

Transcript of the Testimony of

**Kenneth Abbott**

**Date:** December 3, 2010

**Case:**

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INTERVIEW OF KENNETH ABBOTT  
DECEMBER 3, 2010  
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An interview of Kenneth Abbott was taken on the 3rd day of December, 2010, from 3:00 p.m. to 6:40 p.m., before Lisa D. Huneycutt, Notary Public in and for the State of Texas, reported by machine shorthand, at the offices of MALLETT SAPER, 600 Travis, Suite 1900, Houston, Texas 77002.

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1 INDEX

2 PAGE

3 Appearances ..... 2

4 Stipulations ..... 4

5 INTERVIEW OF KENNETH ABBOTT

6 Questions by Mr. Farber ..... 5

7 Questions by Mr. Perry ..... 129

8 Further Questions by Mr. Farber ..... 141

9 Reporter's Certificate ..... 145

10

11

12 EXHIBITS

13 NUMBER & DESCRIPTION PAGE

14 Exhibit 5 ..... 4

15 Declaration of Kenneth W. Abbott

16

17 Exhibit 6 ..... 4

18 Declaration of Kenneth W. Abbott

19 Exhibit 7 ..... 81

20 Atlantis Subsea Project System Handover

21 Procedure

22 (Retained by Mr. Farber)

23

24

25

1 MR. FARBER: All right. Good afternoon.

2 We're going to proceed now with the interview of Mr. Ken

3 Abbott.

4 Mr. Abbott, again, thank you for coming

5 in on a Friday afternoon. We're going to proceed under

6 the agreement outlined by Mr. Perry before the interview

7 of Mr. Sawyer.

8 MR. PERRY: Well, I'm not sure that I

9 have talked to Mr. Abbott about that. So if you'll just

10 let me -- it can be on the record.

11 But we have an agreement that the

12 discussion that we have here today is going to be

13 confidential, okay?

14 So whatever they ask you or whatever you

15 say, we can't be quoting that to anybody else. You can

16 talk to me and Emily and Rene and Ed about it, but

17 nobody else, okay?

18 That doesn't mean that the overall facts

19 are confidential, but the discussion that we have here

20 is confidential.

21 All right?

22 MR. ABBOTT: Okay.

23 (Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6 were premarked for

24 identification.)

25

Page 5

1 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 2 BY MR. FARBER:  
 3 Q. And just so you understand, that's sort of  
 4 standard practice during the pendency of any  
 5 investigation, and we appreciate your willingness to  
 6 adhere to that.  
 7 A. Sure.  
 8 Q. We are -- obviously, we're conducting an  
 9 investigation into the BP Atlantis production facility  
 10 and the status of certain drawings associated with that  
 11 and depicting structures and other -- and other  
 12 apparatus on that production facility.  
 13 We're also taking very seriously and  
 14 evaluating the allegations that you have put forth  
 15 through your lawsuit, and we've also reviewed carefully  
 16 your statement to Congress.  
 17 And so we're -- you know, one of the things  
 18 we're going to do today is cover those -- those  
 19 allegations in great detail.  
 20 What I -- what I really am most interested in  
 21 is understanding, to the extent it's not in either of  
 22 these documents, sort of the underlying facts as you  
 23 know them. Because you were there and you spoke to  
 24 people, you observed things, and so we want to -- we  
 25 want to know all of the facts that underlie your

Page 6

1 allegations.  
 2 MR. FARBER: Do we want to go off for a  
 3 second?  
 4 MS. HAAS: Give him a second. Otherwise,  
 5 I'll move over.  
 6 (Discussion off the record.)  
 7 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) So that's sort of an overview  
 8 of what we're going to be doing today.  
 9 I need to note a couple of other things. All  
 10 of us, the four investigators on this side of the table,  
 11 we are not here speaking on behalf of the Bureau, we are  
 12 not stating policy, we're not speaking on behalf of the  
 13 Department of the Interior, Director Bromwich, Secretary  
 14 Ken Salazar. We are simply asking questions and maybe  
 15 posing hypotheticals so that we can get our arms around  
 16 as many facts as possible.  
 17 There's -- you know, there have been  
 18 characterizations of what my agency has done during  
 19 various stages of either its investigation or its  
 20 inquiry into Atlantis, and I would just ask that we  
 21 not do that anymore. We're working to get this to  
 22 completion as quickly as we can.  
 23 One more thing here. We are going to ask  
 24 about facts; what you saw, who you talked to, your best  
 25 recollections. We are Federal -- agents of the Federal

Page 7

1 Government, and you're obligated to tell the truth in  
 2 today's interview, and I hope you understand that.  
 3 A. Yeah.  
 4 Q. And we have a court reporter here, so another  
 5 set of ground rules is to answer audibly to a question.  
 6 She doesn't pick up nods very well.  
 7 And by all means, let me know if a question of  
 8 mine, or less likely somebody else on this side of the  
 9 table, doesn't make sense, so we can try to -- so we  
 10 can try to get through this as -- as efficiently as  
 11 possible.  
 12 Any -- any questions before we get rolling?  
 13 A. No.  
 14 Q. Okay.  
 15 MR. FARBER: Counsel, any -- any  
 16 questions?  
 17 MR. PERRY: I guess for the record, I did  
 18 mark his two declarations as Exhibits 5 and 6, and they  
 19 are -- I've put them on the table in front of him so he  
 20 could refer to them if you are asking him questions  
 21 about them, or for any other reason he might want to  
 22 look at them.  
 23 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) Mr. Abbott, I don't think,  
 24 in all the materials that I saw, I had a CV for you.  
 25 So on that very top level, could you kind of

Page 8

1 give us sort of -- sort of walk us through -- and I hate  
 2 to do this -- education forward.  
 3 And we probably won't stop you at very many  
 4 places. We'll probably stop you somewhere along the way  
 5 and ask for a little more detail. But I want to start  
 6 there if we could.  
 7 A. Okay. Well, once again, my name is Ken  
 8 Abbott, and I have about 30 years overall project  
 9 management, project controls, scheduling costs, document  
 10 control experience in really several different  
 11 industries.  
 12 I've made project controls and project  
 13 management my career choice, and in that career, I've  
 14 worked with onshore, offshore, EPC companies, which do  
 15 the engineering construction. I've also worked with the  
 16 owner companies, such as Shell Oil and BP and GE and  
 17 GTE.  
 18 And I started out in the industry back with  
 19 Belmas, which was a fab shop. We fabricated the  
 20 equipment for onshore production and offshore vessels,  
 21 exchangers, etcetera.  
 22 Q. Was that --  
 23 A. Once I learned --  
 24 Q. Was that right out of school?  
 25 A. That was in Houston, right out of school.

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Page 21

Page 23

1 A. I talked to Rick about the trees. Correct.  
 2 Q. Okay. John Schweibel, manifolds?  
 3 A. Correct.  
 4 Q. Okay.  
 5 A. I talked to them several times, with Tinnika  
 6 also being in some of the meetings.  
 7 Q. John Mack? Oh, sorry. Pipelines, flowlines.  
 8 A. John Mack. Right.  
 9 Q. David Whitehead, controls?  
 10 A. Controls. I talked with David.  
 11 Q. Okay. Benny Kirkham, again, umbilicals. I  
 12 guess we've already covered that.  
 13 Risers, John Mack. We've covered him.  
 14 Installation, John Hughes.  
 15 That's it. Okay. Thank you for bearing with  
 16 me.  
 17 A. Sure.  
 18 Q. So you talked to each one of those listed  
 19 individuals about --  
 20 A. The problem with the drawings not being  
 21 complete and as-built.  
 22 MR. PERRY: Did you also want names of  
 23 other people besides lead engineers?  
 24 MR. FARBER: Absolutely. Yes.  
 25 MR. ABBOTT: I also talked with my

1 resisted it. I could use your help to try to push this  
 2 through."  
 3 And, you know, he didn't seem -- he just kind  
 4 of ignored the subject.  
 5 And later, in January of 2009, I brought it  
 6 up again to him, and he just got kind of mad and said,  
 7 "Well, the engineers" -- you know, "You're just putting  
 8 too much pressure on the engineers, and they're  
 9 complaining because they don't think they should have  
 10 to do this."  
 11 And I said, "Well, I don't really understand  
 12 why they're complaining. Every company I've ever worked  
 13 for has their lead design engineers review and approve  
 14 the drawings. And, you know, they're responsible to  
 15 issue as-built drawings."  
 16 Q. Did you ever -- did you ever talk to any of  
 17 these folks that we're talking about about whether  
 18 operations personnel on board the Atlantis had access  
 19 to the drawings that they needed to operate the  
 20 facility?  
 21 A. Yeah. Actually, I talked to Ron Bergman (sic)  
 22 in January, early January, with Tinnika Curtis in the  
 23 office.  
 24 We had asked to have -- asked him to have a  
 25 meeting with us to discuss that issue. Ron was the

Page 22

Page 24

1 supervisor, Bill Naseman, N-A-S-E-M-A-N, in November and  
 2 December about the problem, and how the leads that we've  
 3 previously mentioned were really resisting doing  
 4 anything about the problem. They didn't seem to  
 5 understand why they should have to approve the drawings  
 6 or issue them as as-built.  
 7 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) Let me -- let me ask -- okay.  
 8 So that was with Bill Naseman.  
 9 I guess November, December of 2008 was when --  
 10 A. Right.  
 11 Q. -- you talked to Bill?  
 12 Tell me what you remember specifically about  
 13 that conversation.  
 14 A. With Bill --  
 15 Q. Yeah.  
 16 A. -- Naseman?  
 17 Q. Yes, sir.  
 18 A. Well, I was in a staff meeting with Bill.  
 19 I talked to him on the phone about it, too, but I can  
 20 remember one staff meeting during -- I think it was  
 21 November or December of 2008, and we were talking about  
 22 issues.  
 23 And I brought up the fact that, you know,  
 24 "I've been trying to get these as-built drawings and,  
 25 you know, the approval of the engineers. They've really

1 operations manager, and all the people at the site on  
 2 the platform were under him.  
 3 And, you know, I said, "Ron, we understand  
 4 you've got problems getting as-built drawings out  
 5 there." And he said, "Yeah. In fact, I've got none."  
 6 Now, this was January of 2009. Remember, the  
 7 platform started up in December of 2007.  
 8 Q. So did you understand Ron Berger to be saying  
 9 that he had no as-built drawings on the Atlantis  
 10 facility --  
 11 A. Correct.  
 12 Q. -- whatsoever?  
 13 A. Correct.  
 14 Q. Okay.  
 15 A. And he asked what we could do about it to  
 16 help, and I said, "Well, I'm doing all I can to try to,  
 17 you know, come up with a plan to get the engineers to do  
 18 the" -- "to get the drawings completed and to get them  
 19 issued as-built and to get them approved, but we haven't  
 20 had a lot of success yet."  
 21 And then, of course, you know, in January, I  
 22 had the meeting with my boss, and he was just angry  
 23 because he was getting complaints from the leads.  
 24 Q. So let me ask everything you can remember  
 25 about the Ron Berger meeting.

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 25

Page 27

1 And let me -- you said Tinnika -- did I get  
 2 that right?  
 3 A. Tinnika Curtis was there.  
 4 Q. Tinnika Curtis was there.  
 5 A. Right.  
 6 Q. Was anybody else there?  
 7 A. Just Tinnika and me and Ron Berger.  
 8 Q. Where was the meeting?  
 9 A. It was in my office.  
 10 Q. Okay. And at that time, did Mr. Berger talk  
 11 at all about anything called a system handover package?  
 12 A. Yeah. He said, "Where is my system handover  
 13 package?" And I said, "They haven't issued it to you  
 14 yet because they say it's" -- "you know, because it's  
 15 not complete, and we don't want to issue them to you  
 16 until they're complete and as-built."  
 17 That's the way it's supposed to work, you  
 18 know, because you don't want operators looking at  
 19 drawings that are not the final issue, okay? That's  
 20 what's dangerous.  
 21 Q. Yeah.  
 22 A. So --  
 23 Q. So you said he said, "Where's my system  
 24 handover package?"  
 25 What else do you remember him specifically

1 operations manager --  
 2 A. Yeah.  
 3 Q. -- for the Atlantis?  
 4 A. Operations manager for the Atlantis in January  
 5 of 2009.  
 6 Q. The operations manager for the Atlantis tells  
 7 you he doesn't have any as-built drawings on the  
 8 facility.  
 9 What do you do after that? That's pretty  
 10 alarming, right?  
 11 A. Yeah. And just to add to that, back in  
 12 August, in the e-mail from Barry Duff that you've  
 13 seen --  
 14 Q. Yeah.  
 15 A. -- there was another operations manager that  
 16 had made a comment in a separate e-mail attached to  
 17 Barry's. I believe his name was Turner, or something  
 18 to that effect.  
 19 But if you look at that e-mail, you will see  
 20 that he also said, "The priority here is to get as-built  
 21 drawings to the field before the hurricane season starts  
 22 in 2008." And that, of course, never happened.  
 23 So his prior manager had also voiced concern  
 24 over the same problem. If you look at the Barry Duff  
 25 letter and you look at the very last part of it --

Page 26

Page 28

1 saying?  
 2 A. Well, just that, you know, he was -- he was  
 3 upset that he hadn't got any drawings at all.  
 4 And, you know, we told him that we were upset  
 5 that they hadn't been issued, and we were trying to do  
 6 what we could to get them issued and fighting a lot of  
 7 resistance in the process from the leads, and really,  
 8 we didn't feel like management was supporting us,  
 9 either.  
 10 Q. I got you.  
 11 And I'm going to go into that. I want to know  
 12 more about that resistance from the leads and what that  
 13 meant.  
 14 But before we leave what I'm calling the Ron  
 15 Berger meeting, you said it was in January 2009 in your  
 16 office.  
 17 About how long did you talk about the issue?  
 18 A. Probably about an hour.  
 19 Q. An hour? Okay.  
 20 Any other details that you can remember about  
 21 that meeting?  
 22 A. Well, about the meeting itself, I believe  
 23 that -- no. No. That's it for that meeting.  
 24 Q. So what did -- what did you do after -- and  
 25 Ron Berger -- I'm going to get his title wrong. He's

1 Q. Excuse me for a second. I know I have it,  
 2 so --  
 3 A. Yeah. I've got it, too. I mean, it was dated  
 4 September 2nd, 2008, and it's an attachment -- it's  
 5 Exhibit A to our exhibits, actually, Michael.  
 6 Q. Yeah. I actually took it apart, so --  
 7 MR. PERRY: That's the problem with  
 8 paper. It's never where you want it to be.  
 9 MR. FARBER: Exactly. Hold on just a  
 10 second.  
 11 MS. BERTRAND: Mike, do you want mine?  
 12 MR. FARBER: I might. Let me just fumble  
 13 here for a second.  
 14 MS. BERTRAND: Okay.  
 15 MR. FARBER: Yeah, why not. I'll take  
 16 yours.  
 17 Thank you. I'll pass it back to you, I  
 18 promise.  
 19 MR. ABBOTT: Correction. That's  
 20 Exhibit B.  
 21 MR. FARBER: Okay.  
 22 MR. ABBOTT: That's why I'm throwing you  
 23 off. I made a mistake.  
 24 It's a letter from Greg Andrew to Barry  
 25 Duff, in which Greg expresses his concern over -- Gary

7 (Pages 25 to 28)

Page 29

1 had -- Barry had made an estimate that it would cost 2  
 2 million to fix this problem, okay? And basically,  
 3 Andrew had come back and said, "That's too expensive.  
 4 We want to find cheaper means to do it."  
 5 And at the very last part of that e-mail  
 6 dated -- this is Exhibit B -- there's a sentence, "As an  
 7 aside, Dave Turner reminded me that the critical issue  
 8 during hurricane season is to have easy available a set  
 9 of documents for the installed SS1 equipment."  
 10 So he was the manager that preceded Ron,  
 11 and he had the same concerns.  
 12 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) Okay. Did you talk to Dave  
 13 Turner about his concerns?  
 14 A. Well, when I came in -- at the time I came in,  
 15 it was -- they had already switched to Ron Berger by  
 16 the time I got to them.  
 17 So no, I didn't talk to Dave.  
 18 Q. Okay.  
 19 A. He was there when Barry Duff was in that  
 20 position.  
 21 Q. Okay. Do you know what the -- what the  
 22 "installed SS1 equipment" refers to?  
 23 A. Well, SS1 was simply the first group of wells  
 24 that they installed, and the associated equipment,  
 25 production equipment, etcetera, subsea equipment, that

Page 30

1 supported it.  
 2 So that's what they turned up or started in  
 3 November of '07, and that's what he's referring to.  
 4 He's saying, "Hey, this stuff's been operating for a  
 5 year, and we don't have any -- we don't have a full --  
 6 we don't have the documents for it at all."  
 7 Q. Did you talk to -- this is Andrew Greg. We're  
 8 reading from an e-mail from Andrew Greg to Barry Duff  
 9 and Mike Garland --  
 10 A. And Greg was over IT.  
 11 Q. -- attached as Exhibit B to your lawsuit.  
 12 MR. PERRY: Be careful that you don't  
 13 talk while he's talking.  
 14 MR. ABBOTT: Okay. Sorry about that.  
 15 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) So I just want to walk  
 16 through this carefully.  
 17 Mr. Greg, who sends this e-mail, did you have  
 18 a conversation with him about this issue of the set of  
 19 documents for the installed SS1 equipment not being out  
 20 on the Atlantis?  
 21 A. I'm sorry. What's the question?  
 22 Q. Did you talk to -- his e-mail raises the issue  
 23 that -- his e-mail says, "As an aside, Dave Turner  
 24 reminded me that the critical issue during hurricane  
 25 season is to have easily available a set of documents

Page 31

1 for the installed SS1 equipment."  
 2 So he is telling you what Dave Turner reminded  
 3 him. And I'm wondering whether you -- I think you said  
 4 you didn't talk to Dave Turner.  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. I'm wondering whether you talked to Andy Greg  
 7 about this issue?  
 8 A. No. And here's the reason: I didn't come  
 9 there and work for them until August 18th. This e-mail  
 10 was to Barry Duff to take action, not me.  
 11 And when I got there, I got these e-mails at a  
 12 later date. I think this was 9-10, if you look at the  
 13 top page --  
 14 Q. Yeah.  
 15 A. -- or whatever. Anyway, I got it later, okay?  
 16 So by the time I got it, my understanding was  
 17 that, you know, the new operations manager was the other  
 18 fellow, so that's the fellow I talked to --  
 19 Q. Okay.  
 20 A. -- and coordinated with.  
 21 Q. Okay.  
 22 MR. PERRY: Let me just interrupt. You  
 23 were asking for names a minute ago, and there's at least  
 24 one name that I know that he has not mentioned, and  
 25 there might be some others.

Page 32

1 And I just wanted you to know that,  
 2 before you get totally away from that, there are some  
 3 other names.  
 4 MR. ABBOTT: Do you want me to go through  
 5 some of those?  
 6 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) Yeah. Absolutely.  
 7 A. Bill Broman. In November of 2008, Tinnika and  
 8 I put together a plan to try to get the project back on  
 9 track regarding the late drawings, and we submitted it  
 10 to him. We told -- we described the problem.  
 11 And Bill -- I asked Bill to put out a memo  
 12 under his name, because he was the overall project  
 13 director, asking all the lead engineers, you know, to  
 14 get busy, to try to fix this problem.  
 15 And that's exactly how he put it. He said,  
 16 "We have a problem." So there was a BP manager  
 17 admitting it, okay, that there was a problem.  
 18 Q. Did he -- are you saying that you -- that Bill  
 19 Broman told you that he thought that there were not --  
 20 that the necessary documents -- the necessary as-built  
 21 documents were not available on the Atlantis platform?  
 22 A. Exactly.  
 23 Q. Yes?  
 24 A. He was agreeing with me that the necessary  
 25 documents were not available anywhere.

Page 33

1 Q. Okay. I mean, did you -- I mean, did you --  
 2 did you do anything to investigate or inquire into what  
 3 documents were actually on the platform, on the  
 4 production facility?  
 5 A. Yeah. When I -- when I talked to Ron in early  
 6 January, the reason we met with him was to confirm, "Has  
 7 anything gotten out there?"  
 8 You've got to remember, my document control  
 9 person, Tinnika, said they had not issued anything,  
 10 and that was at Gary -- at Barry Duff's instructions,  
 11 because the drawings weren't ready. They weren't  
 12 finalized, they weren't as-built, and they shouldn't  
 13 have gone there, per BP procedure, until they were.  
 14 So that had been halted. And I confirmed with  
 15 Ron Berger in January, just to make sure none had gotten  
 16 to them, and they hadn't.  
 17 So that's -- that's kind of the story to that.  
 18 Q. Okay. So other -- other than hearing from Ron  
 19 Berger, who was an operations manager on the facility --  
 20 A. Right.  
 21 Q. Well, I don't know if he was actually on the  
 22 facility, but he was sort of over the operations of the  
 23 facility.  
 24 A. Sure.  
 25 Q. I guess was he based in Houston, or was he

Page 34

1 actually on the platform?  
 2 A. Ron Berger, at that time, was in Houston.  
 3 Q. Okay.  
 4 A. But he -- but the operations people at the  
 5 site reported to him --  
 6 Q. Okay.  
 7 A. -- on the rig.  
 8 Q. Okay. So --  
 9 MR. PERRY: Let me bring up one point of  
 10 clarification.  
 11 He asked you if Berger told you that they  
 12 didn't have any as-builts at all on the rig, and I think  
 13 you said yes.  
 14 MR. ABBOTT: Correct.  
 15 MR. PERRY: Does that include top side,  
 16 bottom side, the whole nine yards? Is that your  
 17 understanding of the question, or were you only thinking  
 18 of subsea?  
 19 MR. ABBOTT: I was just thinking of  
 20 subsea, because that's what he was looking for.  
 21 MR. FARBER: Okay. Thanks for the  
 22 clarification.  
 23 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) So --  
 24 A. So anyway, do you want to get back to Bill  
 25 Broman, or --

Page 35

1 Q. Yes, sir.  
 2 A. So when Bill Broman got the letter with the  
 3 plan to recover and the schedule to recover and get  
 4 the drawings done, he put an e-mail out to the lead  
 5 engineers on the project, saying, "This is a big issue.  
 6 We need to fix it, so let's get busy doing it,"  
 7 basically.  
 8 And that's a paraphrase. Y'all have the  
 9 attachment.  
 10 And, you know, we started to see -- the  
 11 engineers started to review some of the document lists,  
 12 but they were very reluctant to go back and try to get  
 13 approvals or try to change the drawings, okay? They  
 14 didn't understand why they should have to. I can only  
 15 assume they didn't have to in the past, okay? At least  
 16 on this project.  
 17 And so we had a meeting in early December  
 18 where we sat down, because I thought, "Well, this  
 19 isn't -- nothing's happening. You know, we're not  
 20 fixing the problem."  
 21 We sat down with all these leads that I've  
 22 mentioned, we sat down with Bill Broman, and, you know,  
 23 we raised the issues.  
 24 And once again, we got a lot of resistance  
 25 from the leads, that they didn't understand why they had

Page 36

1 to do as-built drawings, they didn't know why they had  
 2 to sign off on them and approve them.  
 3 And so what I said was, "Look, guys, your  
 4 project execution plan says you have to. It says you  
 5 have to produce as-built drawings and you have to  
 6 approve of parts as the lead. You cannot just take  
 7 drawings from vendors and pass them out to the field  
 8 as -- as an integrated product, because it isn't.  
 9 Y'all know that in the overall design. You've got to  
 10 integrate all these pieces, and you've got to agree they  
 11 fit your needs. That's what owner companies do."  
 12 So they resisted it. Afterwards -- they  
 13 challenged that they even had to do that. Afterwards,  
 14 I sent them a list of the -- you know, the project  
 15 execution plan, the BP procedure for drawing control  
 16 that specified what I had told them.  
 17 And, you know, it's just -- nothing happened,  
 18 Michael, after that. I mean, they just made no  
 19 progress.  
 20 And then in February, I was laid off, and I  
 21 think, you know, they didn't -- they had complained  
 22 enough, and they decided to get rid of the complainer  
 23 instead of -- to get rid of me instead of fixing the  
 24 problem.  
 25 Q. So I want to -- I want to make sure we exhaust

Page 37

1 this list of people that you talked to about the  
 2 problem.  
 3 A. Okay.  
 4 Q. And then I want to go on to some follow-up  
 5 that I have.  
 6 A. There's one more.  
 7 Q. We have Bill Broman.  
 8 A. Right. There's another one, Michael Vass,  
 9 V-A-S-S. He was the lead project engineering manager  
 10 for Technip in the same building as us.  
 11 Remember, they were the major engineering  
 12 contractor doing all the design engineering for BP.  
 13 Q. Uh-huh.  
 14 A. And when I started finding out that there was  
 15 a great amount of incomplete drawings, the main -- my  
 16 biggest concern was P&IDs, because they're really  
 17 critical for everything, for safety reviews and all.  
 18 So I went and I sent them an e-mail and said,  
 19 you know, "We need you" -- "I've noticed that a lot of  
 20 these P&IDs are not complete, and they're not even  
 21 approved. The unit's been working for a year. We need  
 22 you to finish them, okay, and issue them as-built."  
 23 Well, he came back with an e-mail which y'all  
 24 have as an attachment, and he said, "Well, you're right.  
 25 We're going to issue all these P&IDs" -- and he

Page 38

1 mentioned a bunch of other stuff, like, you know, piping  
 2 drawings and mechanical drawings and very detailed  
 3 drawings that would run up into probably the thousands.  
 4 And he said, "We're going to issue all these in a few  
 5 weeks." Well, that didn't happen.  
 6 And, in fact, if you look at the latest list  
 7 from BOEMRE and BP, you'll see that the P&IDs were not  
 8 released. None of them were released when the unit  
 9 started up in November '07.  
 10 And they did go back and try to fix some of  
 11 them after the fact in late 2009, but it was a very  
 12 shoddy job at best. I can go into that later.  
 13 Q. I do want to go into that.  
 14 But -- okay. So Michael Vass from Technip.  
 15 Anybody else?  
 16 A. Let me think. No, not that I can remember.  
 17 Q. Okay. So back to -- back to when -- back to  
 18 when you -- when you started and you identified this  
 19 problem.  
 20 You said you identified it by talking to these  
 21 engineering leads.  
 22 And also, did you have what -- a database  
 23 listing of drawings that you also relied upon to  
 24 conclude that the as-builts weren't there on the  
 25 production facility?

Page 39

1 A. Yeah. And, in fact, we issued that document  
 2 log to them. We issued, for each lead, his own  
 3 particular discipline's drawings and the status of them,  
 4 and, you know, how many had been issued and approved  
 5 as-built, etcetera, and asked them to, first of all,  
 6 look it over to verify. You know, maybe there was  
 7 something --  
 8 Q. Who was the "him" in that, again?  
 9 A. I'm sorry. "Him"?  
 10 Q. Yeah. You said you asked "him" to verify.  
 11 A. Oh, them. I meant them. We issued it to  
 12 them.  
 13 Q. To "them," to the leads?  
 14 A. To each of the leads.  
 15 Q. Okay. Sorry.  
 16 A. And, of course, they reviewed them. And then  
 17 that's when we started getting a lot of pushing away by  
 18 the leads, that they didn't think they should have to  
 19 do that and, you know, what procedure said they had to  
 20 And it was -- this happened in more than  
 21 one meeting. You know, I mentioned the December 2nd  
 22 meeting, but it happened before that in meetings, too.  
 23 Q. Well, tell me what you remember each --  
 24 MR. PERRY: Pardon the interruption.  
 25 MR. FARBER: Okay.

Page 40

1 MR. PERRY: Did you contact or have a  
 2 conversation with Ryan Malone?  
 3 MR. ABBOTT: Yes, that's correct. That's  
 4 one person I forgot.  
 5 Ryan Malone sat next to me. He was the  
 6 son of the then CEO of Americas, BP Americas, and Ryan  
 7 was the project manager on the BP3 -- or the DC3, which  
 8 was another group of wells.  
 9 And I had noticed in this process that  
 10 his drawings also were not progressing very well. And,  
 11 in fact, he was coming up to a point in July of 2009  
 12 where, you know, they would be installing the well  
 13 equipment and the piping, and there just hadn't been  
 14 enough -- near enough progress on the drawings to  
 15 support that.  
 16 And so I did talk to Ryan about this at  
 17 pretty good length in his office.  
 18 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) So --  
 19 A. And that was probably in --  
 20 Q. You probably said when it was approximately,  
 21 but I missed it.  
 22 A. I believe I talked to him about it in  
 23 December.  
 24 Q. December '08?  
 25 A. Of '08.

Page 41

1 Q. Okay. In Ryan Malone's office?  
 2 A. Right.  
 3 Q. And he was the -- you said the son of the --  
 4 A. Of the then -- of the then manager of -- God,  
 5 what would you call him? The CEO of BP North America.  
 6 MR. PERRY: Maybe president?  
 7 MR. ABBOTT: President.  
 8 MR. FARBER: I got you. Okay.  
 9 MS. BERTRAND: Can I just ask, what was  
 10 Ryan's -- Ryan was a lead also, or what was his title?  
 11 MR. ABBOTT: Ryan was a project manager  
 12 for the DC3, which was another set of wells associated  
 13 with the Atlantis, whereas Broman was the overall  
 14 project director over him. So --  
 15 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) So tell me everything you  
 16 remember about the Ryan Malone meeting in his office for  
 17 about an hour.  
 18 What -- I mean, tell me what you remember  
 19 about the conversation.  
 20 A. I just basically told him, you know, how I had  
 21 been looking at DC1, the other portion of the project,  
 22 and I saw big problems with the drawings being complete,  
 23 and I was seeing similar issues with his units.  
 24 And Ryan was concerned -- and I believe that  
 25 in all these e-mails, that he has expressed his concern,

Page 42

1 but I just honestly don't know if I have a copy of it or  
 2 where it's at. I remember seeing that.  
 3 And --  
 4 Q. And what was he either -- well, in that  
 5 meeting, how did he express his concern? What did he  
 6 say, in other words?  
 7 A. Well, he was kind of shocked that that would  
 8 be happening, that that would be the case. And he -- I  
 9 believe he believed me, because I showed him, you know,  
 10 the document log and said, "Here's the facts."  
 11 I mean, the document log is the Bible, as far  
 12 as where are they at with drawing issuance. It is for  
 13 every other company I've ever worked at.  
 14 Otherwise, you -- how can you control 7,000  
 15 drawings if you don't have a list, you know, of what the  
 16 due dates are and what their status is. It's as simple  
 17 as that.  
 18 Q. So did you -- did you have access to the  
 19 entire Documentum?  
 20 A. Yeah.  
 21 Q. And was that -- what was in the entire  
 22 Documentum at the time you were at BP, was that the same  
 23 as the universe of -- the 7,000 universe of documents  
 24 that you're talking about?  
 25 A. Yeah. The documents are in there themselves,

Page 43

1 as well as -- electronic copies of the documents, as  
 2 well as a drawing log --  
 3 Q. Okay.  
 4 A. -- that shows -- it's just a summary of all  
 5 the drawings and what their status is.  
 6 Q. I got you.  
 7 And did you -- did you review the documents  
 8 themselves, or any -- any set of the documents  
 9 themselves?  
 10 A. Well, I probably looked at 3 or 400 of the  
 11 documents. Obviously, it wasn't my job to go through  
 12 and check every one of 7,000 drawings. That was an  
 13 engineer's job. But I did enough spot-checking to know  
 14 that what the list was showing was correct.  
 15 Q. So how did you pick the 300 to 400 ones that  
 16 you spot-checked?  
 17 A. Well --  
 18 Q. Were they across different -- I'm sorry to  
 19 talk over you.  
 20 Were they sort of across different types of  
 21 subsea equipment?  
 22 A. It was across different types.  
 23 For example, the biggest concern I had was the  
 24 P&IDs. So when I questioned Malcolm Vass about the --  
 25 and by the way, it was Malcolm Vass with Technip.

Page 44

1 When I questioned him about it, he sent me  
 2 copies of the key P&IDs to look at, you know, so I could  
 3 see what -- I asked him for the current status or copies  
 4 of them. He sent me that, and then he later, you know,  
 5 sent the e-mail saying that, "We'll have them fixed in  
 6 three weeks," which did not happen.  
 7 I also had occasion to review certain  
 8 procedures and documents as they would come through as  
 9 part of the, you know, document control system, so I  
 10 got to see some of them there.  
 11 But, you know, I did not do an intensive  
 12 effort of looking at every one of the 7,000 drawings.  
 13 The document log is supposed to tell you the status.  
 14 Q. Yeah. So we added -- we added Ryan Malone as  
 15 somebody else that you talked to.  
 16 So if there's anybody else that pops into your  
 17 head as we talk about all this stuff -- I know it's -- I  
 18 know it's been a little while.  
 19 A. Yeah. It's taken me a while to remember, but  
 20 I think that's it.  
 21 Q. Okay. Now, at the risk of -- at the risk of  
 22 having this be tedious, I still think I need to do this,  
 23 and I want to do this.  
 24 I want to -- I want you to take me through  
 25 your conversations with each of the leads. You

Page 45

1 mentioned sort of pushback that came from the leads on  
 2 really having to do the work that you were suggesting  
 3 needed to be done.  
 4 And from my perspective, I need to know as  
 5 much as I can -- or we need to know as much as we can  
 6 about each conversation that you had with each of these  
 7 leads, I mean, if you can do it. But I want you to try,  
 8 because it's important.  
 9 A. That's going to be tough, but I will try to  
 10 tell you some that I remember.  
 11 Q. Okay.  
 12 A. I know that in -- I know that in at least two  
 13 meetings, the one preceding the December 2nd one and  
 14 then on December 2nd --  
 15 Q. Uh-huh.  
 16 A. -- the topic of drawing issuance and lack of  
 17 completed and as-built and approved drawings came up,  
 18 and these attendees were all there, the people I've  
 19 mentioned.  
 20 I, you know, went into quite great detail  
 21 about what was missing and how many were missing, and  
 22 how, you know, I considered that a significant problem  
 23 for the project.  
 24 The project manager, Bill Broman, was there.  
 25 He had also mentioned that it was a problem.

Page 46

1 And then the leads -- you know, we'd kind of  
 2 do the roundtable type thing. The leads would then go  
 3 into detail, and they were just -- especially Hughes and  
 4 Benny Kirkham were very resistant. They were -- they  
 5 acted angry and their voices would raise that they were  
 6 expected now to have to review drawings and sign off on  
 7 them. "Why do" -- and some of their quotes were, "Why  
 8 do I have to do that? Why do I have to sign off on this  
 9 drawing?"  
 10 And it would get so tense that once I said,  
 11 "Well, because every other engineering company and owner  
 12 company in the world does, and why should BP be any  
 13 different?"  
 14 "I mean, you know, we're supposed to be  
 15 ensuring -- you're supposed to ensure that this thing  
 16 has been reviewed and integrated properly from all these  
 17 contractors who are doing all these drawings, and if  
 18 you're not doing that, you're creating a dangerous  
 19 situation for the operators."  
 20 And they would just get really angry at me,  
 21 and then my boss would call me and complain about it  
 22 because all these good old boys got mad, you know.  
 23 That's how it worked.  
 24 Q. So the December meeting, again, was Bill --  
 25 Naseman? Is that his name? Was he there?

Page 47

1 A. The December meeting?  
 2 Q. I'm sorry. The meeting you were just talking  
 3 about.  
 4 A. That was the December meeting.  
 5 No, Naseman wasn't there.  
 6 Q. So --  
 7 A. That was Bill Broman, the project director,  
 8 and all the leads that we've discussed.  
 9 We'd have a weekly meeting, and this was one  
 10 of the -- this took place over two or three weekly  
 11 meetings that we discussed this, because I kept bringing  
 12 it up. You know, I was worried, okay?  
 13 And I just kept getting pushback at every one  
 14 of these, and project management did not seem capable of  
 15 addressing the issue and making it happen, and the leads  
 16 certainly didn't want to do it.  
 17 Q. Yeah.  
 18 MS. BERTRAND: You mentioned your boss  
 19 would get mad at you or whatever.  
 20 MR. ABBOTT: Yeah.  
 21 MS. BERTRAND: I don't want to put words  
 22 in your mouth, but who --  
 23 MR. ABBOTT: Bill Naseman.  
 24 MS. BERTRAND: Okay.  
 25 MR. ABBOTT: And particularly in January,

Page 48

1 he called me into his office and he said, you know, "The  
 2 leads are really angry at you." And I said, "Well,  
 3 why?"  
 4 "Because," he said, "they think you're  
 5 pushing way too hard on trying to get these drawings  
 6 approved by them and issued as-built, and, you know, I  
 7 think you should back off and not put that kind of  
 8 pressure on them."  
 9 And I said, "Well, Bill, you know,  
 10 everybody else does it, and that's just part of good  
 11 engineering, you know, to go through the normal cycles  
 12 of approval and to have an as-built document for that  
 13 operator out at the site."  
 14 And I said, you know, "I've just met with  
 15 Ron Berger. He has no as-built drawings of any kind out  
 16 there, and this plant's been going on -- running for a  
 17 year."  
 18 Now, you know, how well can he avoid a  
 19 catastrophe if he doesn't even know what switch he's  
 20 throwing? And it's really as basic as that.  
 21 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) Were you aware of any other  
 22 process at BP through which -- any other process, other  
 23 than the document control system, through which  
 24 operators, operating personnel, could get engineering  
 25 drawings and related documents, processes, etcetera?

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 49

1 A. Other than Documentum?  
 2 Q. Yes.  
 3 A. There was no other way.  
 4 Q. Well --  
 5 A. I mean, there was no bootleg.  
 6 Q. No, not -- I mean, any other process -- and  
 7 by "process," I mean, you were -- you were managing a  
 8 process, correct?  
 9 A. Uh-huh.  
 10 Q. A document control process.  
 11 Were you aware of any other way in which BP  
 12 would transfer documents and drawings to the production  
 13 facility, maybe from Documentum, but a separate --  
 14 A. No.  
 15 Q. Let me -- I mean, basically, a signoff or a  
 16 systems handover procedure?  
 17 Are those -- are those --  
 18 A. No.  
 19 Q. -- terms --  
 20 A. I'm not aware of any other way -- BP, like  
 21 most companies, is very secure in the knowledge that  
 22 they have a good -- that their procedures are there,  
 23 and they're supposed to be followed.  
 24 And that is, you know, drawings come from the  
 25 fabrication vendors drawings. You know, we have a lot

Page 50

1 of contractors doing a lot of detailed drawings for  
 2 different pieces of the puzzle. And they send those  
 3 drawings in to document control, Tinnika. She issues  
 4 them out to the leads to review and approve. The leads  
 5 sign off on it if they agree, send it back to her, she  
 6 issues copies back to the vendors.  
 7 And at some point, she accumulates them all,  
 8 you know, really mostly when installation is complete,  
 9 and she sends them to the operators.  
 10 And that's the only way I know it works.  
 11 Q. How about --  
 12 A. And that didn't happen.  
 13 Q. I'm sorry.  
 14 A. I'm sorry. Go ahead.  
 15 Q. How about prior -- prior to first oil, are you  
 16 aware of a process that BP would go through to deliver  
 17 to a production facility documents necessary for the  
 18 operations personnel to operate that procedure?  
 19 A. No, nothing other than what I've just  
 20 described.  
 21 Q. Okay. So you're not -- you're not familiar  
 22 with a subsea project system handover procedure at BP?  
 23 A. Oh, yeah. There is a subsea handover  
 24 procedure, but that procedure originates with the  
 25 document control clerk, and those drawings are all

Page 51

1 bundled up or sent -- either bundled up as hard copies  
 2 or sent electronically by her to the operators, period.  
 3 That's the only way I know that that works.  
 4 MS. BERTRAND: And "her" is Tinnika?  
 5 MR. ABBOTT: Her name is Tinnika Curtis.  
 6 MS. BERTRAND: Okay.  
 7 MR. ABBOTT: She was my document  
 8 administrator under my management.  
 9 Q. (BY MR. FARBER) But did you -- did you know  
 10 whether anybody at BP, prior to when you started,  
 11 Tinnika or anybody else, was involved in a process  
 12 that transmitted engineering drawings to the Atlantis  
 13 production platform out of Documentum through a process  
 14 called a project system handover procedure?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. Okay. Did you ask whether anybody else had  
 17 had --  
 18 A. Yeah. I asked Tinnika.  
 19 Here's the thing: You know, if you look at  
 20 this drawing issuance, and you look on there and you  
 21 see that drawings were issued for approval two years  
 22 ago and never issued as approved or never issued for  
 23 construction or never issued as-built, it's pretty clear  
 24 that if they did send that out there, it would be a  
 25 three-year-old drawing, which probably had changed

Page 52

1 tremendously.  
 2 And that's why Barry Duff was so upset in that  
 3 e-mail; because obviously, the operators were starting  
 4 to ask for it. They'd been out there for a year.  
 5 But he said, "We're not going to issue  
 6 drawings that are not complete," and I don't know that  
 7 anybody did anything different than that.  
 8 And if they did, shame on them, because they  
 9 didn't get good drawings out there, complete drawings.  
 10 Q. Okay.  
 11 MS. BERTRAND: Can I ask a question?  
 12 MR. FARBER: Yeah, absolutely.  
 13 MS. BERTRAND: One thing that's a  
 14 little -- that I'm not clear on here is, just say we're  
 15 speaking of subsea documents here, and Technip was the  
 16 one who kind of managed or put that together, provided  
 17 the engineering and some element of getting the  
 18 documents together, not your database.  
 19 MR. ABBOTT: They had their own database.  
 20 MS. BERTRAND: Yeah. Okay.  
 21 What I don't understand is, what are the  
 22 lead -- project leads expected to do? You know, if I  
 23 have a drawing that's issued three years ago, what are  
 24 the project leads to do with a three-year-old drawing  
 25 in approving it?

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 57

1 MS. BERTRAND: Are you sure?  
2 MR. ABBOTT: Yeah. Put it this way: If  
3 90 percent of the drawings -- which is what we found to  
4 be the case in November of 2008, a year after it started  
5 up.  
6 If 90 percent of the drawings were never  
7 even approved, much less produced as-built, as an  
8 as-built drawing, then honestly, they've got a lot of  
9 work to do, and they should have been going about it  
10 for a year.  
11 In other words, they needed somebody to  
12 go out to that site, to that platform, and do physical  
13 inspections of the final installation. You know,  
14 because things change when you install it, okay? You  
15 know that.  
16 And the thing is, you need to take a  
17 drawing, you need to mark it up with what I'm calling  
18 a red line, you know, what changed, and then you need to  
19 get drafters to redraft it as an as-built drawing and  
20 you need to issue it as-built. And you need to get a  
21 package of these and you need to give them to the  
22 operators.  
23 That didn't happen, obviously. That  
24 didn't happen at all. And that's what your regulation  
25 calls for, is as-built drawings. They didn't do it.

Page 58

1 MS. BERTRAND: Okay. Your approval that  
2 you're talking about, that happens very near the IFC  
3 phase, or for each phase?  
4 The approval, the project lead approval  
5 and signoff, is that expected at every phase, drawing  
6 development phase, at the IFC phase or at the as-built  
7 phase? Can you tell me --  
8 MR. ABBOTT: It's expected at every one  
9 of the four phases of engineering, which is issued for  
10 approval, okay? They should approve it, okay? When  
11 it's issued for design, they should approve it. There  
12 should be a client -- and there is on most of them.  
13 There's a client signature spot, none of which hardly  
14 are filled out, by the way.  
15 Then when it's issued for construction,  
16 there should be an approval by the BP engineer. And  
17 finally, when the as-built -- when the redlines come  
18 back showing the final condition of that installation,  
19 they should approve it one more time, and there should  
20 be dates for all of those.  
21 So what you should see at the bottom of  
22 the drawing is one line after another. You should see,  
23 "Issued for approval," signed off. You should see  
24 another line, "Issued for design," "Issued for  
25 construction," and, "Issued as-built."

Page 59

1 And you don't see that. You see bits and  
2 pieces.  
3 MS. BERTRAND: Do drawings in your  
4 database get moved along the development process without  
5 the project lead's signature?  
6 For example, if the client -- and I'm  
7 going to use Technip, but I don't know if this  
8 happened -- has an engineer who signs and approves and  
9 that client block is blank, and Technip is saying,  
10 "This is an issued-for-construction drawing," in your  
11 database, will you list it as issued for construction,  
12 or is your database waiting for a BP signature?  
13 MR. ABBOTT: Tinnika's waiting for a BP  
14 approval signature before she issues it, you know, out  
15 as approved for construction.  
16 What you'll find in a lot of these  
17 drawings -- I know y'all have been looking at them --  
18 is, you'll see a fabricator's engineer and checker sign  
19 them. You won't see but very few BP signatures. They  
20 just -- they just ignored that, okay?  
21 MS. BERTRAND: I'm done.  
22 MS. WILSON: So when you said that what  
23 they should have done when the problem was recognized  
24 was actually go out there and mark up their drawings,  
25 when we're talking subsea, how would they accomplish

Page 60

1 verifying what would be installed to actually be able  
2 to mark up a subsea P&ID?  
3 MR. ABBOTT: Tougher, but that's what  
4 ROVs are for. It can be done. What they're doing is  
5 they're checking dimensions, you know, lengths,  
6 etcetera, and is it where it should be, and is there an  
7 extra fitting on it that we didn't design? Did they  
8 have to put an extra fitting for some reason? Those  
9 kind of things, they should be able to see.  
10 And it's not easy, but at this point,  
11 it's what needs to be done, I mean, if the operators  
12 are going to have what they need to run that thing.  
13 MS. WILSON: So in addition to, you know,  
14 an ROV, you could also do some type of -- I don't want  
15 to say seismic.  
16 MR. ABBOTT: Are you talking about the  
17 laser?  
18 MS. WILSON: Telemetry type --  
19 MR. ABBOTT: Laser type -- see, I don't  
20 know on subsea. I'm not an engineer, okay?  
21 MR. FARBER: One at a time.  
22 MR. ABBOTT: Yeah. I'm not an engineer,  
23 so I can't say.  
24 But I do know that there are laser  
25 scanning devices for above-ground plants where you can