

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 06-SEP-2018 TIME: 2040 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Hess Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: 8. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: G26313

AREA: GC LATITUDE:
BLOCK: 468 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A
RIG NAME:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

- 10. WATER DEPTH: 3360 FT.
- 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 109 MI.
- 12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 14. SEA STATE: FT.
- 15. PICTURES TAKEN:
- 16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

At approximately 2040 hours on September 6, 2018, an incident occurred on the OCS-G 26313, Green Canyon 468-A floating production platform (Stampede). The operator of record is the Hess Corporation. Stampede is located approximately 109 miles from shore in 3360 feet of water.

At approximately 2030 hours, a high gas alarm on the main deck gas compression skid tripped. The incident resulted in a platform shut-in and a full personnel muster was initiated. Once the muster was completed and all personnel accounted for, the fire team was dispatched to the site of the gas detection. They discovered the cause of the gas release was from a sight glass located on the Flash Gas Compressor (FGC) 2-A Gas Filter Coalescer (MAJ-1950A). During their investigation, the fire team determined the gas release was due to four loose fastening bolts located on the sight glass of the coalescer. The sight glass was isolated until repairs were completed. No injuries to personnel were reported during this incident.

BSEE inspectors arrived at the facility on September 8, 2018 to begin an investigation of the incident. Statements and pictures were taken and an Incident of Non-Compliance (INC G-110) was issued for unsafe operations.

Based on BSEE's investigation and Hess' internal investigation, the following findings were identified:

The normal operating pressure of the coalescer is approximately 300 psi. This event could have occurred due to vibration or improper tightening of the bolts during installation. Due to the four loose fastening bolts, the pressure in the vessel caused the gasket in the sight glass to cut out. With the gasket damaged, gas was released which resulted in the gas detection system initiating a platform shut-in.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The four loose fastening bolts on the sight glass on the coalescer.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

N/A

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

As a result of this incident, the operator made the decision to replace all other sight glasses (fourteen) with see-thru flanged sight flow indicators.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

N/A

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The Houma District has no recommendations for the Office of Incident Investigations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 (C): Does the lessee perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservation and conservation of property and the environment? "On September 6, a gas release occurred on the flash gas compressor skid resulting in a platform ESD. The gas release was later attributed to a faulty sight glass on the gas/oil coalescer MAJ-1950A. Operator must conduct thorough inspection of all similar type of sight glasses before resuming production."

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

08-SEP-2018

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

Micah Charpentier / Sammy Viola / Keith Barrios /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

OCS REPORT:

Bryan A. Domangue

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

APPROVED

DATE:

19-FEB-2019