

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 04-DEC-2019 TIME: 0704 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Fieldwood Energy LLC

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G02359

AREA: HI LATITUDE: 28.3532  
BLOCK: A 446 LONGITUDE: -94.097

5. PLATFORM: A

RIG NAME:

8. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER P&A

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION(POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

9. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

- HISTORIC INJURY
  - REQUIRED EVACUATION
  - LTA (1-3 days)
  - LTA (>3 days)
  - RW/JT (1-3 days)
  - RW/JT (>3 days)
  - FATALITY
  - Other Injury
- OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
  - UNDERGROUND
  - SURFACE
  - DEVERTER
  - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

- 10. WATER DEPTH: 165 FT.
- 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 65 MI.
- 12. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
- 13. CURRENT DIRECTION: NE  
SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
- 14. SEA STATE: 0 FT.
- 15. PICTURES TAKEN:
- 16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

On 4-DEC-2019, at High Island A 446 A, at approximately 0704 hours, the Plug and Abandonment (P&A) crew was in the process of pulling the remaining five joints of 3-1/2" work string from the 16" casing of Well A015 utilizing the platform crane. After setting the work string down into the slips, a crew member unscrewed the top joint to break down the work string. Four joints remained set in Well A015. The Crane Operator began to lift the top unscrewed joint to lay it down, but the joint got caught on the last thread section (approximately two feet) causing the bowls and slips to rise and unseat. When the unscrewed joint released, the remaining work string fell back down at an angle. The safety clamp which was secured to the joint of pipe by a locking pin and threaded nut, broke loose during the impact allowing the clamp to open. The 3-1/2" pipe bounced upward and the slips raised upward and out of the bowls which were not secured to the Pacman Plate. This allowed the bowls to open just enough for the 3-1/2" pipe and collar to pass through the bowls permitting the remaining work string to fall down the hole approximately 346 feet. During the fall the work string impacted the cement retainer which was located 72 feet below the mudline.

Investigation by BSEE revealed that the previous lifts were blind lifts and were not discussed or addressed in the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) prior to conducting the job task. In addition, while the lift was being conducted, personnel were distracted while discussing other equipment and failed to visually verify the complete separation of the tool joint as it was being lifted. When the pipe separated and fell, the sudden reduction of weight being hoisted caused the crane to be shock loaded.

The Root Cause of the incident:

1. The crew failed to verify complete separation of the joint of pipe before signaling the Crane Operator to lift the pipe.

Although not the cause of the incident, the contributing causes were:

1. The crew failed to document on the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) they would be conducting blind lifts.
2. The crew failed to secure the bowls to the Pacman plate.
3. The crew failed to secure the handles of the slips (secondary means).
4. According to witness statements, the crew was discussing other equipment during the lift.
5. Fieldwood Energy, Offshore Crane Operation and Maintenance Program, Version 5, does not address blind lifts.

Corrective Actions:

1. The procedure for pulling and breaking out tubulars shall be revised to include "visual verification" that a complete disconnect of each pipe joint is achieved before hoisting. A clear separation of adjoining joints must be physically and visually observed.
2. The procedure shall also be revised to include blind lift situations and communication methods for same.
3. A Safety Alert will be created and disseminated to all Fieldwood personnel detailing the incident and corrective measures.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Root Cause:

1. BSEE discovered the crew failed to verify complete separation of the joint of pipe



APPROVED

DATE: 27-MAY-2020