

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

**ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 12-OCT-2009 TIME: 0630 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: W & T Offshore, Inc.  
REPRESENTATIVE: Gautreaux, Antoine  
TELEPHONE: (713) 624-7274  
CONTRACTOR:  
REPRESENTATIVE:  
TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR  
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G14391  
AREA: EC LATITUDE:  
BLOCK: 373 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A  
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION (POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION  
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY  
 REQUIRED EVACUATION  
 LTA (1-3 days)  
 LTA (>3 days)  
 RW/JT (1-3 days)  
 RW/JT (>3 days)  
 Other Injury

FATALITY  
 POLLUTION  
 FIRE  
 EXPLOSION

LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT  
 UNDERGROUND  
 SURFACE  
 DEVERTER  
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE  
 CRANE  
 OTHER LIFTING DEVICE  
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.  
 INCIDENT >\$25K  
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM  
 REQUIRED MUSTER  
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE  
 OTHER Fire in AC Evap. Enclosure

6. OPERATION:

PRODUCTION  
 DRILLING  
 WORKOVER  
 COMPLETION  
 HELICOPTER  
 MOTOR VESSEL  
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.  
 OTHER

8. CAUSE:

EQUIPMENT FAILURE  
 HUMAN ERROR  
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE  
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL  
 WEATHER RELATED  
 LEAK  
 UPSET H2O TREATING  
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

9. WATER DEPTH: 400 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 113 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 14 October 2009, operations personnel noticed a temperature increase inside the climate-controlled Petrobras Motor Control Center (MCC) building. The MCC building is not located in a Classified Area. Upon further investigation it was discovered that a fire had occurred inside one of the air conditioner (AC) evaporator enclosures located on top of the MCC building. The date and time of the incident is unknown since the location of the unit is isolated and no one witnessed the fire.

During the operator investigation it was discovered that the drain line from the AC evaporator enclosure on top of the MCC building was routed to the cellar deck and terminated in the fuel gas skid. On 18 September 2009, in an effort to eliminate any oil accumulation in the fuel gas skid when bleeding liquid from the fuel gas meter and associated 5-way manifold, operations personnel installed a 1/4 inch drain line from the bottom of the 5-way manifold directly into the AC evaporator enclosure's 1/2 inch drain line which terminates at the main drain line for the fuel gas skid. This fuel gas 5-way manifold is drained regularly to prevent fluid build up in the meter. Operations personnel mentioned that from time to time they would experience a gas/condensate smell in the MCC building but no one investigated the source of the odor.

On 24 September 2009, Diamond S. Refrigeration Inc. replaced a bad condenser motor, bad contactor and overload. The platform experienced an Emergency Shut Down (ESD) on 12 October 2009 due to inclement weather, evidence of fire damage was found on 14 October 2009 and Diamond S. Refrigeration assessed damages on 18 October 2009. Subsequent to discovering the incident, the drain line from the AC enclosure was routed to a safe location.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Gas migrated up through the air conditioner evaporator enclosure's drain line and accumulated inside the enclosure prior to ignition. Due to the severity of the damage caused by the fire, the source of ignition could not be determined but is believed to be a bare wire that made contact with a metal surface causing a spark and igniting the gas.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- \* Failure to trace the drain line prior to making the tie-in.
- \* Failure to investigate the source of the gas/condensate odor inside the MCC building.
- \* The use of 1/2 inch stainless steel tubing for the AC evaporator enclosure drain line combined with the hazardous location in which the drain line was routed provided an easy and convenient tie-in point for the fuel gas manifold drain line.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

**Air Conditioner Evaporator Coil, Blower Motor and associated Enclosure**      **Fire damage - Destroyed**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):                      **\$6,404**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

**The Lake Charles District recommends that the MMS Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM) issue a Safety Alert to heighten industry's awareness of the hazards involved with combining pressure drains with atmospheric drain lines.**

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

**G-110 - An unsafe work practice resulted in a significant fire that destroyed one of the MCC building's AC evaporator coil, blower motor and associated enclosure.**

**\* The drain line from the fuel gas meter 5-way manifold (process source) was tied directly into the domestic AC evaporator enclosure drain line which terminated at the fuel gas skid main drain inlet.**

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**02-NOV-2009**

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

**Marcus Mouton / Royce Buford / Guy Bertrand / Wayne Meaux /**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED:      **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**Larry Williamson**

APPROVED

DATE:    **24-NOV-2009**

# FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: **Believed to be a bare wire made contact with a metal surface causing a spark.**

2. TYPE OF FUEL:
- GAS
  - OIL
  - DIESEL
  - CONDENSATE
  - HYDRAULIC
  - OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: **Gas accumulation inside the AC evaporator enclosure.**

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? **NO**

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:
- HANDHELD
  - WHEELED UNIT
  - FIXED CHEMICAL
  - FIXED WATER
  - NONE
  - OTHER