

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED
DATE: 19-SEP-2017 TIME: 1600 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Shell Offshore Inc.
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:
CONTRACTOR:
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G11445
AREA: GB LATITUDE:
BLOCK: 128 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A-Enchilada
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
 HISTORIC INJURY
 REQUIRED EVACUATION
 LTA (1-3 days)
 LTA (>3 days)
 RW/JT (1-3 days)
 RW/JT (>3 days)
 Other Injury
 FATALITY
 POLLUTION
 FIRE
 EXPLOSION
LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

8. CAUSE:
 EQUIPMENT FAILURE
 HUMAN ERROR
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL
 WEATHER RELATED
 LEAK
 UPSET H2O TREATING
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
 OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: 705 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 102 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

14. PICTURES TAKEN:

15. STATEMENT TAKEN:

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
 CRANE
 OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
 INCIDENT >\$25K
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM
 REQUIRED MUSTER
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
 OTHER

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

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On September 19, 2017 at approximately 1600 hours, a gas release was thought to have occurred which initiated a manual ESD as well as a muster alarm. This occurred while attempting to assess the metal integrity of a section of 2" pipe.

A corrosion inspector was in the process of conducting the annual inspection of the metal integrity on the facility. The inspector noticed a blistered area of a 2" pipe associated with the high pressure blanket gas that rested on an I-beam. When he raised the pipe off of the I-beam, gas began to escape from a small pinhole in the piping. The piping contained approximately 1000 lbs of pressure.

The inspector's personal gas monitor detected the gas and operations were then notified. There were no safety devices such as the gas detection system that sensed gas during the release. The ESD and the muster alarm were manually initiated. After further investigation, the hole was smaller than originally believed reducing the threat for gas accumulation. Photographs showed that the pinhole in the 2" pipe was located in a corroded area of the pipe. There were no injuries or pollution events due to this incident.

On September 20, 2017, The BSEE Lafayette District conducted an onsite investigation.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The incident took place due to corrosion between the 2" piping and the I-beam support forming a hole over time.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None

NA

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Lafayette District office makes no recommendations to the Regional Office of Incident Investigations (OII).

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

NA

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

20-SEP-2017

28. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

John Mouton /

29. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott Smith

APPROVED

DATE:

21-NOV-2017