For Public Release

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 04-DEC-2019   TIME: 0704   HOURS
   OCCURRED DATE: TIME:
   2. OPERATOR: Fieldwood Energy LLC
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
   4. LEASE: G02359
   AREA: HI   LATITUDE: 28.3532
   BLOCK: A 446   LONGITUDE: -94.097
   5. PLATFORM: A
   RIG NAME:
   6. ACTIVITY:
   ☐ EXPLORATION (POE)
   ☐ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
   7. TYPE:
   ☐ HISTORIC INJURY
   ☐ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   ☐ FIRE
   ☐ EXPLOSION
   ☐ COLLISION
   ☐ HISTORIC INJURY
   ☐ REQUIRE EVACUATION
   ☐ HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   ☐ UNDERGROUND
   ☐ SURFACE
   ☐ DEVERTER
   ☐ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
   ☐ OTHER
   ☐ POLLUTION
   ☐ HUMAN ERROR
   ☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   ☐ WEATHER RELATED
   ☐ LEAK
   ☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
   ☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   ☐ OTHER
   8. OPERATION:
   ☐ PRODUCTION
   ☐ DRILLING
   ☐ WORKOVER
   ☐ COMPLETION
   ☐ HELICOPTER
   ☐ MOTOR VESSEL
   ☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   ☐ OTHER
   9. CAUSE:
   ☐ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   ☐ HUMAN ERROR
   ☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   ☐ WEATHER RELATED
   ☐ LEAK
   ☐ UPSET H2O TREATING
   ☐ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   ☐ OTHER
   10. WATER DEPTH: 165 FT.
   11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 65 MI.
   12. WIND DIRECTION:
       SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
   13. CURRENT DIRECTION: NE
       SPEED: 0 M.P.H.
   14. SEA STATE: 0 FT.
   15. PICTURES TAKEN:
   16. STATEMENT TAKEN:
On 4-DEC-2019, at High Island A 446 A, at approximately 0704 hours, the Plug and Abandonment (P&A) crew was in the process of pulling the remaining five joints of 3-1/2" work string from the 16" casing of Well A015 utilizing the platform crane. After setting the work string down into the slips, a crew member unscrewed the top joint to break down the work string. Four joints remained set in Well A015. The Crane Operator began to lift the top unscrewed joint to lay it down, but the joint got caught on the last thread section (approximately two feet) causing the bowls and slips to rise and unseat. When the unscrewed joint released, the remaining work string fell back down at an angle. The safety clamp which was secured to the joint of pipe by a locking pin and threaded nut, broke loose during the impact allowing the clamp to open. The 3-1/2" pipe bounced upward and the slips raised upward and out of the bowls which were not secured to the Pacman Plate. This allowed the bowls to open just enough for the 3-1/2" pipe and collar to pass through the bowls permitting the remaining work string to fall down the hole approximately 346 feet. During the fall the work string impacted the cement retainer which was located 72 feet below the mudline.

Investigation by BSEE revealed that the previous lifts were blind lifts and were not discussed or addressed in the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) prior to conducting the job task. In addition, while the lift was being conducted, personnel were distracted while discussing other equipment and failed to visually verify the complete separation of the tool joint as it was being lifted. When the pipe separated and fell, the sudden reduction of weight being hoisted caused the crane to be shock loaded.

The Root Cause of the incident:
1. The crew failed to verify complete separation of the joint of pipe before signaling the Crane Operator to lift the pipe.

Although not the cause of the incident, the contributing causes were:
1. The crew failed to document on the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) they would be conducting blind lifts.
2. The crew failed to secure the bowls to the Pacman plate.
3. The crew failed to secure the handles of the slips (secondary means).
4. According to witness statements, the crew was discussing other equipment during the lift.
5. Fieldwood Energy, Offshore Crane Operation and Maintenance Program, Version 5, does not address blind lifts.

Corrective Actions:
1. The procedure for pulling and breaking out tubulars shall be revised to include "visual verification" that a complete disconnect of each pipe joint is achieved before hoisting. A clear separation of adjoining joints must be physically and visually observed.
2. The procedure shall also be revised to include blind lift situations and communication methods for same.
3. A Safety Alert will be created and disseminated to all Fieldwood personnel detailing the incident and corrective measures.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Root Cause:
1. BSEE discovered the crew failed to verify complete separation of the joint of pipe
before signaling the Crane Operator to lift the pipe.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. The crew failed to document on the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) they would be conducting blind lifts.
2. The crew failed to secure the bowls to the Pacman plate.
3. The crew failed to secure the handles of the slips (secondary means).
4. According to witness statements, the crew was discussing other equipment during the lift.
5. Fieldwood Energy, Offshore Crane Operation and Maintenance Program, Version 5, does not address blind lifts.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Note: Fieldwood had another crane lifting incident less than one week later following this incident.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None None

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lake Jackson District does not have any recommendations at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 issued to Lessee: (30 CFR 250.107) Does the Lessee perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservations and conservations of property and the environment?

Lessee failed to visually verify complete seperation of the tool joint prior to instructing the Crane Operator to lift the upper joint of the 3.5" work string during a blind lift.

Lessee failed to ensure the JSA addressed all known hazards associated with conducting a blind lift prior to commencing operations.

Lessee must follow manufacture's guidance on the proper way to secure slip bowls.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: 05-DEC-2019

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

James Holmes typed report / John Orsini / Perry Brady /

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

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