ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 15-AUG-2007    TIME: 1230    HOURS

2. OPERATOR: BP Exploration & Production Inc.
   REPRESENTATIVE: Sustala, Dennis
   TELEPHONE: (281) 366-0898
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE: Richards, Ramsey
   TELEPHONE: (281) 589-3894

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
   ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G15607
   AREA: GC          LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: 743        LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM:
   RIG NAME: T.O. DEVELOPMENT DRILLER II

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   HISTORIC INJURY
   REQUIRED EVACUATION
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days)
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   Other Injury

   PATIALITY
   POLLUTION
   FIRE
   EXPLOSION

LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   UNDERGROUND
   SURFACE
   DEVERTER
   SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >$25K <=$25K

8. CAUSE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 6822 FT.
10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 122 MI.
11. WIND DIRECTION: W
    SPEED: 6 M.P.H.
12. CURRENT DIRECTION: NW
    SPEED: 1 M.P.H.
13. SEA STATE: 2 FT.
17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 15 August 2007 at approximately 1230 hours, a 62 bbl Synthetic Base Mud (SBM) discharge occurred while circulating mud in preparation to trip out of hole in order to set a storm packer. While circulating mud down the drill pipe to clean the wellbore of debris for setting the storm packer, the flow line valve to the shaker house was inadvertently closed. One minute after the valve closed, the high fluid level alarm for the diverter housing sounded. The driller sent someone to inspect the alarm while continuing to pump another three minutes before shutting off the flow to the mud pumps. During this time, the shaker hand and mud engineer notified the driller of no return mud flow and mud pit losses. Approximately one minute after the pumps were shut down, the flow line valve was reopened. The driller was informed that mud was on the diverter and in the moon pool area. Upon investigation, it was determined that 62 bbls of SBM was lost from the mud system. Investigation also led to find that the shunt valve on the drain line from the pollution pan to the overboard cuttings trough was in the open position and the majority of 62 bbls mud lost occurred through this valve. As a result of the closed flowline valve, the mud backed up and filled the diverter housing prior to overflowing into the pollution pan. As the pan filled, the mud went into the drain line and over the pollution pan containment into the moon pool. The BP Environmental pager was alerted and all regulatory notifications were conducted.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The main flow line to shaker house was inadvertently closed, causing fluid to back-up and spill over the containment.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The valve on the overboard shunt line was opened three weeks previously and left in the open position from a previous operation. The valve was specified to be closed at the end of that respective operation but had been inadvertently left open. This provided a path for fluid to flow out of containment to the overboard line.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

The tool pusher will be the only authorized person to open or close any valves that has the capability to discharge overboard. The BP Well Site leader will sign all permits that requires overboard discharge valves to be opened or closed. A blind flange was put on the drain line from the pollution pan to the overboard line. The pollution pan drain line is now routed to the skimmer tanks. Had the flowline been closed with the new routing of lines, no fluid would have gone overboard.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:

There was no property damage, but 62 bbls Discharged into the GOM. of SBM was lost.
22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:
   The Houma District has no recommendations for the Regional Office of Safety Management.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:
   An Incident of Non-Compliance, E-100, will be written to the operator since this incident was due to human error.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:  
   Ben Coco / 

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
   Michael J. Saucier

APPROVED
DATE: 15-OCT-2007
1. VOLUME: GAL 62 BBL
  YARDS LONG X YARDS WIDE

APPEARANCE:

2. TYPE OF HYDROCARBON RELEASED: □ OIL
   □ DIESEL
   □ CONDENSATE
   □ HYDRAULIC
   □ NATURAL GAS
   □ OTHER SBM

3. SOURCE OF HYDROCARBON RELEASED: Overboard Shunt Line

4. WERE SAMPLES TAKEN? NO

5. WAS CLEANUP EQUIPMENT ACTIVATED? NO
   IF SO, TYPE: □ SKIMMER
   □ CONTAINMENT BOOM
   □ ABSORPTION EQUIPMENT
   □ DISPERSANTS
   □ OTHER

6. ESTIMATED RECOVERY: GAL BBL

7. RESPONSE TIME: HOURS

8. IS THE POLLUTION IN THE PROXIMITY OF AN
   ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREA (CLASS I)? NO

9. HAS REGION OIL SPILL TASK FORCE BEEN NOTIFIED? NO

10. CONTACTED SHORE: NO IF YES, WHERE:

11. WERE ANY LIVE ANIMALS OBSERVED NEAR: NO

12. WERE ANY OILED OR DEAD ANIMALS OBSERVED NEAR SPILL: NO