

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 09-JUN-2021 TIME: 1445 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Fieldwood Energy LLC**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Pipeline Leak**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

8. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G02193**

AREA: **MP** LATITUDE: **29.32**  
BLOCK: **140** LONGITUDE: **-88.99**

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: **B**  
RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION (POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

9. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

REQUIRED EVACUATION

LTA (1-3 days)

LTA (>3 days)

RW/JT (1-3 days)

RW/JT (>3 days)

FATALITY

Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
  - UNDERGROUND
  - SURFACE
  - DEVERTER
  - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

- 10. WATER DEPTH: **150** FT.
- 11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **12** MI.
- 12. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 13. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 14. SEA STATE: FT.
- 15. PICTURES TAKEN:
- 16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

**INCIDENT SUMMARY:**

On 09 June 2021, at 1445 hours, Fieldwood Energy LLC (Fieldwood) was notified of a mystery sheen in the Main Pass (MP) 61 area. It was determined that the leak was from the MP 140 B Pipeline Segment Number (PSN) 3472 which flows hydrocarbons to the Grand Bay receiving station. The estimated sheen volume was 1.23 barrels as reported by the operator. Fieldwood responded by isolating and bleeding down the pipeline and sending a dive vessel to the area to address the leak on the pipeline.

**SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:**

On 09 June 2021, Fieldwood was notified of a mystery sheen in the MP 61 area. Fieldwood immediately began bleeding pressure down on PSN 3472, which was a possible source of the sheen. The National Response Center (NRC) was notified at 1553 hours (via NRC #1307342). Fieldwood monitored the pipeline pressure over the next few days and determined that PSN 3472 was the source.

On 12 June 2021, at 0645 hours, Fieldwood's recorded pressure readings were 23 psi at the platform and 2 psi at Grand Bay. Once the location of the leak was found, a request to install a clamp was reviewed and approved by the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) Pipeline Section, with a requirement that Fieldwood hydrotest the entire line. The pipeline was approved to be derated from 1440 psig to 300 psig prior to the proposed hydrotest of 375 psig.

On 12 June 2021, the Dive Support Vessel (DSV) Lady Monroe arrived on scene in the afternoon. A clamp was installed on the Fieldwood pipeline segment. The pipeline was hydrotested to 375 psig (1.25 \* MAOP) using the pipeline pressure derating approved by BSEE.

**BSEE INVESTIGATION:**

The BSEE Accident Investigator (AI) was initially notified on 09 June 2021 of a mystery sheen in the Main Pass area. Further inquiry suggested and later verified that the sheen belonged to Fieldwood. Per the NRC report, the sheen was described as 1.23 barrels in volume, silvery in color, at a location of 29.32.0 N Latitude and 88.99.0 W Longitude, and appeared to be coming from a pipeline leak.

All requests for repairs and approvals for the pipeline leak was documented through the BSEE Pipeline Section.

**CONCLUSION:**

A mystery sheen was observed and reported, and later identified as a pipeline leak coming from PSN 3472, owned and operated by Fieldwood. Once Fieldwood was made aware of the issue, the sheen was stopped by bleeding down the pipeline pressure to below hydrostatic pressure. Once the leak was stopped, the AI found that Fieldwood took the necessary steps to investigate the source of the leak, and mitigate the effects of the leak by bleeding down pressure and installing a clamp on the line to prevent further pollution. BSEE agrees with Fieldwood's assessment that the leak was caused by erosion.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

**Equipment Failure: Inadequate equipment maintenance. Erosion caused the leak.**

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

**Pipeline segment #1307342**

**Pipeline: Pin hole leak**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

**09-JUN-2021**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

OCS REPORT:

**Gerald Taylor /**

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

**David Trocquet**

APPROVED

DATE: **09-JAN-2022**