

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR -
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT -
GULF OF MEXICO REGION -

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 08-MAY-2014 TIME: 0200 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Anadarko Petroleum Corporation

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: -

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G18402

AREA: GC LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 608 LONGITUDE: -

5. PLATFORM: - A (TLP MARCO POL

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY -

REQUIRED EVACUATION

LTA (1-3 days)

LTA (>3 days)

RW/JT (1-3 days)

RW/JT (>3 days)

Other Injury -

FATALITY

POLLUTION

FIRE

EXPLOSION

LWC - HISTORIC BLOWOUT

UNDERGROUND

SURFACE

DEVERTER

SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
 CRANE
 OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
 DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
 INCIDENT >\$25K
 H2S/15MIN./20PPM
 REQUIRED MUSTER
 SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
 OTHER

6. OPERATION:

PRODUCTION
 DRILLING
 WORKOVER
 COMPLETION
 HELICOPTER
 MOTOR VESSEL
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
 OTHER

8. CAUSE:

EQUIPMENT FAILURE
 HUMAN ERROR
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE -
SLIP/TRIP/FALL
 WEATHER RELATED
 LEAK
 UPSET H2O TREATING
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
 OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: 4300 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 144 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: ENE -
SPEED: 5 M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: S
SPEED: 4 M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: 2 FT.

At approximately 2350 hours on May 7, 2014, a fire occurred in the skid of the Flash Gas Compressor-B on the Marco Polo TLP. Shortly before midnight, two Platform Operators were working on the flash gas compressor when hydrocarbons were released into the compressor skid. In an attempt to restart the compressor, the Operators had drained condensate out of the 1st Stage Suction Scrubber "MBF-1180-B" into the compressor skid. Subsequently, the vapors reached an unknown ignition source (possible static charge). This may have caused a static charge ignition to the condensate in the skid which resulted in a secondary fire to the CLX cable trays networked throughout the facility. At that time, the Operators were outside of the skid and sounded the fire alarm. All Platform and Drilling Rig Personnel were accounted for during muster operations (73 total). Shortly after, the Fire Response Team deployed and were able to bring the fire under control. Although the Fire Team was able to suppress the skid fire with the firewater system, they were unable to control the rapidly expanding secondary fire with the water system due to reignition in the trays. CLX cables are coated with a petroleum based hard plastic cover and are used extensively on platforms in OCS waters for electrical applications. The fire was eventually subdued with aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) and BC fire suppressants.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

In an attempt to restart the compressor, the Operators drained condensate out of the 1st Stage Suction Scrubber "MBF-1180-B" into the compressor skid. This may have caused a static charge ignition to the condensate in the skid which resulted in a secondary fire to the CLX cable trays networked throughout the facility.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Although the Fire Team was able to suppress the skid fire with the firewater system, they were unable to control the rapidly expanding secondary fire with the water system due to reignition in the trays. CLX cables are coated with a petroleum based hard plastic cover and are used extensively on platforms in OCS waters for electrical applications. The fire was eventually subdued with aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) and BC fire suppressants.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:	NATURE OF DAMAGE:
* Numerous areas of clx wiring, runners and trays.	fire damage
* Piping	
* Hard plastic elevated decking.	
* Platform lighting and fixtures.	

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Houma District has no recommendations for the Regional Office.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

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24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G110: "Does the lessee perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and provide for the preservation and conservation of property and the environment? According to operator information received during the investigation, the operators on duty by-passed the liquid dump valve on the 1st stage suction scrubber MBF-1180-B on the Flash Gas B- Compressor. The unattended open by-pass valve was dumping condensate into the skid in order to bring the high liquid level in the scrubber down in order to restart the gas compressor. A large fire resulted with extensive damage around the compressor area. Rig operations were being conducted on platform at the time.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

08-MAY-2014

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

**Doug Sevin / Keith Barrios / Terry
Hollier /**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: **08-SEP-2014**