1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 22-JUL-2016    TIME: 1725    HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Anadarko Petroleum Corporation
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G18402
   AREA: GC
   LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: 608
   LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A(TLP MARCO POL)
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
   EXPLORATION(POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   HISTORIC INJURY
   REQUIRED EVACUATION 2
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days) 2
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   Other Injury
   FATALITY
   POLLUTION
   FIRE
   EXPLOSION
   LWC
   HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   UNDERGROUND
   SURFACE
   DEVERTER
   SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
   COLLISION
   HISTORIC
   >=$25K
   <=$25K

8. CAUSE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 4300 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 144 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.
At approximately 1715 hours on July 22, 2016, an incident occurred on the Marco Polo Tension Leg Platform (TLP) at Green Canyon 608-A (GC 608A), lease number OCS-G 18402. The operator on record is Anadarko Petroleum Corporation.

Prior to bringing on the subsea gas well GC 562 #4, mechanics completed the process of re-configuring the Flash Gas Compressor (FGC)-CBA-5020-C. After loading the FGC-C compressor, FGC CBA-5020-A shut-in on the Level Safety High (LSH) in the 2nd stage suction scrubber (MBF-1190A). The mechanics decided to re-configure FGC-A at that time. The re-configuring process includes opening Kinney valves, which are bleed valves, to de-pressurize the cylinders for maintenance. It was during this bleeding process that a large volume of natural gas was in the area surrounding the compressor, and a fire ignited. The likely ignition source was the turbocharger of the CAT engine that services the FGC-A.

Note: Normal operating temperature of the turbocharger is approximately 1000° F. After several Temperature Safety Elements (TSE) in the area activated, the fire alarm sounded, the platform shut-in, personnel mustered to their station, and the fire teams were deployed. The fire was extinguished at approximately 1735 hours. Two mechanics in the area of the fire were injured with 1st and 2nd degree burns to the face, neck, and hands. The facility medic attended to and evaluated the injured personnel. A Search and Rescue Service (SARS) helicopter arrived at the facility at approximately 1915 hours and transported the injured personnel to the Baton Rouge General Burn Unit.

Personnel began bleeding down the compressor cylinders within 1 minute after the compressor shut-in for LSH on the 2nd stage suction scrubber. This did not give the compressor nor the turbocharger (which then had approximately 1000° F on it) ample time to cool down. Also, at least one of the Kinney valves was blowing gas almost directly on the area surrounding the turbocharger.

Personnel did not follow company policy by performing a Permit to Work (PTW) nor a Job Safety Analysis (JSA). The time period to perform these two functions might have given the compressor and equipment ample time to cool down.

Daily Production at the time of incident: 23,000 bopd (barrel oil per day) and 16 mmcf/d (million cubic feet per day). POB (personnel on board) at time of incident was 42.
Walkway adjacent to compressor, wiring, scorched piping, insulation. (See pictures taken of the damage.)

Less than $100,000

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Houma District has no recommendations for the Office of Incident Investigations.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110: Does the lessee perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservation and conservation of property and the environment? Fire and injuries occurred to two operators following the bleeding down of flash gas compressor CBA-5020A #5 cylinder on 1st stage suction.

Note - No JSA was performed prior to operations.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

23-JUL-2016

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Terry Hollier / Keith Barrios /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan A. Domangue

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE: NO
1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: Turbochargers on the Compressor Engine

2. TYPE OF FUEL: □ GAS
   ■ OIL
   □ DIESEL
   □ CONDENSATE
   □ HYDRAULIC
   □ OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: Gas from Compressor Cylinder

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE
   KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT? NO

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED: □ HANDHELD
   □ WHEELED UNIT
   □ FIXED CHEMICAL
   ■ FIXED WATER
   □ NONE
   □ OTHER
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator Representational</th>
<th>Injury</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Witness</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Name:**

**Home Address:**

**City:**

**State:**

**Work Phone:**

**Total Offshore Experience:**

**Employed By:** Anadarko Petroleum Corporation / 00981

**Business Address:**

**City:** TX

**Zip Code:**

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**INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT**

**X** OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE | **X** INJURY

**X** CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE | **X** FATALITY

**X** OTHER ________________ | **X** WITNESS

**Name:**

**Home Address:**

**City:**

**State:**

**Work Phone:**

**Total Offshore Experience:**

**Employed By:** Anadarko Petroleum Corporation / 00981

**Business Address:**

**City:** TX

**Zip Code:**

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