

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 22-JUN-2012 TIME: 0900 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: El Paso E&P Company, L.P.

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G19799

AREA: EI LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 364 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY

- REQUIRED EVACUATION 1
- LTA (1-3 days)
- LTA (>3 days) 1
- RW/JT (1-3 days)
- RW/JT (>3 days)
- Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Electrical Shock**

6. OPERATION:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER

9. WATER DEPTH: 360 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 72 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 22 June 2012 at approximately 0830 hours, a contract employee (CE) was injured while cleaning the level safety high/low sensors inside the Clean/Flush tank on the water maker. The CE was making his rounds when he noticed that slime had formed on the level sensors inside of the Clean/Flush tank. After the CE had cleaned the level safety high from outside the tank, he proceeded to reach inside the tank with a water hose to clean the level safety low sensor in the lower portion of the tank. As the CE lowered the water hose into the tank, he received an electrical shock. Prior to any maintenance performed on the water maker, El Paso's Energy Isolation Policy on lock out procedures should have been addressed. The 5 amp breaker connected to the water maker could have prevented the shock but failed to trip due to a malfunction on the electrical system. The control panel switches should have also been placed in the off position as per the manufacturer's recommendations. The CE was able to remove his hand from the tank and distance himself from any further electrical shock. The CE experienced pain and became disoriented causing him to lie on the grating. The Person-in-Charge (PIC) stated he witnessed the incident and the CE seemed to be in pain and or discomfort and seemed to be disoriented. The CE was flown to the ERA base in Cameron, La and escorted to medical facility in Jennings, La. The CE was examined by medical personnel and prescribed pain medication before being released to full duty.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The electrical system on the water maker malfunctioned and failed to allow the 5 amp breaker to trip, which allowed the water in the Clean/Flush to become energized. We are waiting on El Paso's findings as to why this occurred.

At the time of the incident, the CE failed to isolate the power source to the water maker. If this would have been a scheduled event, the Lock/Out procedures would have been implemented as per El Paso's Energy Isolation Blue. Also, the manufacturer's recommendation states that when performing maintenance on this unit to turn all control panel switches to the Off Position.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

N/A

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Following the incident, El Paso E&P Company has placed signs to de-energize the equipment before any maintenance is performed. Also, on 25 June 2012 El Paso held a meeting with employees to discuss this incident in an attempt to prevent any future incidents of this nature.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

None

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

NA -

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

N/A

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Lafayette District office makes no recommendation at this time to the Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM).

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

INC G-110 is issued "After the Fact" to document that El Paso E&P Company, L.P. failed to protect health, safety and the environment by not performing operations in a safe and workmanlike manner as follows: An employee was shocked while attempting to clean the inside of a water maker. The electrical system on the water maker malfunctioned and failed to allow the 5 amp breaker to trip allowing the water to become energized. The employee failed to isolate the power source as per El Paso's Lock/Out procedure. Also the manufacturers recommendations states that when performing maintenance on this unit to turn all control panel switches to the off position. This incident was the result of failure to follow El Paso E&P Company, L.P. Lock Out Tag Out procedure.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

25-JUN-2012

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Wade Guillotte / Raymond Johnson /
Gerald Gonzales /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott S. Smith

APPROVED

DATE:

27-JUN-2012

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE

INJURY

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE

FATALITY

OTHER _____

WITNESS

NAME :

HOME ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

WORK PHONE :

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE :

YEARS

EMPLOYED BY :

BUSINESS ADDRESS :

CITY :

STATE :

ZIP CODE :

