UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE 
GULF OF MEXICO REGION 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 23-FEB-2004   TIME: 1400 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Forest Oil Corporation

3. LEASE: G02688
   AREA: HI   LATITUDE: 
   BLOCK: A 467   LONGITUDE: 

4. PLATFORM: A
   RIG NAME: 

5. ACTIVITY: 
   □ EXPLORATION(POE)
   □ DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)
   □ DRILLING
   □ WORKOVER
   □ COMPLETION
   □ MOTOR VESSEL
   □ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   □ OTHER

6. TYPE: 
   □ FIRE
   □ EXPLOSION
   □ BLOWOUT
   □ COLLISION
   □ INJURY NO. 0
   □ FATALITY NO. 0
   □ POLLUTION
   □ OTHER

7. OPERATION: 
   □ PRODUCTION
   □ DRILLING
   □ WORKOVER
   □ COMPLETION
   □ MOTOR VESSEL
   □ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   □ OTHER

8. CAUSE: 
   □ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   □ HUMAN ERROR
   □ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   □ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   □ WEATHER RELATED
   □ LEAK
   □ UPSET H2O TREATING
   □ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   □ OTHER
   □ Gas Migration

9. WATER DEPTH: 187 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 93 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: NW
   SPEED: 1 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
   SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/ 
    SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
    CONTRACTOR: Woodgroup Production Services
    CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/ 
    SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
    CITY: STATE:
    TELEPHONE:

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17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

The compressor failed to start (4-5 times). When the compressor fails to start, HP gas is vented to flair, LP gas is vented to the low pressure vent line, which is common to the skimmer tanks installed below the MCC room. Gas migrated from the skimmer atmosphere along the structure beams and up through the opening in the deck where the power cables and conduit enter the MCC room from below. The gas detector alarmed with 20% LFL and the door was opened to ventilate the gas. The gas was trapped in the electrical panels and the pump relay opened or closed providing spark, exploding gas and blowing out the doors, panel doors, light fixtures, and building walls. The employee was blown fifteen feet out of the door.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Low pressure gas vented into common venting going to the skimmer, released to atmosphere and migrated into the MCC room from below, through opening (approximately four inches in diameter) into the MCC room and was ignited by an automated switch or relay. The door was opened, causing a chimney effect, sucking more gas into the MCC room. The percentage of gas in the electrical panel was probably well above the LFL than in the room.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Failure to install FSV at the water skimmer to prevent blow-down gas from venting at the atmospheric vent on the skimmer. Additionally, failure to seal all cable and conduit passages into the MCC room. Failure to survey, identify, and seal all penetrations into MCC room.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: 

Switch gear panel doors, light fixtures, Explosion 
and severe damage to the building walls. 
(blowed outward aprox. 4" all the way 
avoid MCC room) 
Amount of damage approximately $10,000.00 
and $15,000.00 to $20,000.00 in upgrades. 

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $10,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

This District recommends that a Safety Alert be distributed to all operators stating the following:

Seal all openings and penetrations into the MCC rooms to prevent gas migration.

Re-pipe low pressure blowdown discharge from compressor, or install flow safety valve in the low pressure vent line between the blowdown line and the atmospheric water skimmer to prevent gas from discharging at the atmospheric vents on the skimmer.

Facilities should have audits or be checked for penetration into buildings, living quarters, and MCC rooms to verify that gas cannot migrate into these areas.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

F-108 Electrical installations not in accordance with API RP 14F. All penetrations not sealed as per API RP 14F: TO PREVENT GAS MIGRATION into MCC room.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

27-FEB-2004

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Jim Hail / Kassim Kassim /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Pausina for Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 07-MAY-2004
1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: MCC room / relay switch

2. TYPE OF FUEL: □ OIL □ DIESEL □ CONDENSATE □ HYDRAULIC □ OTHER □ GAS

3. FUEL SOURCE: Gas migration from water skimmer

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT? No

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED: □ HANDHELD □ WHEELED UNIT □ FIXED CHEMICAL □ FIXED WATER □ NONE □ OTHER □ NONE