

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 09-OCT-2015 TIME: 0015 HOURS

2. OPERATOR:

Energy XXI GOM, LLC

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR  
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE:

G01619

AREA: SP LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 93 LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM:

B

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION (POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER Improper Installation

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
  - REQUIRED EVACUATION
  - LTA (1-3 days)
  - LTA (>3 days)
  - RW/JT (1-3 days)
  - RW/JT (>3 days)
  - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT
  - UNDERGROUND
  - SURFACE
  - DEVERTER
  - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

- 9. WATER DEPTH: 400 FT.
- 10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 20 MI.
- 11. WIND DIRECTION: SW  
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 12. CURRENT DIRECTION: SW  
SPEED: M.P.H.
- 13. SEA STATE: 2 FT.

1. On October 9, 2015 there was a fire inside the galley/diner that burned for over 8 hours. For at least 4 of those hours, the fire inside the galley burned contained, with both doors closed.
2. Attempts to enter the galley with an extinguisher to see what was burning were unsuccessful.
3. The two operators only kept the external fiberglass coverings of the buildings cool and wet with water from the platform's Fire Water Cooling System until additional help arrived.
4. The extensive damage to the insides and structure of the galley/diner was major due to the operator's valid decision to wait on additional help and equipment to adequately fight the fire without posing a threat to personnel and other environmental concerns. During the wait period, the fire spread throughout the entire galley/diner areas destroying potential evidence.
5. Simultaneously, the Person In Charge (PIC) at SP 93 A, after being notified, shut in the 8" Gas Pipeline (Gas Lift) to SP 93 B, and the 4" Gas and 6" Oil Pipelines from SP 93 B and began making emergency phone calls to Energy XXI Supervisory personnel. He then began making distress calls on VHS Channel 16 to any boats or vessels in the field, to provide assistance of any type to a platform with two personnel on board attempting to contain a galley fire. The M/V Canyon Runner (11 miles away) responded and headed directly to SP 93 B and by 12:50 a.m. arrived and stood by for assistance. NOTE: The M/V Canyon Runner was under contract with Murphy Oil. NOTE: There were several other vessels reported passing through the field or within 300 yards of the platform that did not respond to the distress calls.
6. Platform management and Safety Training Supervisors (STS) for Energy XXI were notified.
7. There were no personnel injuries and no serious threats to other platform equipment.
8. The fire was eventually extinguished once additional help arrived and with the use of the water cannon of the M/V Canyon Runner.

## 18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. The specific ignition source for the fire has been identified by 3rd Party Special Investigators as heat from the electric stove/oven transferred through the metal walls to combustible materials in the walls. Installation specifications require a 6" clearance at the rear and sides from combustible construction. The stove was secured directly to the rear and right side walls prior to the fire. Evidence indicates that heat transferred from the oven through the metal walls and to combustible wood panels, supports, insulation and wiring.

## 19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

1. The rental galley was pre-installed with its appliances and equipment before it was delivered offshore by Gulf Land Building Rentals representatives. The installation specification tag is located on the back of the stove, out of view.

## 20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1. Both operators were asleep in the overhead sleeping quarters above the galley at the time the Fire Alarm went off. Note: SP 93 B is manned by only 2 operators.
2. As the operators went to investigate the cause of the alarm, they became aware that the power to the building was off and the emergency lights were on. However, the Gas Generator was still running and the platform production lights were still on. As they reached the galley, they noticed a burning electrical smell coming from the galley and as they opened the galley door, they became aware of the thick, black smoke inside the galley.
3. The operators then started up the back-up Diesel Generator and put it in-service in lieu of the Gas Generator. Then they started up the Fire Water Cooling System Pump.
4. Then they "Pulled the ESD" shutting in the platform and all production.
5. BSEE requested that Energy XXI provide a follow-up investigation as to the specific cause for the fire.
6. It was noted by Energy XXI personnel that it is a common practice to leave the griddle burner on at similar locations throughout its platforms.
7. A request was made by BSEE to preserve the building for future investigation after it was shipped in.
8. Review of documents and permits provided to the BSEE Investigator indicated that Energy XXI had not officially requested approval for SP 93 B Platform to utilize and occupy the Gulf Land Rental Buildings, which included: the Galley/Diner and the stacked, Overhead 8 Man Sleeper. The structure has been on location since 2012 and in use for occupancy.
9. At the request of BSEE, Energy XXI provided 3rd Party Investigators to seek out the root causes. On November 13, 2015 Investigators with McDowell Owens Engineering and Forensic Investigations Group performed a forensic examination of the galley/diner that had been transferred to the GI Shore Base. Their preliminary results suggests that heat transferred from the stove, through the metal wall and on to combustible materials. The stove/oven was transported to a Covington office where it will be examined and tested. Their final report will be submitted for review. BSEE Investigators witnessed the examination.
10. There were two USCG Investigators coordinating this investigation with BSEE. Their conclusions and final report will be presented for review.
11. At this point in the investigation, the USCG Investigators will take Lead on the investigation and provide the appropriate actions, recommendations and guidance as required.
12. A follow up visit to SP 93 B on November 24, 2015, by BSEE Inspectors revealed that the replacement office/sleeper/galley was being "used" by the operators as office space. A request for usage or approval from BSEE has not been submitted. An additional G-115 INC has been issued with regards to the replacement building.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: **Rental Gally/diner**  
NATURE OF DAMAGE: **Internal Fire**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$25,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

1. Provide root cause and analysis for fire.
2. Request a Safety Alert concerning proper stove installation for offshore living quarters.
3. USCG request Gulf Land provide letters to their customer base concerning similar installation setups.
4. USCG request that other similar galley buildings be tested for heat transference with a heat gun.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-115 Authority 802 Enforcement W - Operations Not Conducted in Accordance with Approved Applications.  
G-115 Authority 802 Enforcement W - Operations Not Conducted in Accordance with Approved Applications. Request or approval for replacement building usage not submitted to BSEE.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**09-OCT-2015**

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

**Gerald Taylor / Daniel Woods / Eric Neal / Kimberly Criddle/Johnathan Fraser / Roberto Lopez, USCG/ Jeffrey M Benders USCG /**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**David Trocquet**

APPROVED

DATE: **15-JAN-2016**

# FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

*For Public Release*

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: **Heat from electric stove/oven transferrred through metal walls.**

2. TYPE OF FUEL:
- GAS
  - OIL
  - DIESEL
  - CONDENSATE
  - HYDRAULIC
  - OTHER **Multiple sources inside gally.**

3. FUEL SOURCE: **Combustible construction materials within galley walls: wood, paneling, insulation and wiring.**

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? **NO**

5. TYPE OF FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:
- HANDHELD
  - WHEELED UNIT
  - FIXED CHEMICAL
  - FIXED WATER
  - NONE
  - OTHER

# INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT



# INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

*For Public Release*

<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> INJURY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> FATALITY
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

WORK PHONE:

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: 5 YEARS

EMPLOYED BY:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

ZIP CODE:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> INJURY
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> FATALITY
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS

NAME:

HOME ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

WORK PHONE:

TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS

EMPLOYED BY: **Energy XXI GOM, LLC / 02375**

BUSINESS ADDRESS: **1021 Main  
Suite 2626**

CITY: **Houston**

STATE: **TX**

ZIP CODE: **77002**

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