History Detail
Incident Name: Ryuyo Maru No. 2

Subject: USCG Case History

Incident Date: 11/8/1979

Incident Location: Village Cove, St. Paul Island, Bering Sea, Alaska

Author: USCG Case History

Latitude: 57 10 N

Longitude: 170 20 W

USCG District: 17

Product: No. 2 Fuel Oil

Type: 2

Volume: 6190

Source:Non-Tank Vessel

RAR: Seals, migratory waterfowl, Eider Ducks, arthropods.

Dispersants: No

Bioremediation: No

In-Situ Burning: Yes

Special Interest Topic(s): Logistical or operational problems, unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, adverse weather conditions.

Shoreline Type(s) Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, vertical rocky shores, coarse gravel beaches, marshes.

Summary: On November 8, 1979, the fishing vessel Ryuyo Maru No. 2 grounded in 60-knot winds and 30-foot seas in Village Cove, St. Paul Island, Bering Sea, Alaska. The vessel initially spilled about 950 barrels of light oil and continued to leak for the duration of the incident. An initial survey found nine of 12 tanks holed. The ship's refrigeration system failed, releasing toxic levels of ammonia gas in the interior. Access to the vessel was complicated by the rough seas and a 200-foot high cliff at the grounding site. A makeshift, 90-foot highline was rigged from the base of the cliff to the ship. The only alternative mode of access was by helicopter, which was not always available because of weather. The Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Office (MSO), Anchorage, the predesignated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for the spill, sent a representative to the site on November 9. The owners of the vessel initially assumed responsibility for cleanup operations, but abandoned their responsibility on November 15, at which time the OSC took full control of the spill response. Explosives were used to vent dangerous accumulations of ammonia gas on November 20, and also to finally destroy the vessel on November 22. The response ended on December 5.

Behavior: No. 2 fuel oil has a minimum API gravity of 30, and a pour point between -6 and -27 degrees C. Initial reports from the LORAN Station on St. Paul indicated broken patches of oil in the water extending around Tolstoi Point and into seal rookeries. The oil was breaking up and dissipating in heavy weather with seas in excess of 20 feet. Village Cove and the saltwater lagoon connected to it were heavily oiled. Sheen and emulsified oil were found in Village Cove, Zoltoi Bay, and English Bay. Oil continued to leak from the vessel until November 22, when the vessel was destroyed. Much of the oil burned within the hulk and the remainder moved out to sea.

Countermeasures/Mitigation: The owners of the vessel hired Crowley Environmental Services (CES) to conduct cleanup operations. The Pacific Strike Team (PST) and CES arrived on scene on November 10. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation personnel and Environmental Protection Agency personnel began beach surveys on the afternoon of November 10.\\The shoreline at the site of the grounding was exposed to extremely high wave energy so that no cleanup activities were needed except for removal of oil soaked debris. The northern edge of Village Cove is a shallow, saltwater lagoon. The initial release of oil killed 50 percent of the arthropods in the lagoon. To protect seals and waterfowl, and to minimize further damage to the lagoon's ecology, booming of the lagoon entrance was attempted. However, the 5- to 10-knot currents in the entrance caused entrainment of oil and physical damage to the booms. An attempt was made to build a dam across the entrance to the lagoon. This caused severe scouring at the bottom of the channel as the dam neared completion, and the project was abandoned. A sandbag dike was built with an attached boom to deflect oil into a pit dug in the shore near the dike. Wind action helped collect the oil entering the edge of the lagoon where it was recovered with absorbent materials. Oiled shoreline in the lagoon was cleaned by manual removal using sorbents. Low-pressure washing of beaches and grassy areas, and hazing operations to scare birds from the oiled areas began on November 18.\\Five options were considered to deal with the situation, including: \•pumping oil from the ship to bladders on LCMs (Landing Craft Medium)\•bringing an ocean-type tank barge to the scene from Seattle for the oil transfer\•removal of the ship using expanding foam\•pumping the oil to the top of the cliff\•destruction of the vessel at a time when the weather would disperse it.\\Destruction of the vessel was the option chosen. On November 22, personnel from the United States Naval Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) and the Coast Guard destroyed the vessel by demolition. Thermal grenades were also used to ignite the oil and the nets which could not be removed from the vessel. The slick resulting from the destruction of the vessel moved out to sea and dissipated. Some of the 300 tons of fish and the fishing nets from the vessel came ashore after the explosion, and were cleaned up.

Other Special Interest(s): Between 10,000 and 20,000 seals inhabit St. Paul Island between April and November. Dead oiled seals were observed in the rookeries, but it was not known if the oiling caused these deaths or not; high mortalities are normal during this season. Fishing nets washed off the Ryuyo Maru caused additional mortality when seals become trapped in them. Dead, oiled birds were found; both seals and birds were killed by the concussion of explosives.\\Lack of housing and food for the response personnel and the personnel from the Ryuyo Maru No. 2 caused logistical and operational problems. Equipment for the spill response, especially transportation and fuel for the response personnel was in scarce supply on the island. Equipment and supplies had to be transported in from remote locations. making operations very difficult.\\The Ryuyo Maru No. 2's refrigeration system ruptured during the grounding, and released ammonia into the vessel. It was impossible to locate and seal the source of the leak because no self-contained breathing apparatus units were initially available.\\The vessel was inaccessible for lightering or salvaging operations because of extremely heavy weather. Storms, high winds, and cold temperatures allowed only minimal work to be done on many days.

References: •Reiter, G. Cold Weather Response F/V Ryuyo Maru No.2 St. Paul, Pribilof Islands, Alaska. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings. pp. 227-231. •USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report

Last Edit: 9/19/92