1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 11-MAR-2015   TIME: 0900   HOURS

2. OPERATOR: W & T Offshore, Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE: HELMERICH & PAYNE
   CONTRACTOR: HELMERICH & PAYNE
   TELEPHONE: -

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
   ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G13079
   AREA: EW   LATITUDE: 910
   BLOCK: 910   LONGITUDE: -

5. PLATFORM: A
   RIG NAME: H& P 203

6. ACTIVITY:
   PRODUCTION
   DRILLING
   WORKOVER
   COMPLETION
   HELICOPTER
   MOTOR VESSEL
   PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   OTHER

7. TYPE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

8. CAUSE:
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   HISTORIC INJURY
   REQUIRED EVACUATION
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days)
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   Other Injury
   PATALITY
   POLLUTION
   FIRE
   EXPLOSION
   HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   UNDERGROUND
   SURFACE
   DEVERTER
   SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

9. WATER DEPTH: 557 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 66 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: N
    SPEED: 1 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: N
    SPEED: 1 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: 1 FT.
On March 11, 2015 the H&P 203 accidently sheared the 5 7/8" drill pipe while setting a test plug. Leading up to the incident the rig had set and cemented the 13 5/8" casing and installed the well head, and were preparing to test Blow Out Preventers (BOP's). According to rig personnel, as soon as the rig broke circulation with the cement unit the Blind Shear Rams (BSR's) closed on the 5 7/8" drill pipe. The test plug, a 20 foot pup joint, and 22.35' of 5 7/8" drill pipe was left in the hole.

In the investigation that followed, a contact switch in the rig floor panel for the close side of the shear ram function was found stuck in the closed position. If someone had pushed the "Push to Operate" button in this condition, the BSR's would have automatically closed. Under normal circumstances one would push the "Push to Operate" button, and simultaneously push another command button (such as annular close, annular open, BSR close, etc...) in order to carry out the desired function.

Prior to this incident there was no alarm or warning mechanism in place to notify rig personnel that the contact switch was stuck in the closed position. Following the incident the logic in control station was changed so that the indicator light will flash if the switch is stuck in either the open or closed position.

No personnel accepted responsibility for pushing the "Push to Operate" button, but it is evident that a member of the rig crew pushed the button with plans to make a different function. However, due to the contact switch for the BSR's being stuck in the closed position, as soon as the "Push to Operate" button was pressed the BSR's fired.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
- The contactor switch for the close side of the BSR's was stuck in the closed position.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
- There was no alarm or warning mechanism in place to notify rig personnel that the contact switch was stuck in the closed position.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:                  NATURE OF DAMAGE:
One joint of drill pipe.                  Sheared.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):                $4,500 -
22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:
The Houma District has no recommendations for the BSEE Region at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:


26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: James Richard /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: Bryan Domangue

APPROVED DATE: 30-APR-2015