UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED		
	DATE:	STRUCTURAL DAMA	.GE
	16-JAN-2010 TIME: 1415 HOURS	CRANE	
		OTHER LIFTING D	EVICE
2.	OPERATOR: Maritech Resources, Inc.	DAMAGED/DISABLE	D SAFETY SYS.
	REPRESENTATIVE: Feik, Courtney	INCIDENT >\$25K	
	TELEPHONE: (281) 578-3388	H2S/15MIN./20PE	M
	CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services	REQUIRED MUSTER	_
	REPRESENTATIVE: Kenny Reed	SHUTDOWN FROM G	AS RELEASE
	TELEPHONE: (337) 772-8775	OTHER	
_			
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR	6. OPERATION:	
	ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:		
		x PRODUCTION	
	T FR CF 00000	☐ DRILLING	
4.	LEASE: 00829	■ WORKOVER	
	AREA: SS LATITUDE:	☐ COMPLETION	
	BLOCK: 219 LONGITUDE:	HELICOPTER	
		MOTOR VESSEL	
5.	PLATFORM: A-PRD	PIPELINE SEG	
	RIG NAME:	X OTHER Ilas.	n fire to #1 generator
_	7.CTT.V.TTV	CAUSE:	
6.	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)	CAUSE:	
	X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION	EQUIPMENT FAIR	LURE
7	(DOCD/POD) TYPE:	X HUMAN ERROR	
•		EXTERNAL DAMA	
	HISTORIC INJURY	SLIP/TRIP/FALI	
	REQUIRED EVACUATION	WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER	
	LTA (1-3 days)		
	LTA (>3 days		
	RW/JT (1-3 days)		
	RW/JT (>3 days)	☐ OTHER	
	Other Injury	. WATER DEPTH:	112 FT.
	FATALITY		
	POLLUTION	. DISTANCE FROM SH	ORE: 47 MI.
	X FIRE		
	L EXPLOSION	. WIND DIRECTION:	
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT	SPEED:	M.P.H.
	UNDERGROUND	~	
	SURFACE	. CURRENT DIRECTIC	N .
	DEVERTER		
	SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	SPEED:	M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K	. SEA STATE:	FT.

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17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

At 1415 hours on 16 January 2010, an Operator for Maritech Resource was manually refueling the #1 diesel generator while it was running. During the refueling operation, the Operator left the manual refueling operation unattended to start the #2 generator, located approximately three feet from the #1 generator. Once the Operator started the #2 generator and turned to walk back to the #1 generator, he detected a fire approximately four feet by four feet in diameter being emitted from the #1 generator. The Operator immediately utilized a 30-pound ABC fire extinguisher to extinguish the fire, removed the diesel hose from the fuel tank opening, and closed the ball valve. The #1 generator stopped on its own as a result of the fire extinguisher displacing the oxygen to the generator's intake system.

A collective investigation was conducted by Maritech Resources and (owner of generator). It was determined that there was a momentary flash fire caused by an external source, and the most likely source of ignition was a static discharge during the refueling process. Diesel is flammable and can be ignited by heat, sparks, flames, or other sources of ignition (e.g., static electricity, pilot lights, or mechanical/electrical equipment, and electronic devices such as cell phones, computers, calculators, and pagers that have not been certified as intrinsically safe).

In addition, the Operator did not complete a Job Safety Analysis (JSA), and did not review the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) describing the hazards and safety precautions associated with diesel. During the diesel refueling operation to the #1 generator, the Operator did not ground the fuel nozzle and hose to the generator package. Also, the refuleing process was conducted with the #1 generator running and unattended.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The investigation concluded that the most likely source of the ignition was a static discharge and resulting flash fire of the diesel during the refueling process.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The Operator failed to:

- 1. Complete a JSA for the refueling operation, thereby not identifying the hazards and mitigations for each step of the operation.
- 2. Review the MSDS describing the hazards and safety precautions associated with diesel.
- 3. Ground the fuel nozzle and hose to the generator package during the refueling operation.
- 4. Stop the #1 generator from running prior to initiating the refueling operation.
- 20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
 - On 25 February 2010 Maritech submitted a Safety Alert to all of its Gulf of Mexico platforms concerning the generator flash fire. The Safety Alert specifies action to be taken by Maritech employees for the elimination of future incidents of this nature as follows:
 - * A complete review of the MSDS and a JSA will be conducted prior to each refueling process.
 - * The generator will be shutdown and cooled prior to refueling, and a grounding wire

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and clamp will be installed on the refueling nozzle and hose prior to refueling.

- * The refueling process will be continuously manned at all times.
- * An externally located diesel fuel tank with proper hose connections was installed and will be utilized during refueling.
- * The Operators will be re-trained in fire fighting procedures.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Unit #4823 - 150KW diesel package protective wiring loom and sound-proofing.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

The protective wiring loom and a portion of the sound-proofing on the fuel fill side of the unit melted.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$2,510

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

Due to the specific nature of the incident, the MMS Houma District does not have any recommendations for the MMS Office of Safety Management.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 - Operator failed to perform operations in a safe and workmanlike manner; therefore, this resulted in a flash fire at 1415 hours on 16 January 16 2010 during a manual generator refueling operation. The Operator failed to ground the refueling nozzle and hose to the generator package, and left the manual refueling operation unattended. Once the Operator returned to the generator, he detected a fire approximately 4 feet by 4 feet in diameter. The fire was extinguished immediately with no injuries reported.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

25-FEB-2010

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Tim McGraw - 104 /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan A. Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: 16-MAR-2010

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