

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 06-OCT-2019 TIME: 1700 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Cantium, LLC

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K Allision
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G01372

AREA: BS LATITUDE: 29.41306509
BLOCK: 54 LONGITUDE: -89.07213756

5. PLATFORM: CAIS.#13

RIG NAME:

8. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION(POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

9. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

- HISTORIC INJURY
- OPERATOR
- CONTRACTOR
- REQUIRED EVACUATION
- LTA (1-3 days)
- LTA (>3 days)
- RW/JT (1-3 days)
- RW/JT (>3 days)
- FATALITY
- Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 - UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

- 10. WATER DEPTH: 18 FT.
- 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 7 MI.
- 12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: 29 M.P.H.
- 13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 14. SEA STATE: 7 FT.
- 15. PICTURES TAKEN:
- 16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

INCIDENT SUMMARY:

On 6 October 2019, at 14:40, the Breton Sound (BS) 54 #13 platform operated by Cantium, LLC was struck by the Motor Vessel (M/V) Ms. Emily. There were no injuries or pollution as a result of the allision. There were no personnel on the platform at the time of the allision.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The M/V Ms. Emily was traveling at 10 knots or less on a west northwest course towards BS 54 #13. The vessel, operated by Gulf Logistics Operating, departed Venice on 5 October 2019 at 04:00. At the time of the incident, on 6 October 2019, the visibility was 3 to 4 miles. The winds were 15 to 25 knots out of the east southeast. As the boat traveled to BS 54 to tie up for the night, it encountered four to seven feet seas. When approaching the platform, large ground swells began pushing the vessel. The vessel began surfing down the large ground swells towards the platform. According to the Captain, he steered full right rudder to try to avoid striking the platform. He then shifted the 4 engines out of forward gear and immediately tried to reverse the engines, but all 4 engines died. At this point, with the forward momentum, the M/V Ms. Emily's bow struck the platform. Once engine power was restored, the boat moved away from the platform.

The Captain immediately notified Gulf Logistics Operating, owner of the vessel, and Cantium's personnel at Main Pass (MP) 42 M. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was also notified of the incident. Cantium's Person in Charge (PIC) and Health, Safety, and Environment Coordinator (HSE) traveled from MP 42 M to BS 54 #13 to assess the damage. The PIC and HSE Coordinator observed damage to the bow of the boat and to the platform. The PIC and HSE Coordinator noted that the platform was leaning. There was damage to the boat landing area; however, the #13 well was still in service and there was no loss of primary containment or pollution observed.

The Captain was then directed to head to Venice where all 4 crew members on board were examined and drug and alcohol tested. Cantium reported an estimate of the damages to the boat to be greater than \$25,000. Cantium estimated damages to the platform at \$150,000.

INVESTIGATION:

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) New Orleans District (NOD) was notified of the allision on 7 October 2019. The BSEE Accident Investigator (AI) requested and reviewed the USCG Inspection Form CG-835V and the Accident Report Form CG-2692 from Cantium which was in good order. The USCG has lead jurisdiction as per the Memorandum of Agreement, MOA-OCS-05.

CONCLUSIONS:

BSEE found that the Captain decided to approach the platform during rough seas on the upstream side of the platform and not on the downstream side, where if the engine were to kill or stall, the seas would push the vessel away from the platform. Also, the Captain's decision to shift the gears from forward to reverse to prevent from alliding with the platform was an incorrect act. There is a 6 second delay when shifting from forward gear to neutral gear. When shifting from forward gear to reverse gear without allowing the 6 second delay, there is a safety feature that automatically shuts the engines down. When the engines shut down the vessel allided with the platform.

Prior to the allision, the navigational aide light and the foghorn were functioning. The platform safety system which includes two Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Stations, one

Pressure Safety High Low (PSHL) Sensor on the #13 well flowline, and a Temperature Safety Element (TSE) loop were not affected by the allision. There were no Level Safety Devices to be affected by the allision.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human Performance Error - Inattention to Task: The Captain decided to approach the platform during rough seas on the upstream side of the platform and not on the downstream side, where if the engine were to kill, the seas would push the vessel away from the platform. The Captain's decision to shift the gears from forward to reverse to prevent from colliding with the platform was an incorrect act. There is a 6 second delay when shifting from forward gear to neutral gear. When shifting from forward gear to reverse gear without allowing the 6 second delay, there is a safety feature that automatically shuts the engines down. When the engines shut down, the vessel allided with the platform.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Work Environment - Other Weather Influences: The seas were 4 to 7 feet with ground swells. The winds were 15 to 25 knots out of the east southeast.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A structural assessment of the platform by Technical Engineering Consultants, LLC (TEC) indicated that the caisson would not require additional bracing. The BS 54 #13 TEC Project Job No. 10195 requires approval from BSEE's Structures group.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

The incident caused damage to the platform above the waterline level on the caisson and boat landing braces at Elev. (+) 6'-0" and (+) 1'-6" level. The platform is presently leaning 5 degrees to the platform's North side (SACS - (+) Y Direction).

Allision

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$150,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE New Orleans District makes no recommendations to the Office of Incident Investigation.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

DATES OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:
October 7, 2019 and November 20, 2019

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:
07-OCT-2019

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:
Gerald Taylor /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PANEL FORMED: NO

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
David Trocquet

APPROVED
DATE: 22-JAN-2020