

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 14-FEB-2021 TIME: 0330 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Anadarko Petroleum Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: Nabors Offshore Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING PRS Gripper
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

8. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: G11081

AREA: GC LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 645 LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: A(HOLSTEIN SPAR
RIG NAME: HOLSTEIN SPAR RIG

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

9. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

REQUIRED EVACUATION

LTA (1-3 days)

LTA (>3 days)

RW/JT (1-3 days)

RW/JT (>3 days)

FATALITY

Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

POLLUTION

FIRE

EXPLOSION

LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT

UNDERGROUND

SURFACE

DEVERTER

SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

10. WATER DEPTH: 4340 FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 145 MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

On February 14, 2021, an incident occurred on the Holstein Spar Rig working for Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. Drilling operations were being conducted at Green Canyon Block 645 OCS-G 11081 Well A005, ST01. The Nabors Offshore night Driller pulled a stand of 5.5-inch drill pipe and set it in the slips. When the connection was broken, the Pipe Racking System (PRS) gripped the stand and the Driller released it from the elevators. As the PRS tracked back, the stand of drill pipe came free from the gripper, falling approximately 4 feet to the rotary table with the top of the stand coming to rest on the corner of the derrick. A Safety Standdown was called and proper personnel were notified. No injuries were reported related to this incident.

On February 13, 2021, the night drill crew attended a pre-tour safety meeting prior to going to work at 18:00 hours. After tour change, a Job Safety Analysis (JSA) on "Pulling Out of the Hole" was reviewed and signed by all participating drill crew members involved with this operation. In preparation to pull the 5.5-inch drill pipe out of the well, the night Driller unscrewed the Top Drive from the drill pipe. The Assistant Driller (AD) set all the safety parameters on the PRS to rack stands of drill pipe back in the derrick. Each stand of drill pipe consisted of three 30-foot joints of drill pipe screwed together. The Driller proceeded to pull the drill pipe out of the well, with the AD operating the PRS. As the weight of the stand was transferred to the slips, the connection was broken, and the AD positioned the PRS to well center. The AD functioned the PRS to grab the stand before the Driller unlatched the elevators. Once unlatched, the traveling block was positioned out of the way and the PRS picked up the stand and racked it back in the derrick fingers. At 02:12 hours on February 14, 2021, the Pit Watcher, who had been trained to operate the PRS, temporarily relieved the AD. The AD later returned to the rig floor, but he relieved the Floorhand for a break while the Pit Watcher continued to operate the PRS. When the Floorhand returned, the AD entered the drill shack and monitored the Pit Watcher's actions as he closed the PRS gripper on a stand of drill pipe. The PRS indicator panel displayed that the gripper had been initiated to the closed position. The Driller proceeded to open the elevators in order to rack the stand back in the derrick with the PRS. As the PRS retracted, the stand came out of the top gripper and fell approximately 4 feet to the rotary table with the top of the stand coming to rest against the derrick. A Safety Standdown was called and an incident investigation initiated.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) team was unable to conduct an initial onsite investigation at the time of this incident. However, an investigation team was able to collect documentation, pictures, and video footage furnished by the operator at the team's request. The investigation team reviewed the documentation and noted that a JSA was reviewed and signed by the entire night drill crew involved in the operation on the drill floor, which included the Pit Watcher. The JSA recommended that someone watch the latching of the PRS to ensure that it was completely latched but did not state that it was required. At the time of the incident, no one was watching the PRS to ensure it was correctly latched and the PRS indicator panel displayed that the gripper was initiated to the "close" position. The current PRS panel is not equipped with a positive latch indicator that informs the operator that the pipe is completely latched. Nabors plans to update their JSA and Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) to include assigning a required flagger while operating the PRS to ensure the pipe is properly gripped prior to racking back drill pipe. Also, Nabors will check the availability of upgrading the PRS with a positive latch indicator.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Lack of a positive latch indicator on the PRS panel allowed for a false positive indication of a proper grip on the drill pipe.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Failure of the rig crew to adhere to the JSA's recommendation to have personnel visually verify the drill pipe was properly gripped.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Drill pipe threads

Damaged drill pipe threads

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE Houma District has no recommendations for the Office of Incident Investigatios at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PANEL FORMED: NO

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

Paul Reeves - author /

OCS REPORT:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: Amy
Pellegrin

APPROVED

DATE:

22-JUL-2021