UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 22-FEB-2007 TIME: 1730 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE: Al Daigle
   TELEPHONE: (504) 592-7390
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G04481
   AREA: MP LATITUDE: 
   BLOCK: 77 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: 
   EXPLORATION (POE) DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   □ HISTORIC INJURY
   □ REQUIRED EVACUATION
   □ LTA (1-3 days)
   □ LTA (>3 days)
   □ RW/JT (1-3 days)
   □ RW/JT (>3 days)
   □ Other Injury
   □ PATALITY
   □ POLLUTION
   □ FIRE
   □ EXPLOSION
   □ HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   □ UNDERGROUND
   □ SURFACE
   □ DEVERTER
   □ SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES
   □ COLLISION
   □ HISTORIC
   □ >$25K
   □ <=$25K
   □ STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
   □ CRANE
   □ OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
   □ DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
   □ INCIDENT >$25K
   □ H2S/15MIN./20PPM
   □ REQUIRED MUSTER
   □ SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
   □ OTHER

6. OPERATION:
   □ PRODUCTION
   □ DRILLING
   □ WORKOVER
   □ COMPLETION
   □ HELICOPTER
   □ MOTOR VESSEL
   □ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   □ OTHER

8. CAUSE:
   □ EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   □ HUMAN ERROR
   □ EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   □ SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   □ WEATHER RELATED
   □ LEAK
   □ UPSET H2O TREATING
   □ OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   □ OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 130 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 12 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
    □ SPEED: 0 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    □ SPEED: 0 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: 1 FT.
17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

Compressor Mechanic had just completed servicing the third stage suction and third stage discharge valves on compressor number 3 and had begun to test associated devices with the compressor running. The compressor had been running an estimated time of a half hour. The Platform crew was in galley having their evening meal when the fire alarm went off. Flames were found coming out of the compressor shroud cooling fan. The compressor was immediately shut-in, and crew members shut the fuel start and gas valves. The mechanic immediately shut the fuel gas valves as well, so that the compressor would be completely isolated. The crew used the fire hose to spray water on the affected area until the flames subsided. All valves were isolated with tie wraps to prevent accidental opening until an investigation had been performed. The compressor and surrounding area were flagged as well as having the area taped off to prevent tampering and as a protective measure to prevent someone from being injured until it was deemed safe to restart the compressor.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

One pipe in the cooling shroud was found to be corroded and rusted. It separated at its weakest point near a bend and allowed gas to vent. The gas then collected near the engine exhaust of the compressor, reaching its flash point it ignited. Additionally, a quantity of rust was found on the base of the shroud. It has been considered that with the intense air being distributed by the fan of the cooling shroud, the rust particles may have blown around and struck other items and sparked. It is possible this may have resulted in igniting the gas.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Due to the fact that the cooling piping is behind a cover which is bolted closed to prevent personnel from entering the shroud during operations, it is difficult to detect the condition of the piping by the crew and thus making it next to impossible to know the condition of the pipes and associated devices within the shroud covering. Because of this the rusting of the piping was not detected, and preventive actions were not taken.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: Compressor

NATURE OF DAMAGE: Damaged by fire.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $300

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:
No recommendations.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:
26-FEB-2007

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:
Robert Neal /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
Troy Trosclair

APPROVED
DATE: 11-APR-2007