UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: 07-AUG-2021  TIME: 1500 HOURS
   STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
   CRANE
   OTHER LIFTING
   DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
   INCIDENT >$25K
   H2S/15MIN./20PPM
   REQUIRED MUSTER
   SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
   OTHER Man Overboard

2. OPERATOR: Talos ERT LLC
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR: Quality Companies
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: G02572
   AREA: VR  LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: 331  LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: A
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
   EXPLORATION (POE)
   DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   INJURIES:
   HISTORIC INJURY
   OPERATOR CONTRACTOR
   REQUIRED EVACUATION
   LTA (1-3 days)
   LTA (>3 days)
   RW/JT (1-3 days)
   RW/JT (>3 days)
   FATALITY
   Other Injury

POLLUTION
FIRE
EXPLOSION

LWC
HISTORIC BLOWOUT
UNDERGROUND
SURFACE
DEVERTER
SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION
HISTORIC
>$25K
<=$25K

8. OPERATION:
   PRODUCTION
   DRILLING
   WORKOVER
   COMPLETION
   HELICOPTER
   MOTOR VESSEL
   PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   OTHER

9. CAUSE:
   EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   HUMAN ERROR
   EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   WEATHER RELATED
   LEAK
   UPSET H2O TREATING
   OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   OTHER

10. WATER DEPTH: 218 FT.
11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 86 MI.
12. WIND DIRECTION: SW
    SPEED: 4 M.P.H.
13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.
14. SEA STATE: 3 FT.
15. PICTURES TAKEN:
16. STATEMENT TAKEN:
On August 7, 2021, at approximately 3:00 pm, a Quality Construction and Production (QCP) Pipe Fitter (PF) fell through the grating on the plus 10 deck into the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) at Vermilion Block 331 on Talos Energy (Talos) platform A, while replacing corroded grating. Talos hired QCP for the construction crew, Paloma Energy Consultants LP as the Talos Company Representative (TCR), and Onward Safety LLC as the Health, Safety, and Environment representative supervisor (HSE) to replace the grating on the plus 10 deck.

On the morning of the incident at 6:00 am, the Talos Person in-Charge (PIC) held the pre-job safety meeting to communicate the job tasks and potential hazards on the plus 10 deck. During the meeting, the QCP supervisor, along with the TCR and HSE created the Job Safety Environmental Analysis (JSEA), Fall Rescue Plan (FRP), Approval to Cross Barricade Permit (ACBP), and Hot Work Permit (HWP) needed for the day. All forms were approved during the 6:00 am meeting. At approximately 3:00 pm the PF pre-cut the welds holding the corroded grating to the plus 10 deck supports. The PF realized he needed to take another measurement to fabricate the new grating section and walked onto the pre-cut grating. The pre-cut grating gave way and the PF and grating fell into the GOM. The PF was able to swim to the platform’s boat landing and self-rescue himself. The PF notified the QCP supervisor, the TCR, and the HSE of the incident. The TCR gave the order to continue work and did not report the incident to the PIC.

On August 9, 2021, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) conducted an on-site incident follow-up. During the incident follow-up, BSEE investigators collected all available documents and made a request for all unavailable documents for the incident. BSEE investigators interviewed the Talos PIC and were notified work was completed on August 8, 2021, and equipment and construction personnel had departed the platform. The PIC informed the BSEE investigators he had not been notified of the incident until the construction work was completed. The PIC then notified the Talos Field Foreman of the incident, the foreman arrived on location that day and started the Talos investigation.

BSEE investigators questioned the PIC on the events of the pre-tour safety meetings. BSEE investigators were informed JSEA, HWP, ACBP, and FRP are signed by supervisors (i.e., PIC, TCR, HSE, and QCP) without visiting the jobsite prior to preparing work permits. After reviewing documents received from Talos, BSEE investigators found the construction area on the plus 10 deck with deteriorated grating from corrosion was not barricaded. BSEE investigators noted on August 7, 2021, a ACBP was completed; however, the QCP crew made a decision that a barricade was not needed on the plus 10 deck. The PF wrote in his statement, he did not think he needed a safety harness because there was not an active open hole, even though a safety harness is required per the JSEA. After reviewing the JSEA, ACBP, and FRP collected from August 4, through August 7, 2021, inconsistencies were identified in procedures needed to complete the same job. Example, an ACBP was required in JSEA that was not completed. BSEE investigators have determined through the interview with the PIC and reviewing all the statements and documents, no alarms were sounded for a man overboard incident, nor was a ring buoy deployed to the individual that fell into the GOM.

BSEE investigators have determined a lack of direct supervision and complacency led to the incident. BSEE cannot determine how much deck time the four supervisors spent monitoring the jobsite activities, but have determined that none of the supervisors were on the plus 10 deck at the time of the incident.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
• Inattention to task - The Quality Construction and Production Pipe Fitter walked
onto precut deteriorated grating with extensive corrosion. The grating gave way and
the Pipe Fitter and grating fell into the Gulf of Mexico.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

• Inadequate supervision - The QCP crew took short cuts to complete the grating
removal and replacement by ignoring the required uses of barricades and safety
harnesses, while working on the plus 10 deck. The PIC, TCR, HSE, and QCP supervisor
did not correct the missing barricade and safety harness requirements.

• Inadequate pre-job meeting - The JSEA, FRP, ACBP, and HWP are approved without
visually verifying the jobsite is safe.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): $

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

BSEE Lake Charles District recommends that Office of Incident Investigations and Office of
Safety Management together draft a safety alert to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident
with findings in report.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 (C) 30 CFR 250.107 Personnel failed to conduct construction operations in a
safe and workmanlike manner, which resulted in a man and grating falling overboard into
Gulf of Mexico waters on August 7, 2021.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: 09-AUG-2021

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

Mitchell Klumpp / Scott Mouton / Joey Adams /

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR: Kim Jackson

APPROVED DATE: 20-OCT-2021