UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
DATE: 30-JUN-2005  TIME: 1205 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Forest Oil Corporation

3. LEASE: G25601
AREA: HI  LATITUDE: 28.36098924
BLOCK: A 287  LONGITUDE: -93.76899323

4. PLATFORM: A
RIG NAME

5. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)

6. TYPE: FIRE

7. OPERATION: PRODUCTION

8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE

9. WATER DEPTH: 186 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 93 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

14. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
STRUCTURE UNMANNED

15. CONTRACTOR:

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

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EV2010R 08-AUG-2005
17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

Production Management, Inc. (PMI) operators on HI 334-B were notified by a PHI pilot from HI 264 that there was a fire on the HI A-287 unmanned platform at 11:45 am. The PHI pilot was going to fly two PMI operators to the platform, but decided it was too dangerous to land. He returned the operators to HI 334-B. The PMI operators waited for their field helicopter to return to the field. The PMI field helicopter pilot picked up three PMI hands from HI A-334 "B" and flew to HI A-287. The pilot decided to land and let the three hands off and then left. The PMI hands immediately began fighting the fire. The fire took about twenty minutes to extinguish. The fire flashed back up and the operators determined the fire was being fed downstream due to the FSV not holding and the FSV not working; believed to be because of the heat from the fire. The gas was shut off with the block valve and fire extinguished at that time.

NOTE: Four 350# wheel units and twelve 30# hand held fire extinguishers were used to fight the fire, and Purple-K was in the extinguishers. When the PMI hands pressured up two of the wheel units, the hoses blew off due to fire damage. The hoses were also burned off of two of the 30# extinguishers.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The cause of the fire is believed to be tubing fitting failure due to the glycol pump vibration. The section was 1/2" inch and about two feet long (wet glycol return line) and parted from the fitting at the base of the glycol contact tower, allowing condensate, glycol, and gas to spray onto the reboiler and ignite. The fire was contained by the glycol unit firewall.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: Glycol Skid and Pump
Panel
Re-Boiler
Fire Walls

NATURE OF DAMAGE: High heat melted and warped equipment.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $100,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:
The investigating inspector recommends to MMS that a safety alert be distributed regarding hard piping be used instead of tubing between the contactor and the glycol pump, with more bracing to control vibration.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:
01-JUL-2005

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:
Ronnie Cook /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
Ed Smith

APPROVED

DATE: 03-JUL-2005
1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: Glycol Re-boiler (high temperature vessel)

2. TYPE OF FUEL: [ ] GAS [x] OIL [ ] DIESEL [ ] CONDENSATE [ ] HYDRAULIC [ ] OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: Gas Off Contact Tower

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT? NO

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED: [x] HANDHELD [x] WHEELED UNIT [ ] FIXED CHEMICAL [ ] FIXED WATER [ ] NONE [ ] OTHER