER
- [ ] SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- [ ] OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G31195**
   AREA: **AC** LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: **728** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM:
   RIG NAME: **T.O. DEEPWATER POSEIDON**

6. ACTIVITY:
- [ ] EXPLORATION(POE)
- [X] DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION(DOCD/POD)
- [ ] DECOMMISSIONING

7. TYPE:
   INJURIES:
- [ ] HISTORIC INJURY

	OPERATOR	CONTRACTOR
[ ] REQUIRED EVACUATION		
[ ] LTA (1-3 days)		
[ ] LTA (>3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (1-3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (>3 days)		
[ ] FATALITY		
[ ] Other Injury		

- [ ] POLLUTION
- [ ] FIRE
- [ ] EXPLOSION

LWC
- [ ] HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- [ ] UNDERGROUND
- [ ] SURFACE
- [ ] DEVERTER
- [ ] SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION [ ] HISTORIC [ ] >$25K [ ] <=$25K

8. OPERATION:
- [ ] PRODUCTION
- [X] DRILLING
- [ ] WORKOVER
- [ ] COMPLETION
- [ ] HELICOPTER
- [ ] MOTOR VESSEL
- [ ] PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- [ ] OTHER
- [ ] TEMP ABAND
- [ ] PERM ABAND
- [ ] DECOM PIPELINE
- [ ] DECOM FACILITY
- [ ] SITE CLEARANCE

9. CAUSE:
- [X] EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- [X] HUMAN ERROR
- [ ] EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- [ ] SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- [ ] WEATHER RELATED
- [ ] LEAK
- [ ] UPSET H2O TREATING
- [ ] OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- [ ] OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **8641** FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **175** MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION: **SE**
    SPEED: **17** M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: **3** FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

For Public Release

On 8/11/2026 at approximately 1715 hours, during completion operations located at Alaminos Canyon (AC) 728, Lease G31195, well WN103, API 608054011901, operated by Shell Offshore Inc., onboard the Transocean Deepwater Poseidon, Drillship Rig ID 50170, the 20T auxiliary/wire rope cable on the Port #2 forward knuckle boom pedestal crane parted during a lift causing the load to fall and make impact with the Deepwater Poseidon's outboard pipe deck handrails, warehouse porch deck, and outboard main deck handrails before it continued to fall overboard.
The load consisted of a work basket, flowhead and C-Plate with a total weight of approximately 33,000- pounds. There were no injuries or pollution associated with the incident. Marine Debris report 583048291 was submitted in the TIMS Web District Notices.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was the lead agency investigating and issuing enforcement action for the incident as per the Memorandum of Agreement with the Marine Minerals Administration (MMA.

Sequence of Events on 8/11/2026:
The Transocean Deepwater Poseidon's Port forward #2 knuckle boom pedestal crane auxiliary wire rope cable was utilized to offload a 40-foot by 8-foot by 4-foot basket containing a flowhead and C-Plate with a total weight of approximately 33,000- pounds from the Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) Deer Island. The load was to be landed in the designated area on the port side pipe deck. Before the lift was made, a hazard prompt card, job design and crane pre-use was completed by Transocean crew members and the port side pipe deck where the load would be lifted and landed was barricaded off. Transocean crew members were under the pipe skate in the designated safe step back area approximately 69-feet from initial impact when the incident occurred. As the load was just coming onboard the port side of the Deepwater Poseidon, the Transocean Crane Operator boomed slightly up to clear the crane boom cradle when the auxiliary wire rope cable parted. The load initially fell approximately 27-feet impacting the port side of the Deepwater Poseidon's pipe deck handrails, then fell another 34-feet impacting the warehouse porch deck, then another 18-feet impacting the outboard main deck handrails before falling another 23-feet into the Gulf of America. The Deepwater Poseidon sustained damage to handrails and a hole in the warehouse porch deck. Areas which sustained damage were barricaded off and made safe for the investigation. The crane was made safe and stowed in the cradle. A safety stand-down was held with crane and deck crews. An inspection of the crane was completed to verify no additional hazards existed. A remotely operated vehicle (ROV) was deployed to Investigate subsea infrastructure and no damage was identified. The AC-773 Whale Production facility was made aware of the incident and there was confirmation from the control room that the facility did not show any anomalies.

Wire Rope Information:
The 20T auxiliary wire rope cable was manufactured with a diameter of 1.34-inches with a specified break load of 228,181-pounds per foot. The tensile grade is 1960 with a working load limit of 20.7- tons. The core is a wire stand core with a rope lay of Right-hand Lang's lay. Termination is a solid wire rope thimble. The hook is a swivel type. The auxiliary cable was installed on 6/29/2017. As per Transocean Offshore Installation Manager
(OIM), the auxiliary cable was to be changed every ten years and was near the end of life. Crane wire rope Inspections were completed on 7/14/2026 with 1735 working hours and 6/13/2026 with 1711 working hours. Both inspections noted no damage or deformations and measured the rope at 1.37-inches. A successful wire rope destructive test was completed 7/30/2024. A 20-foot sample of the wire rope had a breaking load strength of 250,290- pounds. The minimum allowable breaking load was 220,462- pounds.

Return to Service:
On 8/15/2026 Shell requested the Port forward #2 knuckle boom crane's main wire rope

For Public Release

cable be placed back into service. Transocean and an independent third-party inspection conducted inspections on 8/12/2026 with no discrepancies identified. On 8/16/2026 approval was given by MMA, USCG, and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) to allow the use of the Port forward #2 knuckle boom crane's main wire rope cable. On 8/18/2026, after further examination of the Port forward #2 knuckle boom crane's auxiliary wire rope cable, the USCG issued (2) deficiencies. The first deficiency put crane #2 out of service until an accident analysis and correction action plan was approved and the second deficiency put all cranes out of service until satisfactory evidence that all crane wire ropes in active service are satisfactory for continued service.

MMA Investigation:
On 8/12/2026, MMA Investigators went out to location and reviewed video footage of the incident, took photos of damage, walked through the crane, verified load chart, and discussed incident with Shell's Company Representative, Transocean's OIM, and Transocean's investigating team. The MMA Investigators reviewed witness statements from all Transocean personnel involved with the lifting operation as well as Transocean personnel involved with the lifts with Crane #1 taking place on the starboard side of the vessel. Reviewed documentation to include CG-2692, Job-by-Design, hazard Id prompt card, wire rope inspections, crane maintenance documentation, crane inspections, additional photos, load manifest, mill test certificate, DNV survey statement, Crane Wire Maintenance Procedure, Transocean safety alert, Transocean's TOP-SET Investigation and Stress Engineering Services analysis report.
The MMA Investigators noted the condition of the auxiliary wire rope cable still on the winch with grease and what appeared to be salt creep. The end of the auxiliary wire rope cable which parted was still hanging over the side of the Deepwater Poseidon but appeared to have a coating of dry grease. As per the OIM, the wire rope was being greased with pressure lubricator unit using lube. The USCG Investigators questioned the application of grease with the pressurized lubricator due to similar historical incidents which identified items such as seal failure with the pressurized lubricator and running speeds of the wire rope cable. Both issues prevent grease from injecting into the wire rope core. Shell stated in a meeting with MMA on 11/3/2026, that the pressure lubricator for greasing should be evaluated to include application pressures, lubricator clamping, and training of personnel concerning the use of the pressurized grease lubricator. The MMA Investigators questioned the duration between wire rope replacement periods for the auxiliary wire rope cable along with no identifiable degradation identified on inspections.

It is important to note that Cranes # 1,3, and 4 have had their wire rope cable changed out every three year/7000-hour according to the cable replacement criteria while Crane #2 auxiliary wire rope cable was to be changed out every ten years. An electromagnetic inspection was completed on the auxiliary wire rope cable in 2024. At that time, the inspection was to be completed every three years. In 2025, Transocean changed the electromagnetic inspection requirement to an annual requirement. Another electromagnetic inspection was never completed on the auxiliary wire rope cable after the 2024 inspection before it failed August 2026. The Port forward #2 knuckle boom crane's weight indicator showed 35,494-pounds when the incident occurred according to the Crane Operator. The load manifest had the 40-foot by 8-foot by 4-foot basket, flowhead, C-Plate at 33,000- pounds. Weather was reported as sunny, 2-3-foot seas, and a Southeast wind at 10-15 knots. Estimated damage cost for the flowhead, basket, and rig repairs was $800,000.

Analysis:
A third-party independent metallurgical investigation was completed with the following results; Rope separation resulted from corrosion-driven material loss and followed by ductile overload. Localized wire

For Public Release

thinning and corrosion deposits near the parted end resulted in a loss of cross-sectional area, increasing localized stress during operation. The fracture characteristics were consistent with tensile/shear ductile overload rather than brittle fracture. Deposits identified on the rope were primarily iron oxides, consistent with corrosion products. The Port forward #2 knuckle boom crane's auxiliary wire rope was a 1.34-inch galvanized, rotation-resistant wire rope that had reportedly been in service for approximately 10 years. The minimum breaking load was 228,181-pounds per foot. Analysis was performed on two retained rope samples. One sample 30-foot from the parted end broke at 38%, 86,035-pounds per foot of the specified minimum and the second sample 300-foot from the parted end broke at 97%, 221,609-pounds per foot of the specified minimum. The significant difference between the two test results demonstrates that the wire rope retained substantially greater strength away from the localized degraded area near the failure location.

Recovery of equipment:
On 8/31/2026 Dive Support Vessel Blue Seas retrieved multiple marine debris items from the seafloor to include auxiliary wire rope, crane block and C-Plate. On 9/3/2026 a meeting was held with MMA to discuss recovery operations and status of the marine debris. The ROV found the damaged basket, C-Plate, and flowhead entry point/buried. A plan was formulated for recovery. The 40-foot by 8-foot by 4-foot basket will be recovered when the Deepwater Poseidon is complete with well WS504 or a suitable marine construction/intervention vessel is available. The flowhead will be recovered at the end of field life. The excavation activity to recover the flowhead could destabilize the seafloor around live production equipment and there is a risk of an ROV damaging production flowlines.

Transocean's corrective action plan:
• TMOC – Complete: Install a shorter auxiliary wire rope for deck lifts only under TMOC 17018217.
• Maintenance Plan – Complete: Revise the maintenance plan to install a standard-length cable and align requirements with BPR-CRN-N126.
• Procedure Revision – Complete: Update BPR-CRN-N126 to require documented technical justification through the TMOC process for any rig proposing to retain or install an auxiliary hoist wire rope for subsea operations.
• Deferral Management – Target November 30, 2026: Establish a FOCUS item requiring each Regional Operations Director to review active deferrals for appropriate risk assessment and controls.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Internal corrosion of the auxiliary wire rope cable led to failure.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Inadequate management of pressurized grease lubricator programs, including equipment condition monitoring, training requirements, inspection scope and frequency, maintenance deferral controls, and wire rope usage practices.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

None.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:	NATURE OF DAMAGE:
Deepwater Poseidon's outboard pipe deck handrails, warehouse porch deck, and outboard main deck handrails suffered damage. Flowhead, basket, C-plate went overboard.	**Structural damage to handrails and decking. Flowhead, basket, C-plate went overboard.**

For Public Release

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **$800,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

None.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

None.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

12-AUG-2026

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:
NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
jarvis outlaw

APPROVED DATE: **18-NOV-2026**