Incident Name: T/V Exxon Valdez
Subject: USCG Case History
Incident Date: 3/24/1989
Incident Location: Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound, Alaska
Author: USCG Case History
Latitude: 61 02 N
Longitude: 146 05 W
USCG District: 17
Product: Prudhoe Bay Crude
Type: 3
Volume: 240500
Source:Tank Vessel
RAR: Coarse gravel beaches, eroding bluffs, exposed bluffs,
exposed rocky shores, mixed sediment beaches, sand/gravel beaches,
sheltered bedrock bluffs, sheltered rocky shores, vertical rocky
shores, whales, seals, Sea Otters, seal concentration areas, seal
haulouts, whale migration routes, whale seasonal use areas, mustelids,
rodents, deer, bears, mammal population concentration areas, intertidal
feeding areas, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, alcids, shorebirds,
wading birds, gulls, raptors, bird rookeries, bird migration stopover
areas, bird migratory routes, bird critical foraging areas, fish,
molluscs, crab, beaches, marinas, subsistence, officially designated
harvest sites, State Parks, National Parks, commercial fisheries,
fish aquaculture sites, archaeological sites, Native American Lands.
Dispersants: Yes
Bioremediation: Yes
In-Situ Burning: Yes
Special Interest Topic(s): Wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation,
closure of commercial fishing areas, closure of shipping lanes or
vehicle traffic routes, human health and safety concerns, media
interest, research conducted, unusual or experimental cleanup techniques,
volunteer response and organization, logistical or operational problems,
habitat impact due to cleanup operations.
Shoreline Type(s) Impacted: Coarse gravel beaches, eroding
bluffs, exposed bluffs, exposed rocky shores, mixed sediment beaches,
sand/gravel beaches, sheltered bedrock bluffs, sheltered rocky shores,
vertical rocky shores.
Summary: On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, en route
from Valdez, Alaska to Los Angeles, California, ran aground on Bligh
Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The vessel was traveling outside
normal shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. Within six hours
of the grounding, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 10.9 million
gallons of its 53 million gallon cargo of Prudhoe Bay Crude. Eight
of the eleven tanks on board were damaged. The oil would eventually
impact over 1,100 miles of non-continuous coastline in Alaska, making
the Exxon Valdez the largest oil spill to date in U.S. waters. The
response to the Exxon Valdez involved more personnel and equipment
over a longer period of time than did any other spill in U.S. history.
Logistical problems in providing fuel, meals, berthing, response
equipment, waste management and other resources were one of the
largest challenges to response management. At the height of the
response, more than 11,000 personnel, 1,400 vessels and 85 aircraft
were involved in the cleanup. Shoreline cleanup began in April of
1989 and continued until September of 1989 for the first year of
the response. The response effort continued in 1990 and 1991 with
cleanup in the summer months, and limited shoreline monitoring in
the winter months. Fate and effects monitoring by state and Federal
agencies are ongoing.
Behavior: Prudhoe Bay crude oil has an API gravity of 27.0,
and a pour point of 0 degrees C. The bulk of the oil spilled from
the Exxon Valdez was released within 6 hours of the ship's grounding.
The general trend of the oil was south and west from the point of
origin. For the first few days after the spill, most of the oil
was in a large concentrated patch near Bligh Island. On March 26,
a storm, which generated winds of over 70 mph in Prince William
Sound, weathered much of the oil, changing it into mousse and tarballs,
and distributed it over a large area. By March 30, the oil extended
90 miles from the spill site. Ultimately, oil would extend more
than 500 miles from Bligh reef, oiling shorelines in Prince William
Sound, the Kenai peninsula, the Alaskan peninsula and Kodiak island.
Oil impacts in the Prince William Sound region were the most severe.
In addition to the storm of March 26, the spill occurred at a time
of year when the spring tidal fluctuations were nearly 18 feet.
This tended to deposit the oil onto shorelines above the normal
zone of wave action. The diversity in shoreline types in the affected
areas led to varied oiling conditions. In some cases, oil was present
on sheer rock faces making access and cleanup difficult, or rocky
beaches with grain size anywhere from coarse sand to boulders, where
the oil could percolate to a sub-surface level. The spill affected
both sheltered and exposed (to high wave/weather action) shorelines.
Once oil landed on a shoreline it could be floated off at the next
high tide, carried to and deposited in a different location, making
the tracking of oil migration and shoreline impact very difficult.
This migration ended by mid-summer 1989, and the remaining cleanup
dealt with oiled shorelines, rather than oil in the water. Cleanup
operations continued during the summer months of 1990 and 1991.
By 1990, surface oil, where it existed, had become significantly
weathered. Sub-surface oil, on the other hand, was in many cases
much less weathered and still in a liquid state. The liquid sub-surface
oil could give off a sheen when disturbed. Cleanup in 1991 concentrated
on the remaining reduced quantities of surface and sub-surface oil.
Countermeasures/Mitigation: The Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company was immediately notified of the incident and sent a tug
to the site to assist in stabilizing the vessel. At the time of
the incident, the Alyeska spill response barge was out of service
being re-outfitted. It arrived on scene by 1500 on 24 March. Alyeska
was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the incident; by March 25, Exxon
had assumed full responsibility for the spill and cleanup effort.\\Deployment
of boom around the vessel was complete within 35 hours of the grounding.
Exxon conducted successful dispersant test applications on March
25 and 26 and was granted permission on March 26 to apply dispersants
to the oil slick. Due to the large storm that began the evening
of March 26, much of the oil turned into mousse. As dispersants
aren't generally able to dissipate oil in the form of mousse, it
was no longer practical to use dispersants on floating oil during
this response.\\On the evening of March 25, a test in-situ burn
of oil on water was conducted. Approximately 15,000 to 30,000 gallons
of oil were collected using 3M Fire Boom towed behind two fishing
vessels in a U-shaped configuration, and ignited. The oil burned
for a total of 75 minutes and was reduced to approximately 300 gallons
of residue that could be collected easily. It was estimated that
the efficiency of this test burn was 98 per cent or better. Again,
continued in-situ burning was not possible because of the change
in the oil's state after the storm of March 26. \\Five dispersant
trials took place between March 25 and March 28. Corexit 9527 was
used for the trials. Four of the tests used C-130 aircraft with
ADDS packs, and one test was applied from a DC-6 aircraft. By March
29 the Regional Response Team (RRT) decided that dispersants were
no longer feasible.\\Because there was not enough equipment to protect
all the shorelines that could be impacted, Federal, state and local
agencies collaborated to establish shoreline protection priorities.
The agencies decided that fish hatcheries and salmon streams had
the highest priority; accordingly, containment booms were deployed
to protect these areas. Five fish hatcheries in Prince William Sound
and two in the Gulf of Alaska were boomed, with the largest amount
of boom deployed at the Sawmill Bay hatchery in Prince William Sound.
On April 15, the Sawmill Bay hatchery was boomed with 30,500 feet
of sorbent boom and 28,600 feet of containment boom in multiple
layers. As many as 15 to 20 boats were used daily for tending the
boom and oil recovery by towing sorbent boom. Overall, the deflection
of oil from the hatcheries was very successful.\\At the height of
containment efforts, it is estimated that a total of 100 miles of
boom was deployed. Almost all the types of boom available on the
market were used and tested during the spill response. \\Due to
the size of the spill, it was necessary to employ inexperienced
workers to deploy and tend booms, and this led to some boom being
incorrectly used or handled, and sometimes damaged. Some boom sank
because of improper deployment, infrequent tending, or leakage and/or
inadequacy in the buoyancy system. Other problems included fabric
tears in boom due to debris, and tearing at anchorage points from
wave action. In some cases, ballast chains were ripped off during
boom recovery if the boom was lifted by the chain. One estimate
suggests that 50 per cent of the damage to larger boom came during
boom recovery. For self-inflating booms, it was important to keep
the inflation valves above the water during deployment so that the
boom did not become filled with water and have to be replaced. \\Since
most of the containment boom was in 50 to 100 feet long sections,
several lengths of boom usually needed to be connected for deployment.
When several types of boom were used in one operation, there were
often problems with incompatible connectors between different types
of boom. Bailing wire and other adaptations were used in the field
for these situations. A universal type of connector (ASTM connector)
came with some booms, but these were difficult to handle and hook
up at sea and were hard to open once they had been submerged in
cold water. Booms to be re-used were hand cleaned early on in the
spill, and as the spill progressed were cleaned in one of the two
barges with mechanical washing facilities.\\To contain oil on the
open water, containment boom was towed between two vessels (usually
fishing boats) to surround the oil and then the two ends of the
boom were drawn together to close the loop and await collection
by a skimmer. \\Aerial surveillance was used to direct the deployment
of booms and skimmers for open water oil recovery. Visual overflight
observations as well as ultraviolet/infrared (UV/IR) surveys were
used by the USCG and Exxon to track the floating oil. Satellite
imagery was also tested as a method to track oil but was not very
useful because of the infrequency of satellite passes over Prince
William Sound (every 7 to 8 days), cloud cover, and lengthy turn
around time for results. \\The primary means of open water oil recovery
was with skimmers. In general, most skimmers became less effective
once the oil had spread, emulsified and mixed with debris. To save
time, it was most practical to keep skimmer offloading equipment
and oil storage barges near the skimmers.\\Weir skimmers were useful
for collecting fresh oil that was present in a thick layer on the
water. As the oil became weathered and laden with debris, however,
it was the simple weir skimmers that were the first to clog. Some
of the larger weir skimmers had auger pumps with cutters for chopping
debris and were able to collect oil for a longer time than the simple
models. \\Oleophilic disc skimmers also worked well while the oil
was fairly fresh. Once the oil became viscous and associated with
debris, these skimmers were not very effective.\\An Egmolap brand
paddle belt skimmer (Egmolap II) was used and was effective for
heavy mousse and debris. It collected very little water under light
sea conditions. A different paddle belt skimmer that was supplied
by the Canadian Coast Guard clogged easily when working with viscous
oil.\\When using rope mop skimmers, it was important to maintain
the smallest angle possible when lifting the skimmer out of the
water, so that the oil did not run down the mop and back into the
water. In situations where the oil was viscous, it was useful to
cut down the diameter of the mop from nine to six inches and inject
diesel oil into the ringers as the mop was being rung out.\\The
most used skimmers during the response were the Marco sorbent lifting-belt
skimmers that were supplied by the U. S. Navy. Once oil became viscous,
the sorbent part of the skimmer was removed and the conveyor belt
alone was sufficient to pull the oil up the ramp. The pump that
came with the skimmer had difficulty offloading viscous oil, so
that other vacuum equipment was used to unload the collected oil.
The Marco skimmers were generally not used close to shore because
they drawbetween three and four feet. In general, the paddle belt
and rope mop skimmers were the most useful for recovery of oil from
the shoreline. The skimmers were placed on self-propelled barges
with a shallow draft.\\Sorbents were used to recover oil in cases
where mechanical means were less practical. The drawback to sorbents
was that they were labor intensive and generated additional solid
waste. Sorbent boom was used to collect sheen between primary and
secondary layers of offshore boom, and to collect sheen released
from the beach during tidal flooding. Pompoms were useful for picking
up small amounts of weathered oil. Towing of sorbent boom in a zigzag
or circular fashion behind a boat was used to collect oil and was
more efficient than towing the boom in a straight line. Sorbent
booms made of rolled pads were more effective than booms made of
individual particles because these absorbed less water and were
stronger, and did not break into many small particles if they came
apart.\\During the Exxon Valdez spill response, a hopper dredge
was used to collect oil for the first time in the United States.
The oil was gathered using a containment boom, and the draghead
of the dredge was placed under the boom below the oil surface. The
oil was then sucked up and placed in storage containers on the dredge.
The drawbacks to using the dredge were that it recovers large amounts
of water with the oil and must be used offshore because of its deep
draft.\\To transfer the recovered oil, water, and debris mixture
from the skimmers to temporary storage containers, vacuum equipment
and positive-displacement pumps were used. Vacuum trucks on barges
or air-conveyers were most useful when used with an open-ended suction
hose with a diameter of 6 to 8 inches. \\Early on in the response,
storage space for recovered oil was in short supply. To combat the
storage space problem, water was decanted from skimmers or tanks
into a boomed area before offloading. As a result, the remaining
viscous oil mixture was difficult to offload, the process sometimes
taking up to 6 to 8 hours. High-capacity skimmer offloading pumps,
in particular grain pumps, were the most useful in transferring
viscous oil.\\Because recovery equipment was in near constant use,
several vessels were set up to perform field repairs and conduct
preventive maintenance.\\The oil remaining on the Exxon Valdez,
was completely offloaded by the end of the first week in April 1989.
After offloading operations were completed, the tanker was towed
to a location 25 miles from Naked Island in Prince William Sound
for temporary repairs. Later in the summer of 1989, the vessel was
brought to California for further repairs.\\Shoreline assessment
was a prerequisite for the implementation of any beach cleanup.
Assessment provided geomorphological, biological, archaeological
and oiling information that was used for the development of site
specific treatment strategies. Cleanup operations were scheduled
around specific activities such as seal haulout activity, seal pupping,
eagle nesting, fish spawning, fishing seasons, and other significant
events as much as possible.\\In 1989, hoses spraying seawater were
used to flush oil from shorelines. The released oil was then trapped
with offshore boom, and removed using skimmers, vacuum trucks (useful
for thick layers of oil) and boom (sorbent, snare, pompoms). For
hard to reach areas, or locations with weathered oil, heated seawater
was used to flush oil from the shoreline. \\Converted vessels and
barges were used for beach washing operations. It would take several
days to outfit a conventional barge with the equipment needed to
heat and pump the water. Smaller vessels that were used for beach
washing early in the spill were re-outfitted for bioremediation
later in the response.\\Along with the large scale beach washing,
manual cleanup, raking and tilling the beaches, oily debris pickup,
enhanced bioremediation and spot washing were used to cleanup the
oil. In some locations, oil was thick enough to be picked up with
shovels and buckets. In addition, mechanical methods were used on
a few sites, including the use of bulldozers to relocate or remove
the contaminated beach surfaces. Mechanical rock washing machines,
which were manufactured for the spill, were not used to clean contaminated
rocks and return them to the beach. \\Oiled storm berm was mechanically
relocated in some cases so that these areas, which normally would
not receive much wave action, would be more exposed and cleaned
by natural processes. If the oiling in the berm was significant
or persistent it was tilled to free the oil or washed to optimize
the cleaning. Recommendations were made to restrict the movement
of berm to the upper third of the beach to ensure its return to
the original location.\\Beach applications of dispersants were tried
in several locations. Corexit 7664 was applied on Ingot Island,
followed by a warm water wash. No significant change in oil cover
or the physical state of the oil was observed as a result of the
treatment. Some ecological impacts were observed in the treated
areas. It appeared that the effects were largely due to the intensive
washing more that the use of Corexit 7664, and were evident in intertidal
epibenthic macrobiota.\\In addition, the dispersant BP1100X was
applied to a test area on Knight Island. Toxicology studies indicated
that the upper and lower intertidal biota were different from pre-application
communities the day after dispersant application, and returned to
pre-treatment levels after seven days. \\Exxon also tested the dispersant
Corexit 9580 in Prince William Sound. The decision to approve a
large scale test of Corexit 9580 in August was reached after an
extensive program aimed at evaluating shoreline cleaning technologies.
The monitoring program addressed three major issues: migration of
oil and Corexit in shoreline sediments, the migration of sediments
and oil in the nearshore environments, and the migration of oil
in the water column, each being evaluated in the monitoring program.
The dispersant's effectiveness and impact were then compared to
mechanical shoreline cleanup methods, and this information was used
to determine whether Corexit 9580 should be used for shoreline treatment.
The Research and Development Committee evaluating the proposal for
dispersant use recommended against broad-scale application of the
product because tests had not adequately demonstrated that removal
and recovery efficiency outweighed possible adverse effects. The
committee recommended using Corexit only on Smith Island, subject
to continued review of the effectiveness of recovery procedures
by on-scene monitors.\\In May of 1989, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Exxon conducted bioremediation trials at two test
sites on Knight Island in Prince William Sound. On the basis of
these tests and other trials later in the summer, Exxon recommended
the use of the bioremediation enhancement agents, Inipol (Inipol
EAP22manufactured by Elf Aquitaine of France) and Customblen
(Customblen 28-8-0 manufactured by Sierra Chemicals of California),
and subsequently treated over 70 miles of shoreline in Prince William
Sound with these agents.\\Past scientific research had determined
that sufficient numbers of hydrocarbon degrading bacteria existed
naturally in Alaska. It was decided that the limiting factor in
enhancing petroleum hydrocarbon degradation was the availability
of nitrogen and phosphorus for the indigenous bacteria. As a result,
bioremediation trials focused on agents that were basically "fertilizers",
and contained no living microorganisms. Considerations in the selection
of bioremediation agents included ease of application, the possibility
of causing algal blooms and eutrophication in areas where nitrogen/phosphorus
concentrations would remain elevated (such as sheltered bays and
estuaries), the flushing of nutrients from the beach soon after
application due to tidal action, and the possible toxicity associated
with concentrations of nitrogen based compounds (such as ammonia).\\Winter
monitoring of the effects of bioremediation consisted of surveys
of more than 20 beaches in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of
Alaska. These studies determined that oil degradation had been enhanced
on the shorelines monitored, but some debate existed over whether
bioremediation was solely, or even largely, responsible.\\Cleanup
operations in 1989 ceased by the end of September. All parties involved
in the response agreed that continuation of cleanup into the Alaskan
winter would jeopardize the safety of cleanup crews. In addition,
it was speculated that the winter storms in Alaska could significantly
remove oil from shorelines, including sub-surface oil. By the end
of the 1989 cleanup, more than 25,000 tons of oiled waste and several
hundred thousand barrels of oil/liquid waste were collected and
disposed of in landfills.\\Cleanup in 1990 began in April and ended
in September. Surveys in the spring of 1990 showed that oiling conditions
had been reduced or changed over the winter. Surface oil in 1990
was significantly weathered but sub-surface oil was relatively fresh
in some locations. Cleanup techniques in 1990 focused more on manual
methods of treatment such as hand wiping and spot washing as well
as bioremediation. Mechanical equipment was used on a few sites.
\\Bioremediation was more extensive in 1990, with 378 of the 587
shoreline segments treated that year receiving bioremediation application.
In general, Inipol was applied in cases where surface oiling existed
and Customblen slow release pellets were preferred for treating
beaches with sub-surface oiling. Generally, beaches were given one
to three treatments over several months. Concern over the possible
toxicity of Inipol led to recommendations for application of only
Customblen on some sites.\\By the spring of 1991, the scope of the
cleanup effort was greatly reduced. Manual cleanup, bioremediation,
and very limited use of mechanical equipment were employed. Cleanup
took place from May of 1991 through July of 1991. \\An important
observation that resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill was that
natural cleaning processes, on both sheltered and exposed beaches,
were in many cases very effective at degrading oil. It took longer
for some sections of shoreline to recover from some of the invasive
cleaning methods (hot water flushing in particular) than from the
oiling itself.
Other Special Interest(s): The Exxon Valdez oil spill aroused
more media and public interest (both national and international)
than any other spill in U.S. history. Alaska is considered by many
to be a pristine environment that includes many species of elsewhere
endangered wildlife. \\In an effort to absorb and use input from
the multitude of groups concerned with the effects of the spill,
the Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committees (ISCC) were formed
to monitor beach cleanup progress. The ISCCs focused on identifying
strategic resource planning needs and consisted of representatives
from Exxon, environmental groups, private landowners, native groups
and state and Federal agencies. There were ISCCs formed in Homer,
Kodiak, Seward and Valdez.\\Concern over oil related wildlife mortality
was intense during the spill. The grounding occurred at the beginning
of the bird migration season. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife service
estimated that mortalities directly related to the spill range from
350,000 to 390,000 birds, especially common and thick-billed murres,
assorted sea ducks, bald eagles, and pigeon guillemots, 3,500 to
5,500 sea otters and 200 harbor seals. In addition, killer whales
may have been affected by the spill as their numbers in the area
declined shortly after the spill. Of the 1,630 birds (over 36,000
dead birds were collected) and 357 Sea Otters that were trapped
and treated by the International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC)-run
facilities (established in Homer, Kodiak, Seward and Valdez in response
to this spill), the total survival rate was 50.7 per cent for birds,
and 62 per cent for sea otters. These survival rates are considered
very good for oil impacted animals.\\Unlike birds, sea otters had
to be anesthetized to be washed which increases the risk to the
animal, and increases the cost of rehabilitation. The Sea Otter
rehabilitation program was complex, with a total of 29 veterinarians,
and 9 veterinarian technicians scheduled to provide 24 hour care.
The resulting cost of the sea otter rehabilitation program was at
least $51,000 per Sea Otter. The highest percentages of sea otter
fatalities (60 per cent) were recorded in the first three weeks
of the spill.\\Due to the magnitude and remote location of the spill
it was necessary to bring significant additional resources (equipment
and personnel) to Alaska to respond to the spill. Most of the response
equipment brought to Alaska early on in the spill had to be delivered
by air. Since the Valdez airport could not handle aircraft larger
than a DC-6 or a C-130, most large air cargo shipments went to Anchorage
and were transferred to smaller planes. In addition, many of the
facilities (such as barge hotels for personnel) and equipment (such
as hot water beach washing barges) was designed specifically for
this spill.\\Most of the affected shorelines were inaccessible by
land. Most of the cleanup operations were conducted from vessels.
Initially, fishing boats and other available craft were used to
house personnel. Later, a state ferry, Navy transport ships, camps
established on deck barges, and a self-contained semi-submersible
derrick barge was used for berthing.\\Besides other logistical problems
with assembling and organizing a large work force in a short time,
the majority of the personnel involved in the cleanup effort had
to be trained for their jobs as well as receive formal safety training.\\There
were commercial fisheries closings as a result of the spill and
great concern over the potential negative effect on hatcheries.
The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) canceled
the 1989 black cod season in Prince William Sound, banned fishing
for Pacific herring and cut short the shrimp season as a result
of the spill. It was determined in 1989 that at least 87 per cent
of the herring spawning grounds in Prince William Sound were heavily
oiled.\\In the winter of 1989/1990 and again in 1990/1991 the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducted monitoring
programs to determine the extent of the natural removal of oil over
the winter, and identify treatment issues to be addressed in the
coming cleanup seasons. These studies determined that removal of
surface oil between September 1989 to February 1990, for exposed
shorelines, was about 90 per cent; for sheltered shorelines and
those with intermittent energy, the removal rates were 70 per cent.
For sub-surface oil, the removal rate was approximately 55 per cent,
though this varied with the depth of the sub-surface oil impacts.\\Concern
by Alaskan residents, in particular native villages, over the possible
contamination of subsistence foods, led NOAA to conduct research
addressing specific issues of subsistence food safety. In general,
no quick method existed to quantitatively assess food safety, but
the overall guideline was that if the food had no visible oiling
or had no oily smell it was probably safe for consumption.\\The
results of the NOAA study indicated that in general, the aromatic
contaminant level in fish, varied little between affected areas
and the unaffected reference site (Angoon, in southeast Alaska).
The level of aromatic contamination in mollusks was higher than
normal (tissue levels exceeded 100 ppb) in the areas of Windy Bay,
Kodiak, Chenega Bay, and Old Harbor, with the highest levels occurring
in samples taken from Windy Bay and Kodiak. Mollusk samples taken
in other areas affected by the oil spill were generally comparable
in levels of aromatic contaminants to samples taken from the reference
site.\\At the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there were no
national guidelines established to indicate the levels of aromatic
contaminants acceptable in food. Results from the subsistence studies
indicated that higher levels of carcinogenic aromatic hydrocarbons
were found in smoked fish, than in the unsmoked fish samples obtained
after the Exxon Valdez spill.
References: Allen, A. A. 1991. Controlled Burning of
Crude Oil on Water Following the Grounding of the Exxon Valdez.
Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 213-216. Carpenter,
et al. 1991. Marine Operations and Logistics During the Exxon Valdez
Spill Cleanup. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 205-211.
Chianelli, et al. 1991. Bioremediation Technology Development
and Application to the Alaskan Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings
1991. pp. 549-558. Ciancaglini, RADM D.E. 1991. The Federal
On-Scene Coordinator's Role in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Oil Spill
Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 325-331. Dames and Moore
1991. Ecological Effects of BP1100X Shoreline Treatment on Knight
Island Prince William Sound, Alaska. Dames and Moore 1991.
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on Nutrients to Contaminated Shoreline in Prince William Sound.
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of Alaska Response. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 519-529.
Hayward Walker, A. and Field, L. J. 1991. Subsistence Fisheries
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pp. 181-187. NOAA Hotline Reports NOAA Response Report
Noerager, et al. 1991. Oil Tracking, Containment, and Recovery
During the Exxon Valdez Response. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings
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Evaluation, and Planning Following the Valdez Oil Spill. Oil Spill
Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 149-152. Varanasi, et al.
1990. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-191; Survey of Subsistence
Fish and Shellfish for Exposure to Oil Spilled from the Exxon Valdez
White, J. and Williams, T. 1991. Saving Endangered Species
in Major Oil Spill Cleanup Efforts. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings
1991. pp. 221-223. Wood, M. and Heaphy, N. 1991. Rehabilitation
of Oiled Seabirds and Bald Eagles Following the Exxon Valdez Oil
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Last Edit: 9/21/92
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