1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 17-AUG-2006 TIME: 0200 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: BHP Billiton Petroleum (GOM) Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE: Mark Jackson
   TELEPHONE: (281) 925-7600
   CONTRACTOR: Global Marine Drilling Co.
   REPRESENTATIVE: Andy Dywan
   TELEPHONE: (713) 599-6303

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G08035
   AREA: AT LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: 574 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM:
   RIG NAME: GSF DEVELOPMENT DRILLER I

6. ACTIVITY:
   EXPLORATION (POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER Hydraulic fluid.

8. CAUSE:

9. WATER DEPTH: 6213 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 100 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: NE
    SPEED: 5 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: E
    SPEED: 1 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: 2 FT.
17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

While a Subsea engineer was carrying out his daily check around 01.00 am (third check on the night), he observed fluid on the moonpool deck. He went to observe tensioner #11 and #12 and noticed the "can catchers" were overflowing with tensioner fluid, he continued to go to tensioner #9 and #10 and they were the same, the can catchers were overflowing. The Toolpusher was notified and Subsea engineer made his was to the rig floor and noticed when he brought up the riser tensioner screen on the X-Com panel that "RARS Recoil Mode Activated" red alarm. This was reset and when looking at the tensioner pairs (#11 and #12) across the readings were approximately 305 Kips each. They were brought up to 333 kips each.

Findings:

1. On 08/16/06 the BOP was tested, at 18:30 hours the Subsea engineer switched from Sem A to Sem B on the inactive blue pod on the BOP stack. (Sem is a control computer in the pod). The switching resulted in a spurious signal being sent the BOP control computer on surface indicating that the LMRP had released. The BOP control computer then sends a signal to the riser tensioner system which in turns actives the Olmsted valves on the tensioners venting hydraulic fluid. However, in this case the venting went unnoticed for 7 hours. In total 500 gallons were vented, 50 gallons remain in the vent tanks, 200 gallons was contained on the deck and a catch pan and 250 gallons spilled into the sea.

2. Riser recoil system was not physically activated by anyone on the rig floor.

3. Recoil system when fired is designed to release fluid out the Olmsted valve.

4. NOV continued checking the alarms and data logger for problems. Also contacted Sense Norway to download data information and send to rig.

5. The LMRP did not disconnect and riser integrity maintained through the incident.

6. The BOP vendor is working on a software solution to the problem. The alarm system is being revised.

7. Presently a strict monitoring program is in place to identify any repeat of the event.

8. Recoil alarm is set at the lowest priority which does not give the Driller an audible alarm and there is no pop up screen. In this case the venting went unnoticed on for seven hours.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

On 08/16/06 the BOP was tested, at 18:30 hours the Subsea engineer switched from Sem A to Sem B on the inactive blue pod on the BOP stack. (Sem is a control computer in the pod). The switching resulted in a spurious signal being sent the BOP control computer on surface indicating that the LMRP had released. The BOP control computer then sends a signal to the riser tensioner system which in turns actives the valves, Olmsted valves, on the tensioners venting hydraulic fluid. However, in this case the venting went unnoticed for 7 hours. In total 500 gallons were vented, 50 gallons remain in the
vent tanks, 200 gallons was contained on the deck and a catch pan and 250 gallons spilled into the sea.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Recoil alarm is set at the lowest priority which does not give the Driller an audible alarm and there is no pop up screen.

NATURE OF DAMAGE: Lost overboard

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $3,250

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

No recommendations to MMS

The MMS concurs with the Operators recommendations to prevent recurrence.

1. In the mean time we are pulling the fuse and jumpers between Hydril and NOV recoil system during a SEM switch which eliminates the possibility of firing the recoil system.

2. We are looking into a modification which will return the fluid from the overflow tank back to the high pressure accumulator, in other words making it a closed loop system which would reduce the possibility of fluid discharge.

3. Hydril is working on a software fix which will not be implemented until they have one and the LMRP/BOP's must be unlatched. We would prefer to do this software upgrade once the BOP is back on surface due to the whole system will require rebooting.

4. We have requested for Sense to change the alarm priority from low to high which will give the Driller an audible and pop-up screen alarm. This software change can not be performed during normal Drilling operations.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: n/a /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: FPausina for TTrosclair

OCS REPORT:

APPROVED

DATE: 16-OCT-2006
1. VOLUME: GAL \hspace{1cm} 5.95 \hspace{1cm} BBL

YARDS LONG \hspace{1cm} YARDS WIDE

2. TYPE OF HYDROCARBON RELEASED:  
   - [ ] OIL
   - [ ] DIESEL
   - [ ] CONDENSATE
   - [x] HYDRAULIC
   - [ ] NATURAL GAS
   - [ ] OTHER

3. SOURCE OF HYDROCARBON RELEASED: Riser tensioner can catchers.

4. WERE SAMPLES TAKEN?  NO

5. WAS CLEANUP EQUIPMENT ACTIVATED?  NO

   IF SO, TYPE:  
   - [ ] SKIMMER
   - [ ] CONTAINMENT BOOM
   - [ ] ABSORPTION EQUIPMENT
   - [ ] DISPERSANTS
   - [ ] OTHER

6. ESTIMATED RECOVERY: 0 GAL \hspace{1cm} BBL

7. RESPONSE TIME: HOURS

8. IS THE POLLUTION IN THE PROXIMITY OF AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREA (CLASS I)?  NO

9. HAS REGION OIL SPILL TASK FORCE BEEN NOTIFIED?  NO

10. CONTACTED SHORE:  NO  IF YES, WHERE:

11. WERE ANY LIVE ANIMALS OBSERVED NEAR:  NO

12. WERE ANY OILED OR DEAD ANIMALS OBSERVED NEAR SPILL:  NO