Incident
Name: Naval Air Station, Brunswick (NASB)
Subject:
Report - Final
Incident Date:
3/28/1993
Incident Location:
Brunswick, Maine
Author:
Stephen Lehmann
USCG District:
1
Product:
jet petroleum #5 (JP-5)
Type: 1
Volume:
1,500 barrels
Source:tank farm
RAR: cattail marsh, rainbow smelt, shortnose and Atlantic sturgeon, striped bass, American shad, Atlantic salmon, smallmouth bass, common sucker, white and yellow perch, king fishers, wood ducks, and local song birds
Dispersants:
No
Bioremediation:
No
In-Situ Burning:
Yes
Special Interest
Topic(s): freshwater, cattail marsh, and riverine shoreline
Shoreline Type(s)
Impacted: unique command structure, Native American burial ground
Summary:
On March 27 or 28, 1993, it is speculated that a large mass of snow fell from the roof of a NASB fuel storage tank actuating a lever that opened a valve. With the valve open, some 63,000 gallons of jet petroleum #5, commonly known as JP-5, poured into the bermed area into an open-water drain. This drain led to a stream off site, eventually running into the Androscoggin River through a small cattail marsh. The open valve went undetected until passing motorists contacted local officials because of the strong petroleum odor. Local officials tracked the fuel to the NASB tank and secured it, then notified the responsible state and federal agencies.
The U.S. Navy (USN) immediately installed two underflow dams, one at the head of the marsh trapping oil in the upper marsh, and two at the main outfall of the marsh into the Androscoggin River. Sorbent boom, hard boom, and hay bales were installed at various locations.
The weather at the time of the release was 65° to 70°F and sunny with snow on the ground. There was an ice cover on the river and substantial snow in the marsh. By March 31 the weather had turned cold and a winter storm watch was in effect. The marsh was mostly frozen; only the main channels remained open. The area received 18 inches of snow from the storm.
Cleanup continued for several days using vacuum trucks and personnel using snow shoes; while deeper in the marsh waters, boats were used. An estimated 45,000 gallons of JP-5 were recovered.
As the thickness of the floating product decreased, so did the effectiveness of the vacuum trucks. Response agencies began to discuss other options; burning in place seemed to be a good potential solution.
The oil caused the death of two female wood ducks. No other casualties or injuries to wildlife were reported.
Behavior:
By March 30 the JP-5 had emulsified and it was estimated that 70 percent of the recovered liquid was an emulsified oil-water mix. The JP-5 volitalized slower that expected for a light oil. Navy jet fuel is specially formulated to lessen the risk of explosion when it is stored aboard ships.
Countermeasures/Mitigation: Planning for the in-situ burn included a small test burn; notifying local officials; putting the Brunswick, ME and NASB fire departments on stand-by onscene with charged fire hoses; identifying minimum weather conditions; establishing safety zones and safety procedures; building a coffer dam to restrict the upstream burn; and closing the NASB runways during the main burn. It was decided that two state DEP responders would start the burn, each wearing fire retarding turn-out gear.
The media was informed and the story of the upcoming in-situ burn was broadcast so the population would not become alarmed if a large dark cloud appeared.
The burn began late morning on April 6, 1993. The state DEP persons used sorbents pads soaked in JP-5 to light the marsh. The floating fuel ignited easier than was expected and burned remarkably well. The initial burn lasted almost two hours without needing to be re-ignited. The smoke was seen in Portland, 30 miles south and Augusta, 40 miles north and was recorded by NASB aircraft to be between 2,000 and 6.000 feet high. The burn was video-taped from a fixed-wing, single-engine USN aircraft by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).*&*&During the first day of burning, EPA technical assistance teams conducted air monitoring in the area. They sampled for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and particulate (PM-10).
As the initial burn began to subside, additional pools of JP-5 were ignited. The marsh was burned in various locations for eight hours. The cattail stalks that remained in the marsh acted as wicks in some areas, pulling the fuel from under the ice.
Responders continued the burn on April 7 in the ice of the Androscoggin River. Channels and openings were cut to allow fuel to seep in and a sorbent pad was used as a wicking agent. Responders returned the following day and burned the marsh for an additional four hours. These fires were considerably smaller than earlier ones, but continued to remove fuel. After three days of burning it was felt that the marsh should begin to flush naturally.
DEP crews returned to the original burn site on April 14 and re-ignited product remaining from the earlier burn and new product that had accumulated.
Other Special
Interest(s): The responsible party (RP) was the Department of Defense (DOD). Although the USCG remains the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for spills coming from a DOD facility, the DOD also acts as the OSC. Cooperation between the USCG and the U.S. Navy (USN) during this spill was outstanding.
A native American burial ground was near the staging area. Archeologists for the State of Maine speculate that the remains could be as much as 9,000 years old. Special care was taken not to unduly disturb the site.
NOAA Activities:
The NOAA SSC was notified of the incident on March 29, 1993, by MSO Portland while attending the International Oil Spill Conference in Tampa, FL. Also attending the conference were the FOSC, the State OSC, and the Department of the Interior and NOAA trustee representatives. The SSC provided resources at risk information and warned against cleanup workers walking in the oil marsh. The SSC worked on the spill from Florida until he went onscene April 2.
The FOSC asked the SSC to help gather and coordinate information with which to make a decision on in-situ burning, and to obtain approval from the concurrence network (as defined by the National Contingency Plan).
The International Oil Spill Conference proved to be an excellent forum to discuss in-situ burning because most of the key experts on that subject and on oiled wetlands were present. After discussing the situation, it was felt that burning over a frozen marsh would not put undue stress on the environment and would eliminate a large amount of oil before the return of many of the marshes seasonal inhabitants.
On April 15 the SSC met with the USN OSC, FOSC, and state representatives to review conditions caused by heavy rains. The rains raised the water level enough to overflow the underflow dam and render it useless. A beaver dam at the southeast of the marsh continues to hold water and some product. It was decided to remove the beaver dam to take advantage of the high water level to flush the marsh naturally.
References:
NOAA Hotline 121, 12 reports.
Research Planning Institute. 1980. Sensitivity of coastal environments and wildlife to spilled oil: Massachusetts. An atlas of coastal resources. Seattle: Ocean Assessments Division, NOAA. 49 maps.
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