UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED DATE: 31-OCT-2008 TIME: 1430 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE: Matthews, Justin
   TELEPHONE: (337) 989-3435

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G01146
   AREA: VR
   BLOCK: 245
   LATITUDE:
   LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: G
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
   EXPLORATION(POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   HISTORIC INJURY
   REQUIRED EVACUATION
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days)
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   Other Injury

   HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   UNDERGROUND
   SURFACE
   DEVERTER
   SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

8. CAUSE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 132 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 64 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.
17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

Subsequent to conducting Hurricane Ike platform repairs, the Operator was in the process of returning the G platform to production. Upon opening the SCSSVs, gas leaks were detected from Wells G-1, G-3 and G-4, occurring from two locations on the wellheads: the flange connection located immediately above the tubing head and the flange connection just above the wellhead spacer piece. The Operator attempted to close all SCSSVs to control the gas leaks, resulting controlling the leaks from Wells G-1 and G-3. However, Well G-4's SCSSV would not fully close/seal, resulting in an uncontrolled gas leak from Well G-4's tree flange connection located immediately above the tubing head bonnet. Gas escaped through the loose mating surfaces of the ring gaskets and grooves, requiring Well G-4 be opened to the flare to minimize gas leakage from the wellhead. This afforded the routing of most of the gas to a safe location. Well G-4's tubing pressure was estimated to be 0 psi before opening its SCSSV. After opening its SCSSV, G-4's tubing pressure built to approximately 100 psi and gradually decreased to about 50 psi. After several hours of flowing the G-4 well to the flare, the SCSSV fully closed/sealed. On the following day, successful repair procedures were initiated on the wellheads. All leaks were repaired by changing out the studs, nuts, and ring gaskets on wells G-1, G-3, and G-4. Subsequent to the repair, the trees were tested to their rated capacities.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Large Hurricane Ike forces acted on the wellhead flange studs, causing the studs to stretch beyond their elastic limit. This resulted in loss of seal integrity of the tree flange connections.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Forces generated during Hurricane Ike caused the stabilizers, which are supports or gussets that attach the well's caisson to the bell guide, to fail. The purpose of the stabilizers is to minimize movement of the caissons relative to the platform structure. Possibly the failed stabilizers contributed to the large forces acting on the flowlines, and the increased flowline forces could have imparted enough moment force to the wellhead studs to stretch them beyond their elastic limit. Excessive flowline forces were evidenced by the flowline u-bolts that failed/broke during the Hurricane.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:

| Property damaged related to the repair of the loss of well control for Well G-4 only: Studs, nuts, ring gaskets. | Studs were stretched beyond their elastic limit. Ring gaskets may have been cut due to escaping gas/debris, and some nuts may have also been damaged. |

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $25,000
22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lake Charles District recommends that the Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM) issue a Safety Alert to inform operators that subsequent to severe weather events, collision's etc., visual inspection of wellhead studs, flowline u-bolts, and stabilizers should be made. If the inspections indicate that the wellhead studs, flowline u-bolts and/or stabilizers may have been subjected to forces greater than design limitations, the following action should be exercised to prevent possible loss of well control:

i. Verify zero pressure on the SCSSV control line.
ii. Isolate the SCSSV control line from the wellhead.
iii. Isolate wellbore pressure from the damaged equipment.
iv. Repair/replace all damaged equipment.
v. Test the wellheads to the maximum anticipated surface pressure prior to opening the SCSSV.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

15-DEC-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Scott Mouton / Mark Osterman /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Williamson, Larry

APPROVED DATE: 28-JUL-2010
INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

- OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE
- CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE
- OTHER

NAME:
HOME ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE:
WORK PHONE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS
EMPLOYED BY:
BUSINESS ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE:
ZIP CODE: