For Public Release

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 19-SEP-2017   TIME: 1600   HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Shell Offshore Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
   ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G11445
   AREA: GB   LATITUDE: 128
   BLOCK:   LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM:
   RIG NAME: A-Enchilada

6. ACTIVITY:
   EXPLORATION (POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   HISTORIC INJURY
   REQUIRED EVACUATION
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days)
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   Other Injury
   FATALITY
   POLLUTION
   FIRE
   EXPLOSION
   HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   UNDERGROUND
   SURFACE
   DEVERTER
   SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
   COLLISION
   HISTORIC
   =$25K
   <=$25K

8. CAUSE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 705 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 102 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

14. PICTURES TAKEN:

15. STATEMENT TAKEN:
On September 19, 2017 at approximately 1600 hours, a gas release was thought to have occurred which initiated a manual ESD as well as a muster alarm. This occurred while attempting to assess the metal integrity of a section of 2” pipe.

A corrosion inspector was in the process of conducting the annual inspection of the metal integrity on the facility. The inspector noticed a blistered area of a 2” pipe associated with the high pressure blanket gas that rested on an I-beam. When he raised the pipe off of the I-beam, gas began to escape from a small pinhole in the piping. The piping contained approximately 1000 lbs of pressure.

The inspector’s personal gas monitor detected the gas and operations were then notified. There were no safety devices such as the gas detection system that sensed gas during the release. The ESD and the muster alarm were manually initiated. After further investigation, the hole was smaller than originally believed reducing the threat for gas accumulation. Photographs showed that the pinhole in the 2” pipe was located in a corroded area of the pipe. There were no injuries or pollution events due to this incident.


18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The incident took place due to corrosion between the 2” piping and the I-beam support forming a hole over time.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: None

NATURE OF DAMAGE: NA
22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Lafayette District office makes no recommendations to the Regional Office of Incident Investigations (OII).

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

NA

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: 20-SEP-2017

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: John Mouton

27. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

28. OCS REPORT:

29. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: Elliott Smith

APPROVED DATE: 21-NOV-2017