Incident Name: MV New Carissa
Subject: Report - Final
Incident Date: 02/04/99
Incident Location: 2.7 miles off Coos Bay, Oregon
Author: Sharon Christopherson
USCG District: 13
Product: number 2 fuel oil
Type: Type 2
Volume: 360,000 gallons (70,000 spilled; 200,000 gallons burned; 100,000 sank with vessel)
Source:non-tank vessel
RAR: sea lions, haulouts, gulls, diving coastal birds, national park, national estuarine research reserve
Dispersants: No
Bioremediation: No
In-Situ Burning: Yes
Special Interest Topic(s): In-situ burning, media interest, complex successful salvage operation
Shoreline Type(s) Impacted: Sand/gravel beach, coarse/fine sand beach, tidal mudflats, marshes, fishery closure
Summary: At 0900 PST on February 4, 1999, the M/V New Carissa, a 639-foot bulk freight ship of Panamanian registry, went hard aground in heavy seas about 150 yards off a stretch of remote, undeveloped sandy beach three miles north of Coos Bay, Oregon. Heavy surf and high winds throughout the next several days made boarding the vessel difficult and dangerous. While the preferred option was to salvage the vessel with the oil on board, the Unified Command requested that contingency plans for vessel lightering, cleanup and pollution response be developed. The longer the ship remained grounded, the greater the risk of it leaking its load of nearly 400,000 gallons of fuel oil. Moreover, a small group of endangered snowy plover was located approximately 800 yards south of the vessel. In fact, on February 8, shipboard personnel observed oil burping out alongside the ship from a small crack in the hull and on the beach near the ship. On February 9, a tug tried to pull the ship off the beach. But by then winds and waves had driven the New Carissa approximately 600 feet further shoreward, beyond the operational reach of the salvage vessel and its ability to safely anchor near the surf zone. The bow section was towed and sunk on March 11, 2000 in 1,811 fathoms of water 282 nautical miles off the Oregon coast. 58 Federal, state, county, and local agencies took part in the month-long response. NOAA, Oregon Fish and Wildlife, Oregon Parks and Recreation, DOI Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Fish and Wildlife, U. S. Forest Service, Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area and South Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve identified and prioritized sensitive environments potentially at risk. A total of 537 birds died (239 oiled; no endangered snowy plovers), with 201 birds at the rehabilitation center (172 oiled; no snowy plovers) as of March 1999. Media interest remains high. Thirteen months after the spill, NOAA and the Coast Guard continue to maintain the following incident web sites, which contain public press release information, Coast Guard pollution reports, and digital photographs: http://www.uscg.mil/d13/units/grunbend/airstation/grounding http://www.uscg.mil/d13/dpa/news As of March 8, 2000, these web sites had totalled over 45,800 hits.
Behavior: The vessel was carrying heavy refined petroleum products that ranged in API from 13.6-20.8. Heavier refined products, such as a Fuel Oil #6, Bunker C and Intermediate Fuel Oils, often consist of a heavy oil cut with a lighter product, such as diesel. If a catastrophic release were to occur under high wind conditions, on-scene observers would probably be able to report a sheen extending downwind from the vessel. The lighter cuts of oil would quickly evaporate, possibly within the first 12-18 hours of the release. The remaining heavier cuts could form a slick or thin film. If the pour point of the oil was below the temperature of the surrounding water (49°F), the oil would likely form a film. If the pour point is above 49°F, the product could appear as large globules or patties of oil. In either event, the high seas would quickly break the oil into smaller pieces or tar balls with little, if any, associated sheen. The resulting scattered tar ball field will be very difficult to observe using visual or remote sensing techniques. High waves could cause some of the fuel oil to form an unstable emulsion during the initial release. When these conditions persist over a period of several days, a more stable emulsion (mousse) with a typical water content of 30% is possible. If the wind and waves drop off the spill could produce a much more visible plume that could end up staining a longer section of beach. In the case of high seas and strong winds, some spilled oil may get mixed in and attached to suspended sediment. RESOURCES AT RISK The multi-agency environmental unit (Oregon Fish and Wildlife, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and NOAA) mapped and prioritized resources at risk for shorelines between Coos Bay and the Umpqua River. The unit conducted both aerial and ground surveys for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine mammals. The Coast Guard distributed these maps with the Incident Accident Plan along with specific operational recommendations for minimizing any potential impacts during salvage or response activities. These resource maps and protection strategies were used to update the existing South Oregon Coast Geographical Response Plan. Following the initial grounding on February 4, 1999 in the surf zone, the current high wave and wind conditions would rapidly disperse any released oil into the water column, putting nearshore benthic organisms at greatest risk of exposure. If the buoyant diesel fuel refloated when the weather calmed, birds and marine mammals would then be at risk. When the New Carissa's bow grounded at Alsea Bay on March 3, 1999, a new mix of resources were potentially affected because of the new grounding location, different coastal habitats that were potentially exposed (rocky shores and sensitive bay habitats), and timing (with both outmigrating birds and juvenile salmon now at risk). In addition, marine mammals could be at higher risk than in the month since the spill. The second grounding site was south of a harbor seal and Northern sea lion haulout at Seal Rocks State Park. California sea lions and harbor seals also congregate in the general area. Moreover, Alsea Bay and the Yaquina River are important estuaries for outmigrating salmon, including chinook and coho. Shellfish and the endangered snowy plover also use the area. The New Carissa remained stranded in two sections on the Oregon coast for over a month (the stern grounded on March 10), before the bow section was towed out to sea and sunk 1,811 fathoms deep.
Countermeasures/Mitigation: The decision to burn the oil remaining onboard the New Carissa was based on a number of factors, the foremost of which was that the ship's structural integrity had been compromised, and oil had been leaking out of the freighter, impacting the shoreline. Moreover, a storm system was predicted for the next few days, which would further damage the ship, and possibly cause the loss of the remaining oil. Monitoring for in-situ burning operations began, based on the Special Monitoring of Advanced Response Technologies (SMART) guidelines. Monitoring provided real-time ground level data on particulate concentration trends at selected locations, helping the Unified Command make informed decisions during the situ burning operations. The first attempt to ignite the oil failed, but the next day, February 11, the Navy EOD team used 400 pounds of explosives to rupture the fuel tank tops and a locally brewed napalm mixture assisted with ignition and helped sustain the fuel burn. The fire burned for 33 hours and successfully consumed about half of the ship's fuel load. The risk of a major spill had been cut in half. But there was still an estimated 130,000 to 155,000 gallons of fuel on board. Furthermore, due to the pounding surf, the ship had split into two pieces, a bow and a stern section. These sections began to drift apart from each other in heavy waves and wind. The re-ignition was by helitorch and a series of reignitions occurred during the afternoon. In general, plumes generated lofted up approximately 500-1,000 feet, drifted north by northeast, before dissipating within 1-3 miles. The Special Monitoring of Advanced Response Technologies (SMART) team monitored the reignition, but wind direction and plume behavior did not warrant deployment. The broken, grounded vessel continued to release oil. The greatest risk came from the bow section, which carried the majority of the remaining oil. On February 17, the Unified Command decided to tow the bow section to sea and scuttle it as the most effective way to prevent further discharge of oil. The UC decided to remove as much unburned oil as possible while waiting for tow preparations to be completed. Lightering would be difficult because of heavy surf and the oil's high viscosity. Approximately half of the nearly 400,000 gallons of oil on board the ship was burned, thus halving the risk of a major oil spill.
Other Special Interest(s): Recreational shellfish harvesting is closed in Douglas and Coos counties. The Oregon Department of Agriculture tested shellfish, clams, and oysters from the impacted areas for contamination. Background samples were collected before any reported oil release. Local fishermen, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Port Authority, Oregon Crab Commission, and NOAA discussed concerns and possible solutions.
NOAA Activities: NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinator, an
assistant scientific support coordinator, and two information management
specialists were on-scene for xx days. NOAA coordinated with the responsible
party's (Gallagher Marine Systems) spill management team and trustees
on cleanup issues and worked as part of the FOSC's incident command
staff to evaluate spill response issues. NOAA coordinated a working
group to review the oil chemical characterization data from the New
Carissa response and compare methodologies. This working group includes
chemists representing the five laboratories (NOAA, Washington Department
of Ecology, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, U.S. Coast
Guard Marine Safety Laboratory, and A.D. Little) analyzing oil and
tar ball samples from this response. After reviewing data and methodologies,
the group developed a consensus on fingerprinting oils for this response.
NOAA provided detailed analyses of wildlife and habitat at risk first
from the grounded vessel off Coos Bay and, later, when the severed
bow section grounded off Alsea Bay. The NOAA SSC worked on scene with
shoreline inspection teams to reach a consensus on "how clean
is clean." The Environmental Unit submited documents outlining
the shoreline sign-off process for impacted shorelines between Baker
Beach (south of Heceta Head) and the Coos Bay North , and for shorelines
from Heceta Head north to the Unified Command for approval. NOAA also
provided incident-specific weather updates for the duration of the
spill response.
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