

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
 BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
 GULF OF MEXICO REGION

## ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED  
 DATE: **27-JUN-2022** TIME: **1745** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Anadarko Petroleum Corporation**  
 REPRESENTATIVE:  
 TELEPHONE:  
 CONTRACTOR:  
 REPRESENTATIVE:  
 TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G11081**  
 AREA: **GC** LATITUDE:  
 BLOCK: **645** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A(HOLSTEIN SPAR)**  
 RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION(POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:  
 INJURIES:  
 HISTORIC INJURY  
 REQUIRED EVACUATION  
 LTA (1-3 days)  
 LTA (>3 days)  
 RW/JT (1-3 days)  
 RW/JT (>3 days)  
 FATALITY  
 Other Injury

8. OPERATION:  
 PRODUCTION  
 DRILLING  
 WORKOVER  
 COMPLETION  
 HELICOPTER  
 MOTOR VESSEL  
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.  
 OTHER

9. CAUSE:  
 EQUIPMENT FAILURE  
 HUMAN ERROR  
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE  
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL  
 WEATHER RELATED  
 LEAK  
 UPSET H2O TREATING  
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

10. WATER DEPTH: **4340** FT.  
 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **119** MI.  
 12. WIND DIRECTION:  
 SPEED: M.P.H.  
 13. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
 SPEED: M.P.H.  
 14. SEA STATE: FT.  
 15. PICTURES TAKEN:  
 16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

POLLUTION  
 FIRE  
 EXPLOSION

LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT  
 UNDERGROUND  
 SURFACE  
 DEVERTER  
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE  
 CRANE  
 OTHER LIFTING  
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. **Deluge Valve 24 V Supply**  
 INCIDENT >\$25K  
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM  
 REQUIRED MUSTER  
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE  
 OTHER

## 17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On June 27, 2022, at approximately 1755 hours, a fire occurred inside a Pressurized Welding Enclosure (PWE) on the Northeast side of Green Canyon (GC) Block 645 Platform A (Holstein). The facility is owned and operated by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation.

### Sequence of Events:

At approximately 1655 hours, construction crew stopped hot work for the day while the Firewatch remained outside of PWE until approximately 1730 hours.

At approximately 1755 hours, the firewater pump kicked on and deluge in Zone 4 activated. The Ballast Control Operator (BCO) went to investigate why the pump was on. Upon arriving at PWE #2 the BCO could see heavy smoke and a flame approximately 2 feet high coming from the lower part of the PWE. Two members of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived on location at approximately 1758 hours. ERT was able to put the fire out utilizing a nearby hose reel. At approximately 1809 hours, Zone 4 deluge was shut down.

At approximately 1820 hours, an investigation of the scene lead to the discovery of severed wire(s).

### BSEE Investigation:

On June 29, 2022, BSEE investigation team conducted on site incident investigation. Information obtained during this investigation determined that on June 27, 2022, at approximately 1655 hours, personnel conducting hot work knocked off for the day. At that time, all personnel including Firewatch exited from inside PWE. After site was secured and general housekeeping completed, at approximately 1700 hours, a Firewatch grabbed a portable fire extinguisher and posted inside the airlock of the PWE for approximately 20 minutes. He then stood out on the perimeter of the PWE for the remaining time.

At approximately 1730 hours, the Firewatch stood down. The air lock of a PWE is constructed to allow personnel to enter and exit the PWE without losing positive pressure so work can continue. Inside the air lock is a door to enter inside the work area which has a window that allows personnel to see inside the PWE. The nature of work being conducted inside PWE was to repair some damaged walkway beams. For this to be accomplished, a harness was to be worn and the Firewatch was alone during the 30-minute cool down.

Personnel on board were not aware of the fire until approximately 1755 hours when the firewater pump started and deluge Zone 4 activated. The cause of the activation was not due to fire being detected but because the wire(s) that the fire burned through inside the PWE were lines that control the activation of deluge Zone 4.

The BSEE investigation team found that facility wiring inside the PWE had been wrapped incorrectly with Panther felt enabling slag from hot work to get down inside of the wrapping and smolder, causing the wire and felt to catch fire. Panther felt is the material used for hot work protection (i.e., fire blanket). The felt was wrapped in such a manner that the tape joint was facing toward the work being conducted. Safe Zone's (owner of PWE) standard operating procedures is to have two firewatchers during hot work operations, one inside and one outside. However, only one Firewatch was on location at the PWE for the 30 minutes after hot work was completed.

The BSEE investigation team also noted that fire and smoke detection systems inside of the PWE are part of the power system that enables the hot work to be conducted. When this control panel was turned off, fire and smoke detection systems inside the PWE are also disabled. As a corrective action, Anadarko plans to separate power supply for fire and smoke detection so that monitoring can continue even after hot work has concluded.

### BSEE Recommendation:

BSEE has two recommendations for this incident. One, adding a second Firewatch to PWE hot work operations inside and to remain on station for the full 30 minutes after hot work is complete. The second is to add the ability of the control room to monitor the status of at least one fire and one gas detection at all times.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

**Improper wrapping of Panther felt of Zone 4 deluge wiring.**

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

**Firewatch outside of pressurized welding enclosure during 30 minute cool down.**

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

**N/A**

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

**Wiring for Deluge**

**Melted**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

**Adding a second firewatch to the inside of PWE. Adding the ability of the control room to monitor a gas and smoke detector continuously.**

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

**None**

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

**29-JUN-0202**

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

**/ Torrin Domangue / Keith Barrios /**

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: **Amy**

**Pellegrin**

APPROVED

DATE:

**07-OCT-2022**